

Security and Resiliency Guide

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED)

Annex for Public Assembly Stakeholders



Homeland
Security

Purpose

Bombings using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are a common security concern related to terrorism and violence in the United States (U.S.). High-profile domestic incidents have occurred and international attacks are frequently in the news. Public Assembly venues are not immune from IED incidents, including bomb threats, suspicious items, and actual bombings.

This guide defines tasks and related processes that security managers and staff at public assembly venues can use to understand and improve their ability to perform counter-IED (C-IED) activities and make decisions. This guide is designed to provide security managers and staff at public assembly facilities with:

- 1) A practical framework to examine their ability to perform C-IED activities, and
- 2) Supporting guidance and materials to strengthen their C-IED preparedness.

As each public assembly facility is unique in size, complexity, and location, no specific guidance can apply to all. For that reason, the information provided in this guide is meant to provide suggestions and examples of what others are doing as options for facilities to consider to enhance their C-IED preparedness.

Background

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) plays a key role in coordinating efforts with the public and private sectors, including public assembly facilities, to build capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and mitigate bombing incidents. To assist stakeholders with enhancing preparedness for IED incidents, OBP and other U.S. Government stakeholders developed the *Security and Resiliency Guide: Counter-IED Concepts, Common Goals, and Available Assistance* (SRG C-IED). The SRG C-IED is a consolidated reference guide of C-IED preparedness information for homeland security stakeholders. It provides an overview of IED threats, a set of common C-IED goals, associated objectives, and practices, as well as links to Federal government C-IED resources.

This Guide is an annex to the SRG C-IED developed to support the specific needs of public assembly facilities. Public assembly representatives, including security managers from several venues and public assembly events, including the Smithsonian Institution, the National Zoo, and the Verizon Center, in Washington D.C., participated in its development to ensure the Annex reflects common operating procedures and the most significant security concerns. Major associations and working groups also participated, including the Venue Operations Summit in Nashville, Tennessee, and the Mass Gatherings; Large-scale Events Security Symposium in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. DHS conducted workshops to gain insight into security best practices, gaps, and potential products that would support C-IED preparedness for the Public Assembly Subsector.

Benefits of the guide to the public assembly community

This guide provides useful information to security managers and staff as they seek to improve preparedness at their venues. Through this guide, security managers and staff can:

- Gain a better understanding of their existing C-IED practices and needs;
- Obtain information to support preparedness efforts, such as risk assessments, planning, equipment purchases, and staff training; and
- Collaborate and communicate more effectively with their public assembly counterparts, community first responders, and government agencies.



Introduction

Definitions

The following definitions may be useful to public assembly security managers and staff as they read this guide, examine their ability to perform C-IED activities, and make decisions to prevent, protect against, mitigate, and respond to IED-related threats.

- **IED:** A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract.
- **IED Incident:** Any event that involves a real or suspected IED threat, including IED detonations, bomb threats, the use of hoax devices, discovery of bomb-making components, or the theft of explosives or precursor materials.
- **Countering IEDs:** The interdisciplinary process for developing, implementing, evaluating, and adjusting measures to prevent, discover, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from IED incidents and their consequences.

C-IED goals

There are 10 common C-IED goals outlined in the SRG C-IED. These goals serve as benchmarks that stakeholders can review and consider for implementation in support of reducing the overall risk posed by IED threats.

Goal

1. **Use and share risk information to guide IED-related physical security, law enforcement, and emergency response activities.**
2. **Identify and report IED-related suspicious activity.**
3. **Prevent the acquisition of explosives and explosive precursor chemicals used in IEDs.**
4. **Implement site-specific protective measures to prevent and minimize the impact of IED incidents.**
5. **Utilize IED screening and detection methods in high-risk environments.**
6. **Take immediate safety precautions for bomb threats, suspicious items, and IEDs.**
7. **Safely coordinate response activities at IED incident sites.**
8. **Request Public Safety Bomb Squad assets to diagnose suspicious items and render-safe IEDs.**
9. **Provide IED-specific emergency medical response.**
10. **Reduce the psychological and economic impacts of IED incidents.**

Introduction

The C-IED tasks in this guide align to six out of the ten C-IED goals in the table above:

Goal 1: Use and share risk information to guide IED-related physical security, law enforcement, and emergency response activities. The C-IED tasks in this category include the activities by which public assembly venue personnel use and share information to improve coordination between stakeholders.

