
# TLP: CLEAR





# Malware Analysis Report

## Notification

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### Summary

### Description

CISA received three files for analysis. The files included three webshells written in PHP: Hypertext Preprocessor (PHP), Active Server Pages Extended (ASPX), and .NET Dynamic-Link Library (DLL). The sample "sd.php" is highly obfuscated and uses rot13 algorithm, zlib for compression and base64 encoding for obfuscation. The "osker.aspx" webshell code was padded with junk code. The .NET DLL webshell is a .NET compiled version of osker.aspx. The samples are interactive webshells and have the ability to upload and manage files, create directories and files, and execute commands on the target machine.

#### Submitted Files (3)

6ce087b904af8a01aae73ac77d81822ad41799f89a5d301dce45191c897012aa (osker.aspx) b63c95300c8e36b5e6d3393da12931683796f88fd4601ba8364658b4d12ac05b (App\_Web\_jl37rjxu.dll) ea98368f6ecb5281654a6a9e4c649ef9b53860f1ee32340145b61e0e42e1072a (sd.php)

# **Findings**

### ea98368f6ecb5281654a6a9e4c649ef9b53860f1ee32340145b61e0e42e1072a

Tags							
obfuscated	trojan uploader webshell						
Details							
Name	sd.php						
Size	5934 bytes						
Туре	ASCII text, with very long lines, with CRLF line terminators						
MD5	f899d6cbe1be6395a0fa2a802b8eb579						
SHA1	e5f29cac0570665bc12f54a7e1894f139cc7b45e						
SHA256	ea98368f6ecb5281654a6a9e4c649ef9b53860f1ee32340145b61e0e42e1072a						
SHA512	6a9c23c3bd8a4b5f7301b80b7187ed6ae055a4e05e2b817800ddade99cb45e50bf3a96a57f9593aa8dfb49934ea48db a722ba3f4b0e8a8a634e6c86da335dcba						
ssdeep	96:8byUcBL9vPh8onLQKwz9UL0wJ0v7R/+B3Oam8WgbVxzbiMhrhRrwSLpVt8lTHGk4:icBL9vFnL1wzGL0tt /cVxzvhrhRZl4hO						
Entropy	6.110792						



## TLP: CLEAR

### Antivirus

**ESET** PHP/Agent.NPM trojan

#### YARA Rules

 rule CISA\_10443863\_01 : backdoor remote\_access\_trojan webshell exploitation information\_gathering remote\_access accesses\_remote\_machines anti\_debugging captures\_system\_state\_data controls\_local\_machine compromises\_data\_availability compromises\_data\_integrity fingerprints\_host installs\_other\_components

{ meta:

```
Author = "CISA Code & Media Analysis"
Incident = "10443863"
Date = "2023-05-11"
Last_Modified = "20230522_1200"
Actor = "n/a"
Family = "n/a"
```

Capabilities = "accesses-remote-machines anti-debugging captures-system-state-data controls-local-machine compromisesdata-availability compromises-data-integrity fingerprints-host installs-other-components"

Malware\_Type = "backdoor remote-access-trojan webshell"

Tool\_Type = "exploitation information-gathering remote-access"

Description = "Detects obfuscated and deobfuscated interactive PHP webshell samples"

SHA256 = "ea98368f6ecb5281654a6a9e4c649ef9b53860f1ee32340145b61e0e42e1072a"

