





CISA ROADMAP FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

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CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
VISION	2
CISA'S ROLE IN SECURING AI	2
FIVE LINES OF EFFORT	3
• LINE OF EFFORT 1: Responsible Use Al to popular Mission	5
LINE OF EFFORT 2: Assure Al Sys	
LINE OF EFFORT 3: Preect Critical Interture From Malicious Use of Al	
LINE OF EFFORT 4 Collaborate with and Communicate on Key Al Efforts with:	the
Interagency, International Partners, and Pe Public	11
LINE OF EP 7 5: E and Al Expressise in our Workforce	13
CONCLUION	14
DEFINITIO	
Artific. telligence (AI)	
/ Surance	15
A ecurity	16
Receaming	16
Adversarial Machine Learning	16
APPENDIX Recent IIS Efforts on Al Policy	17

INTRODUCTION

As noted in the landmark Executive Order 14110, "Safe, Secure, And Tractworthy evelopment and Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI)," signed by the President on October 30, 2025, the safe and secure." As the nation's cyber defense agency and the national coordinator in a ritical infrastructure security and resilience, CISA will play a key reconstruction and managing risks at the nexus of AI, cybersecurity, and critical infrastructure.

This "2023–2024 CISA Roadmap for Artificial Intelligence rives as a guide. CISA's Al-related efforts, ensuring both internal coherence as well a lignment ith the whole-of-government Al strategy. This roadmap incorporates key CISA-leading to record by Executive Order 14110, along with additional actions CISA is leading to record Alexantity and support critical infrastructure owners and operators as they navigate one continuous Alexantic Property of Alexantic

The roadmap includes CISA's efforts to:

- Promote beneficial units of community capabilities and other aspects of CISA's mission;
- Protect the nation Al systems from cybers urity threats; and
- Deter malicious a prs' use of Al care ilities to threaten critical infrastructure.

llel cybersecurity challenges associated with The security challenge ed with Al pa previous genera cturers did not build to be secure by design, rity on the customer. Although Al software systems might differ from putting the by traditional ms of soft re, fundamental security practices still apply. Thus, CISA's AI roadmap builds on the ency' and risk management programs. Critically, manufacturers of Al systems m Ilow <u>secure by design</u> principles: taking ownership of security outcomes g product development with radical transparency and accountability, for customers, lea king secure by esign a top business priority. As the use of Al grows and becomes corporate into critical systems, security must be a core requirement and integral ystem ment from the outset and throughout its lifecycle.

VISION

We envision a future in which AI systems advance out ration's cyber defense, where our critical infrastructure is resilier and protected from malicious use of AI, and where AI developers for itize security of their products as a core business aquire.

SECURING AL

CISA's Strategic Plant 3-2025 underpins CISA's adaptation to the complete complete to and impacted AI:

GC L 1 | CYBER | FENSE. Al tools can help defend cyber pace against to ditional threats, as well as emerging Aldriver reats. However, Al-based software systems are also at require securing and necessitate cyber refense for all

RISK REDUCTION AND RESILIENCE. Critical infrastructure organizations increasingly use AI systems to maintain and improve resilience. CISA will guide and support responsible and risk-aware adoption of AI-based software systems at are secure by design.

GOAL 3 | OPERATIONAL COLLABORATION. As Al contributes to a rapidly changing threat landscape, CISA will communicate threat and risk information to the U.S. public, including <u>critical infrastructure sectors</u>. Furthermore, Al companies and Al use cases may be subject to targeted threats and may require specific services and protections in response.

GOAL 4 | AGENCY UNIFICATION. CISA will <u>responsibly</u> <u>integrate AI software systems across the agency</u>, as well as recruit and develop a workforce capable of optimally harnessing AI software systems to carry out CISA's mission.

FIVE LINES OF EFFORT

This roadmap represents our work to unify and acceled the CISA's All efforts along five lines of effort (LOE):

LINE OF EFFORT 1:

Responsibly use AI to support our mission. AA will a AI-enable software tools to strengthen cyber defense and support of critic infrastructure mission. CISA's adoption of AI will assure respected, ethical, and safe use—consistent at the Constitution and all applicable laws and policies, including the addressing federal procurement, privacy, civil right and civil libraries.