Goal 2: Identify and report IED-related suspicious activity. The C-IED tasks that align to this goal include the activities to help increase awareness and preparedness for identifying and communicating IED-related suspicious activity.

Goal 4: Implement site-specific protective measures to prevent and minimize the impact of IED incidents. These C-IED tasks include the activities by which public assembly venue personnel strive to deter IED threats and protect against an IED attack to their facilities.

Goal 5: Utilize IED screening and detection methods in high-risk environments. These C-IED tasks discuss various screening and detection methods that public assembly venue personnel can utilize to identify and prevent IEDs and IED components from entering into public assembly venues.

Goal 6: Take immediate safety precautions for bomb threats, suspicious items, and IEDs. These C-IED tasks include the activities by which public assembly venue personnel can effectively respond to IED threats to their facilities in support of increasing safety, minimizing potential disruptions, and assisting law enforcement and first responders.

Goal 7: Safely coordinate response activities at IED incident sites. These C-IED tasks include activities by which public assembly venue personnel can effectively and safely react at the IED incident site.



*Figure 1: World Trade Center parking garage following the 1993 bombing that killed six people and injured 1,000
Property of DHS*

Subsector definition

The Public Assembly Subsector is comprised of arenas, convention centers, auditoriums, movie theaters, cultural properties (e.g., museums, zoos, planetariums, aquariums, libraries, and performance venues), and other assets where large numbers of people meet for the purpose of professional education, meeting/gathering, and entertainment.¹ The Public Assembly Subsector is closely related to the Sports Leagues and Venues Subsector, as these venues share many of the same characteristics.²

Public assembly stakeholders

For the purposes of this guide, public assembly stakeholders include the following:

- **Visitors:** Any person visiting the public assembly venue, including patrons attending an event or exhibit, entertainers, and any associated support staff for traveling performances or exhibits.
- **Security/Management:** Employees or contract staff responsible for ensuring the safety of staff and visitors.³
- **Public-Facing Staff:** Employees or contract staff who come into contact with visitors (e.g., staff who greet visitors and sell and validate tickets, ushers/docents, and vendors).
- **Facilities/Engineering:** Employees or contract staff responsible for building engineering and maintenance, deliveries, and cleaning.
- **Internal Support Staff:** Employees or contract staff responsible for day-to-day venue administration (e.g., office staff, scientists/researchers, technicians).



*Figure 2: Public assembly stakeholders
Source: iStock and Shutterstock images*

¹ (Commercial Facilities Sector-Specific Plan - An Annex To The NIPP 2013 2015)

² There is a separate C-IED Preparedness Guide focused specifically on the Sports Leagues and Venues Subsector.

³ For venues without full-time security managers, these activities would likely be accomplished by the facility manager.

Public Assembly Subsector C-IED Goals

Assess IED risk

Knowing and understanding the specific risks to a public assembly venue from IEDs is a necessary first step to selecting and prioritizing the C-IED tasks presented in this guide.

Risk is generally defined as the potential for an unwanted outcome from an incident as determined by its likelihood and consequences.⁴ A C-IED risk analysis should address two core questions:

- How likely is it that an IED threat or detonation will occur?
- If an IED threat or detonation occurred, what would the consequences be?

As an example, a prominent museum in a major metropolitan area may be an attractive target for attackers because of the high number of people present at any given time and the psychological importance placed on the venue. However, a convention center in a mid-size city, which likely has less restrictive security requirements at entrances, may be easier targets for attackers. As a result of these different risk factors, the prominent museum will have different priorities than the convention center, which will affect the decisions that the security managers for each of these venues will make to strengthen the C-IED tasks outlined in the next section.

IED threat considerations

Consider how the likelihood of an IED incident would affect the approach to implementing the C-IED tasks. Threat scenarios to consider include the following:

- **Steady-state IED threat** environment that exists on a day-to-day basis.
- **Elevated IED threat** to a public assembly venue based on credible intelligence analysis. For example, a law enforcement agency informs public assembly venues that there is a threat to facilities in their city posted to a known terrorist recruiting Website.
- **Credible IED threat** to a specific public assembly venue based on the identification of a suspicious object or a bomb detonation. For example, an unattended package with wires protruding suspiciously is found in the atrium of a convention center.