strings:

```
\begin{aligned} & \$e0 = \{ 65\ 76\ 61\ 6c\ \} \\ & \$e1 = \{ 72\ 6f\ 74\ 31\ 33\ \} \\ & \$e2 = \{ 62\ 61\ 73\ 65\ 36\ 34\ \} \\ & \$e3 = \{ 67\ 7a\ 69\ 6e\ 66\ 6c\ 61\ 74\ 65\ \} \\ & \$e4 = \{ 73\ 68\ 65\ 6c\ 6c\ \} \\ & \$e5 = \{ 78\ 61\ 69\ 73\ 79\ 6e\ 64\ 69\ 63\ 61\ 74\ 65\ \} \\ & \$e5 = \{ 78\ 61\ 69\ 73\ 79\ 6e\ 64\ 69\ 63\ 61\ 74\ 65\ \} \\ & \$e6 = \{ 54\ 75\ 62\ 61\ 67\ 75\ 73\ 4e\ 4d\ \} \\ & \$s0 = \{ 58\ 30\ 4d\ 42\ 31\ 33\ \} \\ & \$s1 = \{ 74\ 75\ 6e\ 61\ 66\ 65\ 65\ 73\ 68\ \} \\ & \$s2 = \{ 70\ 61\ 73\ 73\ 77\ 6f\ 72\ 64\ \} \\ & \$s3 = \{ 6f\ 6e\ (\ 63\ |\ 43\ )\ 6c\ 69\ 63\ 6b\ 3d\ \} \\ & \$s4 = \{ 6a\ 61\ 76\ 61\ 73\ 63\ 72\ 69\ 70\ 74\ 3a\ 78\ 79\ 6e\ \} \\ & \mbox{condition:} \\ & \mbox{(6 of}\ (\$e^*)\)\ or\ (3\ of\ (\$s^*)) \end{aligned}
```

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

### Description

}

This sample is an obfuscated PHP interactive webshell. This webshell is encoded and obfuscated using rot13, gzinflate and base64 as seen in the following code: "eval(str\_rot13(gzinflate(str\_rot13(base64\_decode(((\$sym))))));" The obfuscated code is a string and is stored in the \$sym variable from where it is read and decoded upon execution (Figure 1). The webshell requires the password "pass" for authentication and uses the string "\$xyn='tunafeesh';" as a cookie to authenticate.

This webshell enumerates the local system it infects including the operating system, current user, directories, files and permissions. The webshell has the ability to create, rename, and delete files and directories. Furthermore, it has the ability to upload additional files to the affected webserver, run in Safe Mode and execute commands via cmd.exe (Figure 2). The webshell provides a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to the operator to perform these operations on the infected machine.

---Notable Strings Begin--eval(str\_rot13(gzinflate(str\_rot13(base64\_decode((\$sym)))))); tunafeesh pass TubagusNM






xaisyndicate garuda tersakti con7ext\_shell b374k shell X0MB13 X0MB13@REBORN.COM hxxp[:]//www[.]twitter[.]com/X0MB13\_ hxxp[:]//www[.]fb[.]com/xombie.xombie.7 onClick="xyn ---Notable Strings End---

### Screenshots





OMB13	III <b>Saftware: III Una</b> I <u>Gaer:</u> remnux uld:1000 gid:100	me: Linux remnux 5.4.0-77-generic #86-U 0 111 <u>Safe Mode:</u> OFF 111 <u>Directory:</u> /ho	buntu SMP Thu Jun 17 02:35:03 UTC 2 me/remnus/Documents/10443863	021 x86_64     MalwareSubmitted/sd	
				Upload: Browse No file selected.	
		0664			
		0664			
		0664			

Figure 2. - sd.php webshell interface. Threat Actor (TA) would have access to this interface remotely to conduct various actions like upload additional files, create directories and files, run commands and more.

#### 6ce087b904af8a01aae73ac77d81822ad41799f89a5d301dce45191c897012aa

Details	
Name	osker.aspx
Size	107843 bytes
Туре	data
MD5	fcb8a6a264d05f1689c9dce5824b217d
SHA1	001e4906879e78d567a30502638233f34292504a
SHA256	6ce087b904af8a01aae73ac77d81822ad41799f89a5d301dce45191c897012aa
SHA512	703437c5742f343cabc6023698e031f0c4167252e9679d4e4fd13d9703f27de21faa7edf275bd9a39c4b2e454a83c43d5 55849ae61a0897ac1da9ed6be820d4d
ssdeep	3072:K+mYWYJo8+p87xbsTttEtizQhch+mYWYJo8+pO:K+mYDnhch+mYDD
Entropy	6.343192
Antivirus	