LINE OF EFFORT 2:

Assure Al systems. CISA will sist secure by design, ess and Al-based software adoption a diversarray of stakeholders, ngencies; private sector including federativilian g rnme n, tribal, an erritorial (SLTT) governments companies; and st through the t of best practices and guidance for secure evelop velopment and implementation. and ra ent A software

LIN OF EFFORT 3:

Pro at critical infra ructure from malicious use of Al. CISA will assess and recommend mitigation of Al threats facing our nation's ritical assessment in partnership with other government agencies d industry paramers that develop, test, and evaluate Al tools.

FFFORT 4:

Collaborate with and communicate on key AI efforts with the interagency, international partners and the public. CISA will ontribute to DHS-led and interagency processes on AI-enabled software. This LOE includes developing policy approaches for the U.S. government's overall national strategy on AI and supporting a whole-of-DHS approach on AI-based-software policy issues. This LOE also includes coordinating with international partners to advance global AI security best practices and principles.

LINE OF EFFORT 5:

Expand Al expertise in our workforce. CISA will continue to educate our workforce on Al software systems and techniques, and the agency will continue to actively recruit interns, fellows, and future employees with Al expertise. CISA will ensure that internal training reflects—and new recruits understand—the legal, ethical, and policy aspects of Al-based software systems in addition to the technical aspects.












effectiveness and vice measurements of performance is challenging and will require an ongoing effort—with continuous refinements as

needed—throughout the life of the plan.

RESPONSIBLY USE AI TO SUPPORT OUR MISSION





- 1 | CISA assesses our cybersecurity programs for potential uses of AI and provides the resources, requirements, and oversight to incorporate AI where appropriate.
- 2 | Through the reconsible use of AI tools, Connetwork defenders proactive mitted threats to critical network before changing intrusit occur.

MEASURE APPROACH

Increased responsible uses of Al software to across CISA workflows.

OBJECTION 1 | Establishing governance and oversight governance and oversight

CISA will establish robust Al governance processes to coordinate actions across the agency. This will include developing ethical and safety oversight processes as well as legal procurement, privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties considerations. Responsible use will be central to our eation of Al.

To promote responsible AI use, CISA will:

- Create our own <u>NIST AI Risk Management Framework</u>
 (<u>RMF</u>) profile to help develop and implement security
 and privacy controls for AI;
- Implement a programmatic structure for Al adoption within cyber defense missions;
- Review active Al use cases;
- Develop workplace guidance for generative technologies; and,
- Address Al data requirements and uses.

OBJECTIVE 1.2 | Collect, review, and prioritize Al use cases to support CISA missions.

CISA will create an agency AI Use Case Inventory to collect, review, and prioritize AI use cases supporting our missions. This inventory will encompass improvements to existing IT systems, collaboration tools, workflows, critical infrastructure defense programs, and proposed data collections for training AI models.





OBJECTIVE 1.3 | Develop an adoption strength for the next generation of Al-enabled technological strength for the next generation of th

To stay ahead of the adoption curve w ing privacy and civil rights protections, CISA will losely ainate Al-r research and development effort to targe ps in m needs. These initiatives include th dentifica aseline safety and ghts, the responsible practices for AI to prote d, and the development creation of a safe and re Al test rity use cases. of technical requirements to

OBJECTIVE Incorporate cyber defense, incident management, a credres rocedures into AI systems and processes.

CISA all equiplish incident response capabilities for Al usage, including emedy and redress procedures when necessary. In addition, and will adopt an approach for continuous evaluation of Al models the reviewing IT security practices to securely integrated Al technology.

OBJECT VE 1.5 | Examine holistic approaches to limiting bias se at CISA.

CISA will explore holistic approaches to limit bias in Al use, identifying potential bias points in the development, testing, implementation, and maintenance processes in order to build in fairness. Beyond exploring bias and mitigation strategies, CISA will develop a quality assessment for training data and public notice of our Al Use Case Inventory.

OBJECTIVE 1.6 | Responsibly and securely deploy AI systems to support CISA's cybersecurity mission.

Responsible and secure Al deployment aligns with CISA's core cybersecurity mission. To help ensure this, CISA will explore the identification, testing, evaluation, and deployment of Al capabilities for cyber defense, including detection of vulnerabilities in critical U.S. government software, systems, and networks, and we will document the lessons learned.