Figure 3: Example actions in response to a changing threat environment
Property of DHS

Furthermore, any change in the likelihood of an IED incident, such as a credible threat to public assembly venues in a particular city, will affect the actions staff take to implement C-IED tasks (see Figure 3). For example, day-to-day operations during the steady-state IED threat environment for a public assembly venue may mean visually screening ticketed patrons as they enter. However, if there is a credible threat, venues may work together with law enforcement to visually screen patrons or even screen patrons with a metal detector. The decision on what specific security requirements to implement, if any, may depend on the availability of resources, the associated costs of those resources, the impact to visitors, and the visitors' willingness to accept an additional burden to enter the venue.

⁴ (Risk Steering Committee 2015)



Public Assembly Subsector C-IED Goals

This section outlines examples of C-IED tasks that security managers and staff at public assembly venues can implement to prevent, protect against, mitigate, and respond to bomb threats and incidents. Descriptions of each C-IED task include examples from industry documents and discussions with stakeholders that summarize a spectrum of approaches for security managers to consider, based on risks to their respective venue, their mission, and available resources as they build and/or improve C-IED preparedness over time. Following this section are three appendices:

- **Appendix 1** provides a broader list of C-IED tasks, to include the example tasks outlined below, in an operational checklist format for venues to use to self-assess their preparedness.
- **Appendix 2** lists resources available to public assembly venues to build and improve their C-IED preparedness.
- **Appendix 3** lists the references used to develop this guide.

Goal 1 – Use and share risk information to guide IED-related physical security, law enforcement, and emergency response activities.

The following C-IED tasks include the activities security managers and staff at public assembly venues can incorporate to effectively use and share information to any and all stakeholders involved.

Assess risk of an IED incident.

Assess the likelihood and consequences of an IED incident that directly impacts a) the public assembly venue and b) adjacent facilities such as hotels. A number of resources are available to support risk assessment of an IED incident, including the following:

- Local bomb technicians, who are part of local fire or law enforcement agencies;
- DHS Protective Security Advisors (PSAs);⁵
- Local emergency managers, as part of their ongoing Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) process; and
- Local, regional, or state fusion centers.⁶



Example

Incorporate “alert levels” into venue emergency plans. These levels can be tied to local or federal advisory systems, such as the National Terrorism Advisory System, or to criteria defined by the venue. The plan can also outline specific protective actions for each level (e.g., additional screening practices or augmenting security staff during an incident).

Be aware of new circumstances or information that may increase or decrease the threat of an IED, such as high-profile or controversial events, visiting dignitaries, and National Special Security Events.

⁵ PSAs are DHS representatives whose mission is to protect critical infrastructure through engagement with private sector stakeholders. For more information, see <https://www.dhs.gov/protective-security-advisors>.

⁶ For more information about fusion centers, see <https://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers>.



Public Assembly Subsector C-IED Goals

Monitor and share IED-related security information.

Establish relationships with government and industry stakeholders to maintain the routine exchange of IED-related security information—including alerts, attack indicators and warnings, and advisories. Some examples of partnerships include the following:

- Private sector liaisons from law enforcement agencies;
- Local emergency management agencies;
- Local, regional, or state fusion centers;
- DHS PSAs;
- Neighborhoods, communities, and business associations; (e.g., business improvement districts); and
- National venue associations (e.g., League of Historic American Theaters, Venues Today, and Venue Solutions Group).



Example

Establish a periodic meeting of public assembly security managers within a neighborhood or jurisdiction to share security-related information. Invite local and regional stakeholders to participate and share information (e.g., fusion centers, PSA, and local law enforcement). By establishing these relationships when no explicit IED threat exists, public assembly security managers will know whom to contact for information.



Example

Develop standard messages for visitors in advance, which can be displayed around the venue and on video monitors during elevated threat environments.

If the threat is elevated, provide additional information about the potential threat during daily staff meetings. Additionally, visitors tend to be more accepting of security measures when they know that there is an elevated threat. Therefore, during circumstances when the threat is elevated, provide updated information and guidance to visitors more often and more visibly, using posters and video monitors, for example.

Goal 2 – Identify and report IED-related suspicious activity.

The following C-IED tasks include the activities security managers and staff at public assembly venues can employ to efficiently recognize and report IED-related suspicious behaviors and items.

Educate all staff and visitors to understand potential IED threats.

Train all employees and volunteers to recognize and report suspicious behavior and objects that could be associated with IEDs. For example, training for staff who are responsible for the entrances could address what to do when they observe an unattended bag, as well as examples of suspicious behavior (e.g., someone who leaves a bag and then exits the venue). In addition, educational materials (e.g., posters and signs) and checklists can help employees and volunteers, as well as visitors (e.g., patrons and personnel associated with traveling performances and exhibits), recognize and report suspicious activities and objects that could be associated with IEDs.