IKARUSTrojan.ASP.AgentMcAfeeASP/Backdoor.iVaristJS/Agent.AIW

#### YARA Rules

 rule CISA\_10443863\_02 : backdoor remote\_access\_trojan webshell exploitation information\_gathering remote\_access accesses\_remote\_machines anti\_debugging captures\_system\_state\_data controls\_local\_machine compromises\_data\_availability compromises\_data\_integrity fingerprints\_host installs\_other\_components

# {

```
meta:
      Author = "CISA Code & Media Analysis"
      Incident = "10443863"
      Date = "2023-05-11"
      Last Modified = "20230522 1200"
      Actor = "n/a"
      Family = "n/a"
      Capabilities = "accesses-remote-machines anti-debugging captures-system-state-data controls-local-machine compromises-
  data-availability compromises-data-integrity fingerprints-host installs-other-components"
      Malware_Type = "backdoor remote-access-trojan webshell"
      Tool_Type = "exploitation information-gathering remote-access"
      Description = "Detects interactive ASP NET webshell samples"
      SHA256 = "ea98368f6ecb5281654a6a9e4c649ef9b53860f1ee32340145b61e0e42e1072a"
   strings:
      $s0 = { 3c 25 40 20 50 61 67 65 20 4c 61 6e 67 75 61 67 65 3d 22 43 23 22 }
      $s1 = { 62 61 73 65 36 34 ( 44 | 64 ) 65 63 6f 64 65 }
      $s2 = { 53 65 6c 65 63 74 20 2a 20 66 72 6f 6d 20 57 69 6e 33 32 5f 50 72 6f 63 65 73 73 }
      $s3 = { 53 45 4c 45 43 54 20 2a 20 46 52 4f 4d }
      $s4 = { 73 71 6c 63 6d 64 2e 65 78 65 }
      $s5 = { 63 6d 64 2e 65 78 65 }
      $s6 = { 49 49 53 20 56 65 72 73 69 6f 6e }
      $s7 = { 43 72 65 61 74 65 4e 6f 57 69 6e 64 6f 77 }
   condition:
      all of them
 }
ssdeep Matches
No matches found.
```

#### Relationships

6ce087b904...

Related\_To

b63c95300c8e36b5e6d3393da12931683796f 88fd4601ba8364658b4d12ac05b



#### Description

This sample is an ASP .NET webshell. The webshell code was padded with junk code for detection evasion. The beginning of the webshell code can be seen in Figure 3. It is possible to access the webshell interactively via browser to view the GUI as seen in Figure 4.

This webshell has the ability to enumerate drive name and type, software, operating system versions, processes, and users, and has ability to copy, create and delete files, directories and databases. Furthermore, this webshell is able to upload, download, run and execute commands using cmd.exe and sqlcmd.exe. This webshell has the ability to interact with and manipulate SQL databases. Furthermore, this webshell uses Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Management Objects to query processes, users and network domains. It is also able to encode and decode data using base64.

---Notable Strings Begin--osker 321 <%@ Page Language="C#" base64Decode Select \* from Win32\_Process Select \* from Win32\_Process Where ProcessID Add\_Table\_Row(tbl, "Server IP", Request.ServerVariables["LOCAL\_ADDR"]); Add\_Table\_Row(tbl, "Host Name", Dns.GetHostName() );//Environment.MachineName); Add\_Table\_Row(tbl, "IIS Version", Request.ServerVariables["SERVER\_SOFTWARE"]); Add\_Table\_Row(tbl, "IIS APPPOOL Identity", Environment.UserName); Add\_Table\_Row(tbl, "OS Version", Environment.OSVersion.ToString()); myconn = new SqlConnection(connections.Text); myconn.Open(); string command = guery; mycomm = new SglCommand(command, myconn); SqlDataReader dr = mycomm.ExecuteReader(); string query = "Select \* from Win32 Process Where ProcessID = \"" + processName + "\""; ManagementObjectSearcher searcher = new ManagementObjectSearcher(query); ManagementObjectCollection processList = searcher.Get(); ManagementObjectSearcher QS=new ManagementObjectSearcher(new SelectQuery(query)); ---Notable Strings End---