ASSURE AL SYSTEMS

CISA will assess and assist secure by design Al-based software adoption across a diverse array of stakeholders, including federal civilian government agencies; private sector companies; and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments through the development of best practices and guidance for secure and resilient Al software development and implementation



REPRESENTATIVE OUTCOMES

- 1 | CISA identifies cybersecurity risks, and security resilience challenges a early as possible during AI adoptito mitigate threats to critical infrastructure.
- 2 | CISA adapts existing to the guidance and service offering to Al software system, including pest practices for red to ming Al and for making Al so the anal is secure by design.
- 3 | Stalk hole, anderstand w Al-specific vulners and sit into the existing coording ed vul. ability disclosure less.

MEASUREME APPROACH

Increased adherence to CISA risk guidance and best practices for AI software deployment, including guidance on red teaming and vulnerability mangement.

A Second Property of Alaca Second Property of

CISA who sess potential risks related to the use of Al in critical in astructure sectors, including ways in which depriving Al may make critical infrastructure systems mor vulnerable to critical failures, physical attacks, and cylinattacks. CISA will then consider ways to mitigate the vulnerabilities. Additionally, CISA will incorporate the NIST Al Risk Management Framework (Al RMF 1.0), as well as other appropriate security guidance, into relevant safety and security guidelines and best practices for use by critical infrastructure owners and operators.

OBJECTIVE 2.2 | Engage critical infrastructure stakeholders to determine security and resilience challenges of Al adoption.

CISA will engage with critical infrastructure stakeholders to assess and address the use of Al across critical infrastructure sectors.

OBJECTIVE 2.3 | Capture the breadth of AI systems used across the federal enterprise.

CISA will evaluate <u>Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)</u> toolchains, including SBOM format standards and automated SBOM collection and translation software, to confirm coverage of AI software.





OBJECTIVE 2.4 | Develop best practices and guidance for acquisition, development, and peration of secure AI systems.

CISA will develop best practices and counce for the acquisition, development, an operation of secure of systems. We will also provide a dance for the cure use of AI technologies and will integrate this guidance into the Cybersecurity Personnee Goal pertaining to AI and related systems.

OBJECTI 2.5 | Display adoption of strong vulnerability management practice for Al systems.

ISA will a velope als and techniques to harden and test a vertex, as well a incorporate appropriate outputs of adversal ML processes and AI system vulnerabilities into the lational Vulnerability Database. This includes conductive an operational test of an AI vulnerability in the Corplinate Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) process, as well a writing strategic guidance for security testing and red raming AI systems and software, particularly Open Society Corplinate.

OBJECTIVE 2.6 | Incorporate AI systems into Secure by Design initiative.

CISA champions a secure by design approach to developing and manufacturing technology products, ensuring manufacturers design products with security in mind at the onset, so consumers receive products that are secure right out of the box. To encourage a secure by design approach to AI software and products, CISA will integrate AI security into the Secure by Design program and will develop a research pipeline to continually understand and project ways to support AI systems security.

PROTECT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM MALICIOUS USE OF AI





REPRESENTATIVE OUTCOMES

- 1 | Through engagement with stakeholders, including tabletop exercises focused on Al-enhance attacks, CISA protects Al systems from adversarial manipulation or abuse.
- e advano 2 | CISA support hent of Al risk manage. nt prag across the critical in ture community through the blication and dia ination of dec suppor nate such as a nt guio A risks to manager critical intestru

MEASUREME APPROACH:

Number of publications and engagements that support shared awareness of emerging Al-related risks and advances in Al risk management practices.

JECTIVE 3.1 Regularly engage industry seven older partners that are developing AI tools to assess and address security concerns to critical infrasticture and evaluate methods for educating artners and stakeholders.

ISA will build on existing structures to advance industry collaboration and coordination around Al security. The Information Technology Sector Coordinating Council's Al Working Group, which was established in March 2023, will continue to provide advice on Al security challenges and feedback on agency Al initiatives.

CISA will also stand up an operational effort in the <u>Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC)</u>, JCDC.Al, to catalyze focused collaboration around threats, vulnerabilities, and mitigations affecting Al systems. The JCDC effort will also explore potential operational planning efforts that bring together Al providers and critical infrastructure operators to address specific risks.



OBJECTIVE 3.2 | Use CISA partnerships and working groups to share information on Al-driven threats.

CISA will use agency partnership and working groups, including JCDC.AI, to state information on AI-driven threats. The agency vill engage adustry, federal, and international partners to a derstand emerging threats and stare the broader commuity.

