Ms. Ginger Norris, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security (CISA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Designated Federal Officer (DFO) for the President’s National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC), began by reminding everyone that this was a Federal Advisory Committee governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act. She stated that the NIAC would retroactively announce this NIAC meeting in the Federal Register Notice and accept public comments in writing after 30 days of the date of this meeting. She then called the meeting to order and turned it over to the NIAC Chair, Ms. Connie Lau, who would read through the roll for those attending.

II. ROLL CALL OF MEMBERS

Constance H. Lau, NIAC Chair

NIAC MEMBERS PRESENT:
Ms. Constance Lau, Dr. Beverly Scott, Ms. Jan Allman, General Albert Edmonds, Mr. J. Richard Baich, Mr. Rand Beers, Dr. Georges Benjamin, Mr. Robert Carr, Mr. William Fehrman, General Reynold Hoover, Chief Rhoda Kerr, Mr. Richard H. Ledgett, Jr., Mr. George Hawkins, Mr. Kevin Morley, Mr. James Murren, Ms. Kirstjen Nielsen, Mr. Keith Parker, Ms. Ola Sage, and Mr. Michael J. Wallace.

NIAC MEMBERS ABSENT:
Mr. William Boston, Mr. Benjamin Fowke, Ms. Margaret E. Grayson, Joan M. McDonald, and Mr. Carl Newman.

SUBSTANTIVE POINTS OF CONTACT PRESENT:
Mr. Scott Seu with Ms. Constance Lau
Mr. Charles Durant with Mr. William Fehrman
Mr. Frank Prager with Mr. Benjamin Fowke
Mr. Samuel Chanoski with Mr. Michael J. Wallace
Mr. Nathaniel Millsap with Ms. Jan Allman
Mr. Theodore Basta with Dr. Beverly Scott
CONSTANCE H. LAU, NIAC Chair

Ms. Lau thanked everyone for calling in for this special quarterly business meeting (QBM) of the NIAC. She stated that she was sure that those attending this QBM were aware of the topic of the coronavirus and its effect on the world. She stated that there have been a number of members from the government that are working with the NIAC to bring this council up to speed on some of the government efforts. She also stated that the government has an ask to the council as to what the council’s views might be on how the it might be helpful under these circumstances. She then turned the call over to Director Christopher Krebs, CISA, and asked if he could bring them up-to-date.

BOB KOLASKY, Assistant Director, National Risk Management Center, CISA, DHS

Director Krebs began by thanking everyone for joining short-term emergency call. He apologized for the delayed start time for this meeting and stated that he looked at what needs to be done to prevent a delay like this from occurring again. He then mentioned that he trusted that everybody was generally up to speed with what has been going on with the coronavirus. He shared that the World Health Organization declared, earlier this week, that this was a global pandemic. He added that about forty-five minutes or so before this QBM the President declared a national emergency in the United States and activated certain provisions of the Stafford Act, unlocking federal funding for state and local response efforts, as well as working with private sector organizations to increase production of tests, increase availability of tests, COVID tests, and other aspects. He stated that this is rapidly shifting out of the containment phase, even out of the mitigation phase, and he added that he saw it shaping into more of a response phase of the COVID-19 event.

He emphasized that some of the planning baselines that they have historically conducted for pandemic guidance have contemplated, potentially, a less severe strain of a virus, and also likely a shorter production time for vaccine. He believed that H1N1 planning factors were about a four to six-month vaccination development period; however, he stated that he believed for this one what they are hearing is anywhere from a year or more for a vaccine. He added that it is going to require a little bit of a different approach and be a little bit testing of their assumptions. He stated that in the meantime he thought, particularly as they think about the excellent NIAC study of 2007, that some of the underlying assumptions of the way companies do business, technology, teleworking, and other things have changed a little bit.

Director Krebs then spoke on what he wanted to do at the QBM. He stated that Robert Kolasky, Assistant director of CISA’s National Risk Management Center (NRCM), would briefly talk
about what has been done recently with the national critical functions and what they have been trying to develop some prioritization scheme. He stated that this was similar to the 2007 NIAC study. He stated that Brian Harrell, from the Infrastructure Security Division, was on the phone for this QBM as well. He added that he knew that there had been a very robust debate amongst the NIAC members about what to do, if anything, with the 2007 plan, and he shared that he had a couple of his thoughts on this, particularly with the next steps that were contemplated at the end of the 2007, and he wanted to close out with a discussion of what everyone thought useful and value-adding at this point. He then asked Ms. Lau if he could pass it over to Assistant Director Kolasky.