Public Assembly Subsector C-IED Goals

If the threat is elevated (e.g., following an attack that occurred at a public assembly gathering overseas), consider issuing reminders during scheduled staff meetings. DHS has developed a wide variety of materials, such as training videos, posters, and checklists, that public assembly venues can use to supplement their IED training efforts. See Appendix 2 for a list of available resources.

Recognize out-of-place and suspicious behavior.

Be mindful of out-of-place and suspicious or concerning behaviors that may indicate planning or execution of an IED attack. Some examples of suspicious or concerning behaviors include the following:

- Loitering at the entrances and exits;
- Wearing unusually bulky clothing that is inconsistent with weather conditions and might conceal explosives; and
- Attempting to access restricted areas or entrances as patrons are exiting.

If the threat is elevated, use staff meetings to reinforce recognition of out-of-place and suspicious behaviors. See Appendix 2 for more information on recognizing suspicious behavior.

Recognize IED components and explosive precursors.

Be aware of common IED components, such as wires, timers, and triggers, and be able to recognize them around the venue in areas such as entrances, exterior walls, and along interior gathering areas (for more information on IED components, see Appendix 2). In addition, be familiar with explosive precursors, many of which are common household items, when they are in unexpected places or are unexpectedly missing from storage areas. Some common chemicals likely found in public assembly venues that could be used as IED precursors include the following (for more information on IED precursor materials, see Appendix 2):

- Drain cleaner;
- Paint remover;
- Sanitizers;
- Fertilizer; and
- Batteries.

Additionally, maintain control over the storage areas for any explosive materials (e.g., some venues may store fireworks) to ensure access only by authorized personnel. If the threat is elevated, use staff meetings to reinforce recognition of IED components and explosive precursors.



Example

Incorporate C-IED educational materials into other emergency information and materials provided to staff and visitors. Consider developing checklists, information cards, lanyards, pamphlets, and/or smart-phone applications to help staff and visitors remember C-IED activities and responsibilities.



Public Assembly Subsector C-IED Goals

Report any potential IED-related information to appropriate authorities.

Establish procedures for visitors and staff to report information to security personnel on suspicious behaviors that could be associated with IEDs and potential IED threats. Some examples include targeted surveillance of a public assembly venue, unattended packages along the exterior wall, or vehicles illegally parked near an entrance. If the threat is elevated, reinforce these reporting procedures during staff meetings and with public service announcements. For more information on responses to suspicious behavior, see Appendix 2.



Example

Report all bomb threats to local law enforcement. With technological advancements, threats may be directed to multiple facilities nearly simultaneously, and the information can help responders build an accurate picture of the scope of the issue.

Provide evidence and information from bomb threats to local law enforcement.

Contact local law enforcement with IED-related information ranging from suspicious activity that may be of interest to law enforcement to a credible IED threat. Law enforcement agencies may request that facilities provide evidence (e.g., closed circuit television [CCTV] footage) supporting the IED-related information reports. For more information on reporting suspicious behavior to law enforcement, see Appendix 2.

Goal 4 – Implement site-specific protective measures to prevent and minimize the impact of IED incidents.

The following C-IED tasks include the site-specific activities security managers and staff at public assembly venues can implement to prevent and minimize the impact of IED incidents.

Verify identity of full-time employees, temporary staff and performers, and volunteers.

Public assembly managers typically conduct criminal and financial background checks on potential employees as part of the hiring process (unless local or state laws prevent them from doing so). Imposing those requirements on temporary staff (e.g., visiting researchers, specialists), performers and their associated crews, and volunteers can be more challenging. Emerging technology to run rapid background checks, as well as searching social media accounts, could address this security gap.

Large public assembly venues typically require full-time employees, contract staff, and volunteers to wear identification badges, which should be revised regularly. This is less of a concern with smaller venues where employees know one another and would recognize someone who did not belong. More challenging are temporary staff (e.g., visiting researchers, specialists), performers, and their associated crews. Emerging technology to make single-use identification badges cheaply and quickly could address this security gap. If the threat is elevated, consider conducting an audit of identification badges and credentials to verify information is current and accurate.



Example

Change the color and/or orientation of identification badges frequently to make it difficult to attempt to replicate or use old credentials to gain access into the venue.



Public Assembly Subsector C-IED Goals

Conduct a security sweep before opening and prior to special events.