OBJECTIVE Assess All sks to critical infrastructure.

rastructure secor has a unique Each critical apabilities. As adversaries adopt ا softw systems and as Al expands Al-ena the cybe eat lan ppe, CISA will publish mater s to se awareness of emerging risks. CISA so evalua sisk management approaches methodologies to determine the appropriate vtical framework for the assessment atment of AI risks and will identify ecesty enhancements.



COLLABORATE WITH AND COMMUNICATE ON KEY AI EFFORTS WITH THE INTERAGENCY, INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS, AND THE PUBLIC



CISA will contribute to DHS-led and interagency processes Al-enabled software. This LOE includes developing policy approaches for U.S. government's overall national strategy on Al and supporting a with of-DHS approach on Al-based-software policy issues. This LOE are included pordinating with international partners to advance global Al best practice, and priceles.

REPRESENTATIVE OUTCOMES

1 | CISA stakeholders are aligned a fund clear guidance for AI security

MEASUREMENT APPROACH

Proportion of Al-focused guidance and policy documents developed in collaboration with U.S. interagency and international partners.

OBJECTIVE 4.1 | Support the development of a whole: OHS approach. All policy issues.


CISA will apport to levelopment of a whole-of-todS are road. All policy issues. As CISA development of a gency-specific All efforts, we will closely a trainate with DHS entities, including the tdS Al Task Force.

OBJECTIVE 4.2 | Participate in interagency policy meetings and interagency working groups on AI.

CISA will attend interagency meetings to foster coherent and collaborative approaches to federal government Al policy.

OBJECTIVE 4.3 | Develop CISA policy positions that take a strategic, national level perspective for AI policy documents, such as memoranda and other products.

CISA will develop policy positions that take a strategic, national level perspective for AI policy documents and ensure alignment of CISA strategies, priorities, and policies with interagency doctrine. CISA will drive policy decisions to support critical infrastructure equities and integrate national strategic level perspectives in key AI policy documents. Additionally, to increase public awareness about AI assurance, CISA will develop AI assurance publications.






OBJECTIVE 4.4 | Ensure CISA strategy, priorities, and policy framework align with interagency policies and strategy.

CISA will work across the intermency to ensure CISA policies and strategies and with the whole-of-government approach to Al

OBJECTIVE 4.5 | Engine with pernation partners surrounding obal AI surj

CISA will a selop and to-seal guidance for Al security with our inderal sencies and internal partners. SA vill engage with international partners surrounding global Al security an ancouranthe adoption of international best practices for some Al.



EXPAND AI EXPERTISE IN OUR WORKFORCE

CISA will continue to educate our workforce on Al software systems and techniques, and the agency will continue to actively recruit interns, fellows, and future employees with Al expertise. CISA will ensure that internal training reflects—and new recruits understand—the legal, ethical, and policy aspects of Al-based software systems in addition to the technical aspects.



REPRESENTATIVE OUTCOMES

1 | CISA hires, trains, and retains a workforce with AI expertise.

OBJECTIVE 5.1 | Connect and an entry Al expertise that already exists in Class workforce

defense ency, the CISA As the nation's cyb team includes a ong work ce of cybersecurity experts. The agend yill id existing AI expertise s CISA. We will also developen Al communit f practice for engage cross the ag y, as well as maintain from ear division leading Al key poin of co. activities ositions ency for a collaborative and cohes roach to expanding our Al capabiliti

OBJECTIVE 5.2 Recruit interns, fellows, and staff with AI expertise.

CISA will recruit interns, fellows, and staff with Al expertise. CISA will use a variety of pathways, including the Cyber Talent Management System (CTMS), for recruiting, developing, and maintaining our Al workforce.

ME SURL ENT APPROACH

ncreased Al expertise in the CISA workforce.

OBJECTIVE 5.3 | Educate CISA's workforce on Al.

CISA will provide training and education opportunities for employees on an ongoing basis as part of our plan to help our workforce have the knowledge and skills to engage, innovate, and apply appropriately the current and emerging capabilities afforded by AI.

OBJECTIVE 5.4 | Ensure internal training not only reflects technical expertise, but also incorporates legal, ethical, and policy considerations of Al implementation across all aspects of CISA's work.

CISA will provide access to training that includes objectives on legal, ethical, and policy aspects of implementing Al.

CONCLUSION

s the A whole-of-government approach is needed to ılly harı initiative benefits and mitigate the risks of Al. Through th in this roadmap, CISA strives toward our vision o nation in Al systems advance our nation's cylefense, w re our critical infrastructure is resilient and protected. malic is use of Al, and where Al developers prioritize security or .. ducts as a core business requirement.