Ms. Lau first checked to see if Brian Cavanaugh, Senior Director for Resilience Policy (Acting), National Security Council (NSC), had joined the QBM call, or anyone from NSC representing for him, and did not have anything to say. As there was no response, she asked Assistant Director Kolasky to share.

Assistant Director Kolasky thanked Ms. Lau and Director Krebs, and he thanked the NIAC for making time for this meeting and for all of their work in the NIAC. He stated that he talked to a number of the NIAC last week for follow-up on the NIAC’s last study, and that it was good to talk to them again on this. He shared that he wanted to give the NIAC an overview of what they have been doing and mentioned that it's thematically consistent with some improvements they’ve made to the 2007 study. He stated the NIAC was all familiar with this, and he wanted to talk to them a little bit about the National Critical Functions as a structural way of viewing infrastructure with, not the way necessarily to organize how they do policy work, but in the middle of an incident or if they are anticipating an incident, thinking about risks in terms of whether the function is going to potentially fail and what is the impact of that. He stated that this is the work they did in Blue Sky days, within the National Critical Functions last year.

He went on to discuss that this is an all-hazard play of viewing risks that he thought it was working pretty effectively in this scenario, where what they are trying to make sure from an infrastructure perspective is that there is continuing function in the things that they need to help the overall public health emergency. He stated that they are anticipating anything that could break either at the national level or down levels and cause them to be less effective in their immediate responses and the consequences to the citizens or what could spin out of control from an economic or national security perspective, and he shared that, conceptually, they have the ability for that.

He went on to explain that within the concept of the “what's going on” in the COVID incident, there are really four core drivers or scenarios that he thought were the most important to try to get in front of and that could be the source of the risk. He stated that they have outlined those risk assessments, but the four scenarios have shown that there is a core commodity shortage of something that's essential to deliver their functions. He shared that they had started this a month ago by looking at whether the core commodity shortage was coming from China and other parts of Asia who are the Chinese supply chain, but he expressed that it was a broader source of the commodity shortage and added that now there could be commodity shortages here in general as well. He shared that the second driver was whether there was going to be a workforce shortage
either at a general percentage or a certain type of critical worker that they can't afford to have a shortage of, which the 2007 NIAC study looked at a lot. He added that workforce shortages could come from illness or other areas like that, but it could also come from logistical considerations to getting to work.

He then explained that the third scenario is capacity overload. He shared that they are spending a lot of effort right now trying to anticipate any potential capacity overload and mitigate that around the public community health systems, but there are other things that could cause the overload to be a problem. He stated that the fourth scenario is lack of demand, and the lack of demand causing the function to crater a little bit. He mentioned that he thought a risk scenario like that is what people see when flying commercially for a variety of reasons, and for health reasons, with potential shortage of ability to fly cargo, there is a lot of cargo that comes in the whole of passenger planes.

He then explained that across those four scenarios they have evaluated 55 critical functions and have a risk assessment that is going to be the way that they drive towards prioritizing collective government mitigation activity at the national level. He stated that it stimulates demand to create more capacity to do things to ensure the critical workers do get to work and a few things to do things to ensure that core commodities are available.

He stated that this was a framework that they had put in place, and they made an active risk assessment. He added that they were going to be working toward that and that it was going to be driving sort of coordinated in a dashboard view of the risks where they are taking coordinated activity from an infrastructure side. He stated that they have been working with NSC on this and are looking at base. He explained that both where they are today but also where they are trying to get six weeks from now and anticipate how the systems may break. He stated that he thought it could be a little more robust than a sector-by-sector way of looking at this because it is really trying to crystallize the workforce and establish who are the real core workers to deliver the ability to function and what can we do without them.