Screenshots

99	0D	0A	3C	25	40	20	50	61	67	65	20	4C	61	6E	67	™<<%@ Page Lang
75	61	67	65	ЗD	22	43	23	22	20	20	20	74	72	61	63	uage="C#" trac
65	ЗD	22	66	61	6C	73	65	22	20	45	6E	61	62	6C	65	e="false" Enable
56	69	65	77	53	74	61	74	65	4D	61	63	ЗD	22	66	61	ViewStateMac="fa
6C	73	65	22	20	20	76	61	6C	69	64	61	74	65	52	65	lse" validateRe
71	75	65	73	74	ЗD	22	66	61	6C	73	65	22	20	20	65	quest="false" e
6E	61	62	6C	65	45	76	65	6E	74	56	61	6C	69	64	61	nableEventValida
74	69	6F	6E	ЗD	22	66	61	6C	73	65	22	20	25	3E	OD	tion="false" %>.
ΑO	3C	25	40	20	69	6D	70	6F	72	74	20	4E	61	6D	65	.<%@ import Name
73	70	61	63	65	ЗD	22	53	79	73	74	65	6D	2E	43	6F	<pre>space="System.Co</pre>
6C	6C	65	63	74	69	6F	6E	73	2E	47	65	6E	65	72	69	llections.Generi
63	22	25	ЗE	0D	0A	3C	25	40	20	69	6D	70	6F	72	74	c"%><%@ import
20	4E	61	6D	65	73	70	61	63	65	ЗD	22	53	79	73	74	Namespace="Syst
65	6D	2E	57	65	62	2E	53	65	72	76	69	63	65	73	22	em.Web.Services"
25	ЗE	0D	0A	3C	25	40	20	69	6D	70	6F	72	74	20	4E	<pre>%&gt;&lt;%@ import N</pre>
61	6D	65	73	70	61	63	65	ЗD	22	53	79	73	74	65	6D	amespace="System
2E	57	65	62	22	25	ЗE	OD	0A	ЗC	25	40	20	69	6D	70	.Web"%><%@ imp
6F	72	74	20	4E	61	6D	65	73	70	61	63	65	ЗD	22	53	ort Namespace="S
79	73	74	65	6D	2E	49	4F	22	25	3E	0D	0A	3C	25	40	ystem.IO"%><%@
20	69	6D	70	6F	72	74	20	4E	61	6D	65	73	70	61	63	import Namespac
65	ЗD	22	53	79	73	74	65	6D	22	25	3E	0D	0A	3C	25	e="System"%><%
40	20	69	6D	70	6F	72	74	20	4E	61	6D	65	73	70	61	0 import Namespa
63	65	3D	22	53	79	73	74	65	6D	2E	4E	65	74	22	20	ce="System.Net"

Figure 3. - Beginning of osker.aspx webshell code.



Password			LOGOUT				
:							
•							
Select All Files To Downlog	Select All Files To Download ALL    Delete ALL Copy/Move						
	ars:    <u>New Folder</u>    <u>New File</u>						
Current Path:							
Name	Size	Date Modified	TO DO				
Editing File:							
Type Commands							
Result:							
connection string:							
select DB: Tal	oles:						
Run Query							

Figure 4. - Web interface for osker.aspx webshell. The webshell interface password is "321".

# b63c95300c8e36b5e6d3393da12931683796f88fd4601ba8364658b4d12ac05b

Tags							
backdoor	trojan webshell						
Details							
Name	App_Web_jl37rjxu.dll						
Size	163840 bytes						
Туре	PE32 executable (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows						
MD5	71323c956317b6b2c8e4ed4595ccfe5a						
SHA1	7ebd98f97f61cabff05438dfac34d0331ce233aa						
SHA256	b63c95300c8e36b5e6d3393da12931683796f88fd4601ba8364658b4d12ac05b						
SHA512	da3716aab9c9a8a85705c1372c4d75250dc021caa4f3b7566f6c142bdb3a45a063ec5f343b15b9be6056890768e80e 512f6ddbb86de178c475a160f56c0dad						
ssdeep	072:XEFKnpDtdlftAle66rOqhTG0t7x2lftAle66rOqhTG0:XEyJXmtQTO+ymtQTO+						
Entropy	.776030						
Antivirus							
Ant	iy Trojan[Backdoor]/ASP.WebShell						
Avii	BDS/Redcap.euknj						
Bitdefende	er Trojan.Generic.33706396						
Emsiso	ft Trojan.Generic.33706396 (B)						
McAfe	RDN/Generic BackDoor						
Zillya	Backdoor.WebShell.Script.653						