KEY DEFINITIONS

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI)

Within this document, "Artificial intelligence" (Al) has the meaning¹ set forth in the <u>National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020</u> (enacted as Division E of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283), Section 5002(3):

A machine-based system that can, for a given set of human-defined objectives, make predictions, recommendations or decisions influencing real or virtual environments.

Artificial intelligence systems use machine and human-based inputs to:

- (A) perceive real and virtual environment
- (B) abstract such perception and models through analysis in an average mated manner; and,
- (C) use model inference formulate options for information action.

All encompasses machine learning which, according to Exercive Order 14110 is "a set of telepiques the can be used to train All algorithms and the period ce on a task based on do

AI ASSURANCE

Many terms are shared veen the and information security co but the same term carry ent and incompatible meaning Because th comm roadmap is relevant to this document incorpora s both set. oth communities meanings. example, al use of "assurance" have a veloped s indepe ntly since at e 1980s:

at all or ges of the Al engineering lifecycle ensure that any elligent system is prouding at any elligent system is prouding at comes that are valid, verified, ta-driven, estworthy and explainable to a layman, ethical in the context of its ployment, unbiased in its learning, and fair the users."²

SECURITY ASSURANCE: "Measure of confidence that the security features, practices, procedures, and architecture of an information system accurately mediate and enforce the security policy."³

When this document simply says "assurance" or uses another shared term without distinguishing the origin, this document incorporates **both** communities' meanings.

¹ There a prior statutory definitions for artificial intelligence. The "Al in Government Act of 2020" (P.L. 116-260, Division U, Title I, codified a U.S.C. § 11301, note), listed earlier in this document, uses the definition from § 238(g) of the John S. McCain National Defense Augustion Act for Fiscal Year 2019, (P.L. 116-232, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2358 note).

The ter artificial intelligence" includes the following:

⁽¹⁾ Any an afficial system that performs tasks under varying and unpredictable circumstances without significant human oversight, or that can learn from experience and improve performance when exposed to data sets.

⁽²⁾ An artificial system developed in computer software, physical hardware, or other context that solves tasks requiring human-like perception, cognition, planning, learning, communication, or physical action.

⁽³⁾ An artificial system designed to think or act like a human, including cognitive architectures and neural networks.

⁽⁴⁾ A set of techniques, including machine learning, that is designed to approximate a cognitive task.

⁽⁵⁾ An artificial system designed to act rationally, including an intelligent software agent or embodied robot that achieves goals using perception, planning, reasoning, learning, communicating, decision making, and acting.

² Batarseh FA, Freeman L, Huang CH. A survey on artificial intelligence assurance. Journal of Big Data. 2021 Apr 26;8(1):60. <u>A survey on artificial intelligence assurance</u> | Journal of Big Data (springer.com)

AI SECURITY

Al Security is a term encompassing several different categories of cybersecurity, including the three key categories addressed in this roadmap:

1. Applications of Al for cybersecurity: CISA actively leverages Al tools for threat detection, prevention, and vulnerability assessments.

2. Cybersecurity of Al-enabled systems:

CISA is applying traditional cybersecurity principles and practices to protect and secure Al-enabled systems. In addition to being well-positioned to leverage our existing expertise, CISA is advancing Alenabled systems security through efforts to promote secure by design best practices for Al-enabled software systems.

3. Threats from Adversarial

CISA, in collaboration with ner parts of DHS, will focus on research development, and acquisition of tools to prove the resilience of federal civilial ecutive branch (FCEB) age tical infrastructure tect th ns from mancious agencies ar organiza uses of A

RED TEAMIN

red team are a structured testing effort to and flavoration and interesting effort to and flavoration and interesting effort to and flavoration with developers of and collaboration with developers of Al systems. Al red-teaming is most often performed by dedicated 'red teams' that adopt adversarial methods to identify flaws, vulnerabilities, or logic errors, such as harmful or discriminatory outrots from an Al system, unforeseen or uncesirable system behaviors, limitation for potential risks associated with the suse of the system."