He stated that Director Krebs wanted him to highlight where they have made some risk adjustments. He shared that over the next few days they were going to be really focused on a set of priorities, while at the same time doing deeper analysis to make sure they are not missing anything. He also stated that they are starting to get into each critical function and into some of the interdependencies between the functions, something that the NIAC members had raised at different times. He remarked that this was kind of the core way that they are organizing risk mitigation activity for infrastructure. He commented that this gives them a strategic view that they could then layer on with the operational requirements and then they can hear the day to day as they talk to owners and operators through the systems where there are shortages and have immediate demand. He stated that in the future they are going to be able to anticipate and to respond operationally.
V. DISCUSSION OF POTENTIAL STUDY TOPIC

Ms. Lau then asked Director Krebs, since there is now a national emergency, if everything is moving from containment and if there was mitigation to the response. She asked him to provide the council with an update on this. She added that Assistant Director Kolasky had given the NIAC a sense for the risk analysis, and she asked Director Krebs to explain what has been done about this and his thought on how the NIAC might fit into it.

Director Krebs explained that they were trying to distill down the question to something that was answerable, and he said he would give a backdrop of what was going on across the administration. He began by explaining that because it had not been a natural disaster, a hurricane or a disaster declaration, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Response Centers and Coordination Centers have not been activated; he added that in addition to this, the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) have not been activated under the Stafford framework. He stated that what they have is something more along the lines of a task force that's working across the administration, which is led by the Vice President. He stated that this task force principally supports and executes by Health and Human Services (HHS) and Centers for Disease Control (CDC), which was focused at this point on a couple of different steps. However, he commented that this one step was the aspects of testing and detection. He also stated that there were some Homeland Security measures on travel enforcements and controls.

He stated that this was where they were, and then he stated that the point shifts from what their containment and mitigation response is within the national emergency with some of the disaster declarations that will happen across the country, which opens the Stafford model and the national response framework, where the ESFs is fully activated. He said that the NIAC would be able to see the National Response Coordination Center activated and know the availability of states. He explained that one thing that the President has asked for is for all of the states’ public health standards to establish their emergency operation center and to activate them across the country. He stated that the NIAC would start seeing federal funds flowing down to address unmet needs. However, he said, to the prioritization piece, they were trying to understand if there were 100 units of effort effectively, or 100 units of whatever the commodity is, what the public health officials are going to require the most significant, and he added that in this case, if it were Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and what are the other critical functions across the economy would also require some degree of prioritization, assuming there's available.

He also mentioned limited available stocks and knowing if it is not going to go to everyone, whether it's restocking nuclear facility, fuel, or refueling nuclear facilities, operations centers at electricity generation, or things of that nature. He stated that are not sure how to distinguish that from perhaps less critical functions or services, as Assistant Director Kolasky had pointed out. He then remarked on how he was looking at the NIAC 2007 study as a pandemic guide, and he stated that there was a lot of excellent left-of-boom planning but that he was interested in knowing what kind of right-of-boom there was. He shared how they wanted to start prioritizing what is different about those assumptions that were built in due to teleworking and other changes in telecommunications technology, see what the differences were, and find out if the assumptions
still held up and if they needed to change anything. He shared that because of what is going to happen, and assuming this event lasts for a minimum of two months or possibly even longer, they are going to have to make some really hard decisions, such as whether the Defense Production Act comes into play. He asked the question “how do we start making some key judgments or informing the decision-makers in the White House to start allocating scarce resources accordingly?”

Ms. Lau thanked Director Krebs for his update and stated that there were several members who had some thoughts about the points that were referenced. She asked if she could open the line at this point to some of the discussions for that. Director Krebs asked that this be done but clarified that they were not asking the NIAC members to go back and redo the 2007 study, and he emphasized that they felt the underpinning of the planning efforts of 2007 remained relevant and has in fact informed the current pandemic planning efforts. He stated that what they were looking for what, if anything, had changed and what newer items should they consider that may not have been available in 2007.

General Al Edmonds stated that he had a couple of comments based on what was discussed. He explained that he is in the area here at Washington and has watched some of the things that have happened so far this week in terms of things that are new from 2007 that might need to be considered. He stated that one of the things that he has noticed is what he would call “mission workforce shortage”. He explained that what was pointed out to him was that one of the things that needs to be looked at going forward is the different people whose primary jobs are now in recess, and he added that what they should look at is how to take advantage of these workforce people in a supportive role to mitigate some of the risks that have been mentioned. He stated that the second thing he has noticed was capacity overload because of people teleworking. He stated that there needs to be a way to make sure the network systems, like the Internet and different social media platforms, are looked at and are robust enough to accommodate telework on a massive scale.