### YARA Rules

• rule CISA\_10443863\_03 : backdoor remote\_access\_trojan webshell exploitation information\_gathering remote\_access accesses\_remote\_machines anti\_debugging captures\_system\_state\_data controls\_local\_machine compromises\_data\_availability compromises\_data\_integrity fingerprints\_host installs\_other\_components

{



```
meta:
      Author = "CISA Code & Media Analysis"
      Incident = "10443863"
      Date = "2023-05-16"
      Last Modified = "20230605 1500"
      Actor = "n/a"
      Family = "n/a"
      Capabilities = "accesses-remote-machines anti-debugging captures-system-state-data controls-local-machine compromises-
  data-availability compromises-data-integrity fingerprints-host installs-other-components"
      Malware_Type = "backdoor remote-access-trojan webshell"
      Tool_Type = "exploitation information-gathering remote-access"
      Description = "Detects .NET DLL webshell samples"
      SHA256 = "b63c95300c8e36b5e6d3393da12931683796f88fd4601ba8364658b4d12ac05b"
   strings:
      $s0 = { 53 00 65 00 6c 00 65 00 63 00 74 00 20 00 2a 00 20 00 66 00 72 00 6f 00 6d 00 20 00 57 00 69 00 6e 00 33 00 32
  00 5f 00 50 00 72 00 6f 00 63 00 65 00 73 00 73 }
      $s1 = { 62 61 73 65 36 34 ( 44 | 64 ) 65 63 6f 64 65 }
      $s2 = { 53 00 45 00 4c 00 45 00 43 00 54 00 20 00 2a 00 20 00 46 00 52 00 4f 00 4d }
      $s3 = { 49 00 49 00 53 00 20 00 41 00 50 00 50 00 50 00 4f 00 4f 00 4c }
      $s4 = { 4d 61 6e 61 67 65 6d 65 6e 74 4f 62 6a 65 63 74 }
      $s5 = { 43 72 65 61 74 65 4e 6f 57 69 6e 64 6f 77 }
      $s6 = { 73 71 6c 71 75 65 72 79 }
    condition:
      all of them
  }
ssdeep Matches
No matches found.
Relationships
                                      6ce087b904af8a01aae73ac77d81822ad4179
  b63c95300c...
                     Related_To
                                      9f89a5d301dce45191c897012aa
Description
```

This is a 32-bit .NET Dynamic-Link Library (DLL) file. This sample is a ASP .NET webshell and is related to the osker.aspx file. These webshells may affect Microsoft Exchange Servers and IIS services exploited by the ProxyLogon vulnerability. This sample is a .NET DLL file that is created by the ASP.NET Runtime when ASPX script is seen for the first time on the system. The capabilities and functions are identical to the osker.aspx file.

# **Relationship Summary**

6ce087b904	Related_To	b63c95300c8e36b5e6d3393da12931683796f 88fd4601ba8364658b4d12ac05b
b63c95300c	Related_To	6ce087b904af8a01aae73ac77d81822ad4179 9f89a5d301dce45191c897012aa

# Recommendations

CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization's systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.

· Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.

- · Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
- Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
- Restrict users' ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators



group unless required.

- · Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
- Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
- Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
- Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
- Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its "true file type" (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
- Monitor users' web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
- Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
- Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
- Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).

Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, "Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops".

### **Contact Information**

- 1-888-282-0870
- CISA Service Desk (UNCLASS)
- CISA SIPR (SIPRNET)
- CISA IC (JWICS)

CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: <u>https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/</u>

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What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

**Can I edit this document?** This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or <u>CISA Service Desk</u>.

Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:

- Web: <u>https://malware.us-cert.gov</u>
- E-Mail: <u>submit@malware.us-cert.gov</u>
- FTP: ftp.malware.us-cert.gov (anonymous)

CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA's homepage at <u>www.cisa.gov</u>.