During the steady-state threat environment, security staff typically conduct a visual security sweep of the venue prior to opening and before events. The timing of the security sweep and the resources used vary between venues (e.g., some large facilities will do security sweep and lock down the facility; smaller venues will do a visual inspection just before opening doors). The security sweep should include an inspection of security barriers, such as locks, gates, and doors, for signs of intrusion, especially for high-risk areas that require extra security controls, such as security offices, mechanical and storage rooms, and designated performance areas. If the threat is elevated, consider expanding the security sweep to include areas outside the venue, such as exterior walls and parking lots.

Implement facility-related security measures.

Identify and implement protective security features, such as perimeter lighting, fences, and secure storage for explosive materials and precursors (e.g., cleaning supplies and fireworks brought into the venue for a performance), based on identified vulnerabilities. In addition, consider installing vehicle or other physical barriers that provide effective standoff distance from potential IED attacks and implementing measures to mitigate the consequences of an IED detonation (e.g., opening entrances earlier to reduce the number of people congregating before special events and installing blast-resistant windows and trash receptacles in certain areas of the venue). For more information on security measures, see Appendix 2.

Goal 5 – Utilize IED screening and detection methods in high-risk environments.

The following C-IED tasks include the activities security managers and staff at public assembly venues can utilize as screening and detection measures in public assembly venues.

Screen patrons and inspect bags upon entry.



Example

Educate visitors about venue screening and inspection practices. When visitors are prepared, the screening process proceeds more quickly.

The extent of screening and inspection practices (e.g., visual cues and the use of hand-held or walk-through metal detectors) during the steady-state environment varies widely across public assembly venues, depending on availability of resources, the mission of the venue, risk assessment results, and the associated burden to patrons. For example, some public assembly venues require tickets for patrons to enter the facility with security personnel screening patrons and inspecting bags, often with uniformed law enforcement officers in close proximity; others have open access with multiple entry and exit points; and others still vary their screening and inspection practices depending on the exhibition or performance.

If the threat is elevated, consider developing approaches to increase the security presence and enhance screening and inspection practices, such as requesting armed law enforcement officers to post at entrances and exits; using walk-through or hand-held metal detectors; instituting random screening and bag checks; and limiting what visitors can bring inside the venue. Screening and inspection practices also need to balance security inside the venue with large crowd volume near the entrances to the venue, which becomes another security concern.



Public Assembly Subsector C-IED Goals

Screen vehicles.

The extent of vehicle screening and inspection practices (e.g., visual cues, use of undercarriage mirrors) during the steady-state environment varies widely across public assembly venues, depending on the event and location of parking facilities. For example, public assembly venues with onsite parking are more likely to conduct more comprehensive vehicle screening during the steady-state environment.

However, if the threat is elevated, the need to screen vehicles at onsite parking areas managed by the venue may outweigh collateral inconveniences. Enhanced vehicle screening could be as simple as adding extra security staff to monitor the loading and unloading areas immediately outside the entrance, or additional security capabilities, such as K9 units. For more information on screening vehicles, see Appendix 2.

Screen incoming deliveries.

During the steady-state threat environment, public assembly venue staff typically conduct visual screening of deliveries, focusing on general recognition of anything suspicious that could be associated with IEDs, such as strange odors, ticking sounds, and protruding wires.

However, if the threat is elevated, reinforce the importance of screening mail and other deliveries and reporting anything suspicious during daily staff meetings. Consider implementing more comprehensive screening practices (e.g., undercarriage screening and use of K9 units), depending on availability of resources, especially for those deliveries arriving on a day when there is a planned event. Consider also reorganizing delivery schedules, so that deliveries are not accepted during or immediately before planned events. For more information on screening deliveries, see Appendix 2.

Goal 6 – Take immediate safety precautions for bomb threats, suspicious items, and IEDs.

The following C-IED task includes the activities that security managers and staff at public assembly venues can employ to take immediate safety precautions for bomb threats and suspicious items.

Search for potential IEDs.

Standard practice upon receiving a bomb threat is to initiate a strategic search of the entire venue to locate the potential bomb, to include the interior (e.g., restrooms and garbage cans), exterior (e.g., along exterior walls and parking lots), and buffer zones (e.g., lobbies and concourses).

If available, CCTV footage can aid in the search to determine, for example, if a suspicious package is merely an unattended bag or if it was left behind deliberately. CCTV can also actively be used to monitor crowds for suspicious activity.

Emerging technology, such as geo-specific social media monitoring tools that allow users to monitor information being posted to social media sites from a specified location, can provide additional information to security managers and staff to support the search for potential IEDs.