He stated that the third thing he looked at was transportation, especially since it is a huge thing in the Washington, D.C. area. He shared that the President spoke a few minutes earlier on the television about using Wal-Mart’s drive-through for tests and other things. He felt that they should look at transportation in a more holistic way and not just in rails, airplanes, or other kinds of transportation like that and also look at how they take some of these workforces and reuse or put them in the workforce, utilizing the Uber/Lyft way of picking up people, and using them to take people out for those tests. He stated that the last thing he saw was the senior citizen focus on this particular virus. He expressed that the senior citizens do not want to come out, and he shared that on the television today it spoke about how some senior citizens were asking folks to go shopping for them at the grocery store because now the Boomers are putting their parents into senior citizen homes rather than having them live in their homes. He stated that if the things that they recommended in 2007 were taken into macro view and then flipped to today, to focus on what is happening on a real-time basis, he felt this would help by taking some of those key issues and expanding them into what is really happening today.
Ms. Lau thanked General Edmonds for these contributions and asked if anyone else had something to contribute. Dr. Beverly Scott share that General Edmonds had hit a number of the points, and she added that since 2007 there was no question that there has been a major technological transformation. She stated that it has really hit communications and that the world of work is changing. She stated that this was foundational in terms of what kind of thing they can get and try to have available, and she added that it may not be the best but at least they would be able to give people something. She emphasized that things are never going to have perfect information, but she stated that they can share what the practical, real things are for people to do, for example telecommuting and all kinds of other capabilities are available. She added that they should provide people with tips on what to consider doing. She stated that this is similar to when they created the “See Something, Say Something” goal and gave people an idea on how to get information out. She stated using social media devices, like YouTube, to get out seven things a person can do and examples of how they could do them.

She gave an example for this by explaining that while big companies may automatically telecommute and work everything virtually, it would be simple to give them practical tips and information. She added that she thought that part of what is happening too is that there has to be a consistency in terms of where people can go for information, sharing that there has been an explosion of information on social media and all of that, but there needs to be a place where at the same time and channel people can go to get the updates on what nationally is being said about this. She stated that this helps the tier because there is so much information out there right now and a lot of it is misinformation. She emphasized how important it was to be able to have some anchor for the public.

She also added that the workforce will be all over the place, in particular, with all of the contracting out within these critical infrastructure sectors, and she emphasized that organized labor must be a part of the conversation at a high level because, whether people like it or not, a lot of organized labor, particularly those in critical lifeline sectors, will start getting into issues, like exhaust on first responders and other natural capacity limitations on what a person can do and this effect when this person is someone that is depended upon. She ended by stating that she thought that this would lend itself to pulling out the best information and examples they have and getting some of the right people in the room. She added that getting the best information in terms of how to move forward in these areas is important because there needs to be a response sent out now and that now is the time to react.

Ms. Lau thanked Dr. Scott for her input and invited General Reynold Hoover to share his thoughts. General Hoover thanked Ms. Lau and stated that his concern was something that had not been raised, and he shared that his concern was the old continuity guide. He stated that the continuity plans are based on a decapitation of the government, but this is different, presuming that the President has COVID-19 or the President should be tested for it and emphasizing that he was not wanting to trail down this point, and he stated that this extends beyond the White House and beyond the President. He shared that the critical infrastructures aren't. He asked if the critical infrastructure owners and operators were starting to really look at and think about not only their line of succession but also their lines of authority. He stated that this virus knows no bounds and
the National Infrastructure Advisory Council

Draft Meeting Minutes for the March 13, 2020 Quarterly Business Meeting

Page 8 of 13

they haven't yet seen a test of their continuity program when it's not an automatic decapitation and they have a line of succession.

He then posed a hypothetical situation where the President had the virus. He stated that the President would then pass it to the Vice President, or the other way around, or all the people surrounding the President would get it. He added that they would then see members of congress that get it, world leaders get it, and people who are surrounding world leaders get it. He clarified that he didn't mean to overdramatize this, but he thought it was something that needed to be at least addressed and that they needed to consider this notion of not only continuity of government but also of critical infrastructure as part-owners and operators. He stated that they needed to start taking a hard look at their own lines of succession because he felt that the United States (U.S.) national security was at risk.