The goals of security ting an teaming (whether on A ystems o are to identify vulnerabil es in a sys and better age the as ciated security hersed posture During rity red team assess nt, a red tea. te pts to gain organization's terprise cess to gger a security response ork and e organ tion's people, processes, fron or teg

VERSAR MACHINE LEARNING

alicious cyber actors target vulnerabilities ughout the Al supply chain to cause cern behavior, unintended by the system owner or operator, in machine learning (ML) systems—referred to as adversarial machine learning. For example, malicious actors may manipulate training data, affect the performance of the ML model's classification and regression, or exfiltrate sensitive ML model information. For more information on adversarial machine learning, including information on types of activity, see National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technical Series **Publication Adversarial Machine Learning:** A Taxonomy and Terminology of Attacks and Mitigations and MITRE ATLAS Adversarial Machine Learning 101.5

³ NIST SP 800-39, Managing Information Security Risk Organization, Mission, and Information System View. This definition is also very similar to the international IETF definition in RFC 4949.

⁴CISA Cybersecurity Advisory: CISA Red Team Shares Key Findings to Improve Monitoring and Hardening of Networks

⁵ Poison Training Data. MITRE ATLAS™ (Adversarial Threat Landscape for Artificial-Intelligence Systems) Techniques. https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0020/.

APPENDIX

RECENT U.S. EFFORTS ON AI POLICY

Recent actions taken by the U.S. government's executive and legislative bunches related to Al-based software systems reflect the need to marshal a harmal effort to defend critical infrastructure and government networks and assets, work with params across government and industry, and expand existing services and programs or federal civilia. Incies and critical infrastructure owners and operators. The flowing to antiefforts guide CISA's actions in this plan:

Executive Order 14110 "Safe, Secure, And Trustword, And Trustword, And Use of Artificial Intelligence (Al)." (October 2023) This is ofocused in east of that Al is safe and secure. This will require robust, reliable, repeatable, and part indized evaluations of Al systems, as well as policies, institutions, and mechanisms to the understand, and mitigate risks from these systems before they are put tracse.

m Leading Arti ial Intelligence Companies to Manage the **Voluntary Commitments f** Risks Posed by Al. (Update September 202 The Biden-Harris administration has secured nding Al comp voluntary commitments from ies to help move toward safe, secure, and transparent devel technologi These commitments include ensuring products t of th are safe before nc, building systems that put security first, and roduc them t اریان: earning the

Learning by DHS remponents. (August 2023) This policy statement provides that DHS will squire and use conly in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution and all other at lice. Leaves and policy.

New lation 15c. E Foundation Funding. (May 2023) This dedicated \$140 million will launce the new National Al Research Institutes to promote responsible innovation, bolster America Al research and development (R&D) infrastructure and support the development of a diversal workforce.

Al Risk Management Framework (RMF). (January 2023) In collaboration with the private and public sectors, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed this framework to better manage risks—to individuals, organizations, and society—that are uniquely associated with Al. The NIST Al RMF, intended for voluntary use, aims to improve the ability to incorporate trustworthiness considerations into the design, development, use, and evaluation of Al products, services, and systems.

Blueprint for an Al Bill of Rights. (October 2022) This framework is a set of fire principles—identified by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy—that yould guide the design, use, and deployment of automated systems to protect the American public in age of Al.

2021 Final Report of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligent (Marc) 2021) This report presented an integrated national strategy to reorganize the government the nation, and rally our closest allies and partners to defend and compete in coming era of Al-accelerated competition and conflict.

National Artificial Intelligence Initiative (NAII) Act of 2 (Division B. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021) Clanuary (121) Among other things, this act established direction and authority to cook that All respect, development, and demonstration activities among civilian agencies, the poartment of Defense, and the intelligence community to ensure that each informs the last of the phers.

Al in Government Act of 2020 (Title I of Lasic Cof the Cocolidated Appropriations

Act, 2021). (December 2020) This set create the Al Center of Excellence within the General

Services Administration and difference Office Management and Budget (OMB) to issue a

memorandum informing fed that agencies of policitation and application of Al and
identifying best practices for mitigating risks

Department of Homeland Squrity 2020 Ar cial Intelligence Strategy. (December 2020)
This strategy set of the phase PHS's capability to safeguard the American people, our homeland, and are value through the mitigation of Al into DHS's activities and the mitigation of new rise posed by Al.

EO 13960: Presentire and Security Al in the Federal Government. (December **2020)** This executed order required federal agencies to inventory their Al use cases and share the inventories with their government agencies and the public.

esta isheri cae. inciples and strategies to strengthen the nation's capabilities in Al to promise and strategies to competitiveness, and national security.