The Honorable Kirstjen Nielsen mentioned that she had been in talks about this continuity aspect, and she also thought that it was really important. She stated that the guide that the Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure Key Resources, which was put out by DHS, had a section in it that discussed the topic that General Hoover had referenced and was the continuity of operations guide for essential functions. She stated that one idea might be to relook at that particular thing to see if there were any additional best practices that have been learned, if some of the guidance are no longer applicable, and if they could put something out that is tangible and specific, which people can implement. She emphasized that the continuity of senior officials and its importance can't be underscored. She shared that the devolution of authorities and responsibilities for a public utility can be quite complicated. She stated that it is important that private sector owners, in general, but also critical infrastructure owners and operators create a continuity plan.

The Honorable Nielsen thanked Assistant Director Kolasky for his brief and stated that she believed that the framework he was describing sounded like a great way to identify very specific issues. She stated that if a person took a national critical function and cross-checked it against the four drivers that were briefed, he or she would have a very specific understanding of whether there's a risk or a vulnerability, where there are, and the areas where additional guidance might be useful. She noted that she would defer to Assistant Deputy Kolasky on the next steps and emphasized that this should be a tangible way, even if it is just the NIAC members giving them their thoughts, their experiences, and their expertise related to critical functions, which she felt could be useful.

Director Krebs stated that he wanted to a bow on this, and he shared that the last three or four comments were what he was specifically hoping to pull out of this conversation. He stated that the NIAC was the national experts of infrastructure resilience issues. He added that they have sector coordinating council mechanisms but that those are a lot more tactical. He stated that what they needed was an over-the-top strategic understanding of how the landscape has shifted, particularly, if anything dramatically has shifted from 2007. He emphasized that if the answer was that it had shifted but not in a way that was significant from a planning perspective then he felt ready to move along. However, he clarified that what they were trying to do was test some of the assumptions, specifically those related to Assistant Director Kolasky’s framework. He asked
if there was anything the NIAC members thought should be added or refined or if there was something that they should roll out. He emphasized that if this was ultimately not a good use of anybody's time, he was more than happy to move on from it, and then he added that his goal, which he and Ms. Lau had previously discussed, was to take a more strategic approach than NIAC had used as a group that creates a study in 18 month but one that someone can actively pull into an event and say, “You're the experts. What are we missing here? What are we doing wrong? What do we need to do better?”. He stated that he did not know everything or have all of the answers and that he didn't even know all of the questions, and he stated that he wanted the NIAC to help them flesh these out so that they do the right thing on behalf of the country.

Ms. Jan Allman stated that she wanted to highlight some of the things Dr. Scott had said. She said that in regard to today, and not doing some things or maybe having done in things from the past, she wanted to look back at her pandemic exercise that she and her team have used a lot over the last couple of weeks. She shared that, like local municipalities, they have not had any type of refresher training or communication on how to really involve the health department and on how to engage with local communities and work to get back to operation. She stated that she was leading this effort and trying to get the state to offer them resources or give them input. However, she clarified that her perspective was from a state and regional area where collaboration is not existing because there is so much lack of knowledge. She shared that employers have a lot of lack of knowledge and awareness on how to handle this virus and on where to go for their concerns. For example, she said that they do not seem to know that they can call the health department if they have concerns or know the basics. She added that these employers think at this point that it is on their shoulders, and that is not how it all works. She shared that they need to know that it works through the health department, the CDC. She emphasized that there is a lack of general knowledge going out and that she was referencing more medium to small companies in particular.

Ms. Lau added an answer to General Hoover and the Honorable Nielsen’s question about continuity of operations for clinical infrastructure, by sharing that, at least for her company, part of their business continuity plan does indicate the tiering of people or the cascade of people who would be responsible when anyone in that chain gets eliminated, so they do have continuity of operations in their business. She then added to the point made by Ms. Allman. She stated based on Ms. Allman’s point, one question she would have is on how organized each critical infrastructure is, stating that she knew the electric sector tends to be very well-organized but was unsure if all critical infrastructure were. She shared an example of this by stated that they are doing things like testing all of their remote devices, such as their Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), having a rotating basis, and ordering more supplies in case everyone has to work remotely. She said that if there is a spread of the disease, not everyone is will be impacted at once because of these measures they have taken, and there will still be people who can actually restore the power.

She shared that she felt the structure that Assistant Director Kolasky explained was a great way to look at the issue, but she stated that after listening to Dr. Scott’s points, she realized the one thing that was not covered within the core for drivers was basic public confidence and getting the information out in a united message. She added that for a unity of messaging, she agreed with
Ms. Allman’s point on what to do, and she stated that it has primarily been on a state level as opposed to being some really good guidelines that everyone can listen to and have confidence that somebody is in charge and that everything is all being worked through as it should be.

Ms. Ola Sage shared that she was not involved at all in the 2007 NIAC study, but she felt that, in terms of what may have fundamentally shifted or changed, they are operating in an environment of zero trust. She wondered if there was a way that they could use this in a positive way as they think about these critical functions. She explained that they would think about how they would operate in a pandemic where zero trust is required, whether that is socially, like social distancing because they don't trust somebody less than six feet away from them, whether that is economically because people can't work and they have to figure out how they will operate in that environment, whether that is politically, and whether that is technologically because now they have introduced all kinds of cyber-related concerns as a result of this. She emphasized that this was one of the assumptions that she thought might be worth exploring, and she asked what the concept of operations for doing this intentionally was and how do they deliver these critical functions in a zero trust environment. Director Krebs stated that he had not thought about it this way but felt that this type of framing approach was creative. He added that he was going to need to consider this but really liked it and wanted to figure out how to utilize it because it made perfect sense.

General Edmonds added that the point of this whole communication and this survivability kind of issue goes back to the several studies the NIAC has done. He shared that the one that stood out to him the most was the NIAC’s resilience study. He explained that they went to every one of the industries and looked at how those industries could survive during any kind of disaster. He stated that while they did not necessarily look at a pandemic, each one of them had a resilience piece to it. He emphasized that for some of them they even went back and did a resilience study on the resilience of those industries. He stated that he believed that if they looked at those studies and look at this pandemic, a key to all those things were communications across industries and the interdependency of the industries. He added that if they took this very situation then they would have a multi-industry event happening that they have distilled down and called a health industry problem. Then he stated that in fact this pandemic has impacted everything in the country and every one of the industries is being impacted. He emphasized that there are going to be lots of industry issues because when people don’t fly airplanes, don’t drive the trains, and don't have a social event, and only go to the grocery store and the drug store, there are going to be other problems. He also stated that he thought there was a fresh piece to look at and that this was back on this interdependency and communications part. He shared that in almost every one of their studies they have tried to come to a point where they thought they needed regional focus so that sates could do their things and that they did not try to eat the whole U.S. in one big bite. He shared that they ought to take a look at it like that.

Ms. Lau reminded everyone that there was about eight minutes left to this QBM, and she asked how Director Krebs wished to proceed, noting that they hardly been able to allow members to give their thoughts. Director Krebs asked Assistant Director Kolasky to explain what would be most useful to him and his efforts within this framework. Assistant Director Kolasky stated that
from the current discussion he believed that most of the information that was surfacing was intended to be captured.

He stated that this touches on several areas and showed how this will cascade into other things. He stated that they were particularly looking for any insight as to whether what was going on within the scenario was what should be happening and what else they should be looking at. He stated that he would defer to the them and let them share some of their initial insights and feedback on where they think more attention should be placed. He added that they would be mapping out detailed risk outcomes for all 55 national critical functions and then starting with the systems. He shared that they do not have it already but that the dashboard was a good starting point. He also shared that carrying the dashboard and getting some feedback on adjustments needed to the dashboard will be useful. He stated that it was too late for methodology at this stage and that he and his interagency colleagues had to do the work.

The Assistant Director of Infrastructure Security, Brian Harrell, then mentioned that they are looking at a number of cross-cutting areas. He stated that they have identified a number of potential areas where they could see some cascading infrastructure consequences and he thought some of the four buckets that he thinks of is the infrastructure operations and maintenance. He shared that this includes absenteeism and workforce reduction, which he mentioned had been brought up earlier. He stated that where there was a lack of coordination between the sectors, their state and local partners, the federal government, healthcare and the other supply chains, and the operations impact those quarantine centers. He stated that he thought that this is unlike other critical infrastructure attacks, where when something like happens, people know exactly who to reach out to and who to let know when there is an impact. He explained that when a bomb goes off, people know that they are going to engage the FBI or DHS. However, he continued to explain, during a pandemic scenario like this there are a lot of questions as to who do people reach out to and alert when there is an impact. He stated that they continue to point to the protective security device program, they continue to invite or point to the ISAC and fusion centers to push this information out, but her shared that it was getting this information in terms of testing and impacting interdependencies that was critical to what Assistant Director Kolasky is trying to do.

Ms. Lau stated that it sounded like there needed to be another special meeting scheduled, and she asked Director Krebs if this was what he would like to do. She mentioned making this next meeting one that would last for two or three hours so that they can discuss all of the specific topics and organize it where there are specific questions by sections that they want feedback on. She asked if this would be an effective way to handle the next meeting as it seemed that there was no study being asked to do but instead a desire to receive immediate feedback on this. Director Krebs agreed that there was not time for a study on this subject since was currently happening.

Director Krebs mentioned that he thought what they needed was to look at their assessment. He felt that it would be useful if there were a couple of different tiger teams that were set up. He explained that this was one thing they had looked at back in 2007 and he thought it was good. He then asked if there was anything dramatically different that they had missed, and if so, it was
probably this one piece. He added that another piece that could be looked at is the framework, as Assistant Director Kolasky discussed, and poking some holes at it. He shared that it would also be helpful to know how the NIAC would apply these to their own business models and for them to validate a use case or two.

He then spoke to Ms. Lau about the electrics and mentioned that these were the things that they would be thinking about across the critical functions and these factors are one of the things they're most concerned about and are almost like a decomposition of the function. He then expressed that these two items would be useful. He stated that he wanted the NIAC in the fight and that if there was something that they could do together he wanted that because he felt they were an asset to them, and he didn't feel they had used the NIAC historically as well as they possibly could. He clarified that this was an "all hands on deck" effort, and that he was trying to use every asset that he had at his disposal while also making sure they got a good effort. He asked them to not assume that there as a master plan he was trying to plug them into, and he added that they were the experts and that he wanted them to tell him what was missing.

Dr. Scott added that they need to also be clear with the public. She stated that it would be good to get out to the public what they could do to help and what they personally should be doing and what they can do to help their community. Mr. James Murren mentioned that he had a couple ideas. He stated that it is simple to tell people to stop shaking hands or to wash their hands, but it meets what is being asked. He added that there needs to be a Public Service Announce (PSA) program and added that this could be a quick recommendation that could be taken to the White House. He also shared two points that he’d observed. He stated that he has 80,000 employees here in the U.S. and shared that half of them are union and half of them non-union. He stated that one is dealing with the unions on a local basis because communications are very different and added that he would be happy to help with that.

He added that they are in over 15 different states, and every governor is tackling it differently, which means that there is a very, very poor level of consistency state by state and that they are not developing best practices because they are really not communicating as well as they could. He stated that this was an immediate need I saw. He stated that the second point was concerning the consistency around the U.S. from a state leadership perspective. He stated that the third point he had was related to a central clearinghouse of communication. He shared that they have been using Johns Hopkins Medicine as their communication tool because it seems to be one of the best he has seen. He added that anything could be used needs to cascade out nationally. Ms. Lau thanked Mr. Murren for sharing.

Director Krebs informed Ms. Lay that he needed to go to another meeting, and he asked Assistant Director Kolasky to take the helm. He thanked everyone for attending this QBM and shared that he would follow up very soon after this. He again apologized for the delay in getting on the line. Ms. Lau thanked Director Krebs and shared that they were minutes from the top of the hour. She proposed that she, Dr. Scott, and Ms. Norris and discuss what works for the NIAC to be able to give some immediate feedback that meets Director Krebs and Assistant Director Kolasky, Assistant Director Harrell, and Assistant Director Willke’s needs. She then stated that it may be through additional conference calls or a split up into the tiger teams, like Director
Krebs outlined. She asked all the NIAC member to stay tuned as that will be helpful in them moving forward and she added that if anybody had any additional ideas or suggestions that they want to funnel into this process, they should email them through the email string that they were all previously on.

With this, Ms. Lau adjourned the meeting and thanked everyone for attending it.