If a potential IED is located through the search process, monitor the device, but do not touch it, until law enforcement arrives on scene. Importantly, limit the use of communication devices when searching for an



Example

Assign responsibilities to support an IED search to staff who are familiar with specific areas, as they will be most able to spot anything out-of-place. Include this information with educational and training materials.

Public Assembly Subsector C-IED Goals

IED, as the use of two-way radios and cell phones could trigger detonation of an actual device. Notify and coordinate with law enforcement for further instructions.

For more information on search procedures, see Appendix 2.

Determine and implement appropriate protective measures.



Example

Provide local law enforcement with the location of the rallying point for the venue. They will conduct a security sweep of the area prior to an evacuation to ensure the location is safe.

If an IED threat is determined to be credible, establish a cordon around the object to keep staff and visitors away from the area. Determine whether an evacuation is warranted, and if so, whether the entire venue needs to be evacuated or if a partial evacuation is sufficient (e.g., relocating visitors from one exhibit hall to another at a museum or zoo). Identify an evacuation route that minimizes exposure to a potential blast. Ideally, inspect the chosen evacuation route and rallying point before notifying visitors of the need to evacuate.

In the event of a successful IED detonation, keep visitors within the venue if it is safe to do so, given the concern of secondary devices. If the decision is made to evacuate visitors, identify exit points as far from the blast as possible, and direct the evacuation accordingly.

For more information on IED evacuation distances, see Appendix 2.

Threat Description	Explosives Capacity	Mandatory Evacuation Distance	Shelter-in-Place Zone	Preferred Evacuation Distance
Pipe Bomb	5 lbs	70 ft	71-1199 ft	>1200 ft
Suicide Bomber	20 lbs	150 ft	151-1049 ft	>1700 ft
Briefcase/Suitcase	50 lbs	150 ft	151-1049 ft	>1550 ft
Car	500 lbs	320 ft	321-1899 ft	>1900 ft
SUV/Van	1,000 lbs	400 ft	401-2099 ft	>2400 ft
Small Delivery Truck	4,000 lbs	640 ft	641-3799 ft	>3800 ft
Container/Water Truck	10,000 lbs	800 ft	801-5099 ft	>5100 ft
Semi-Trailer	60,000 lbs	1570 ft	1571-9299 ft	>9300 ft

Figure 4: Bomb Threat Stand-Off Card
Source: DHS OBP

Goal 7 – Safely coordinate response activities at IED incident sites.

The following C-IED tasks include the activities that security managers and staff at public assembly venues can utilize to safely coordinate the response to IED threats at their facilities and support the local emergency response community following a successful detonation.

Establish and operate a unified command structure during events.

Implement a unified command structure, guided by the incident command system (ICS),⁷ as a means to organize and integrate public assembly venue management and security staff with local, state, and federal agencies (e.g., local police, bomb squad, fire, and emergency medical services; state police and National Guard assets; and the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]), who are also supporting an event. Define and document the command structure in the venue emergency operations plan or emergency action plan.

Implement emergency operations plan.

Develop and update an emergency operations plan to guide the response to an IED threat or successful detonation. At a minimum, the plan should outline procedures for the following activities:

- Reporting credible IED threats to local law enforcement;
- Searching for potential IEDs and what to do if one is located;

⁷ For more information about ICS, see <https://www.fema.gov/incident-command-system-resources>.

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- Notifying appropriate personnel and agencies;
- Coordinating with first responders to ensure unity of effort;
- Providing information to visitors; and
- Executing emergency protective actions based on an identified IED threat.

For more information on threat and detonation responses, see Appendix 2.

Share IED-related information in the event of an IED threat.

When responding to an IED threat, notify and provide information to local law enforcement and fire rescue agencies, patrons, entertainers, and any accompanying staff for traveling performances and exhibits.

- **Information to law enforcement and fire rescue agencies.** The types of information that security managers should expect to provide arriving law enforcement and fire rescue responders include the following:

- Information collected on a bomb threat checklist;
- Any suspicious activity or deliveries at the time the threat was made;
- Information about the IED threat including whether the threat was made to a general phone number or a private number, the phone number that made the call, and exactly what the caller said;
- Whether a search for the suspected IED has been conducted, and if so, the results of that search;
- Size of any suspected IEDs located, as this will determine the area that will need to be cordoned off;
- Venue floor plan, CCTV, and other electronic information that could be informative; and
- Potential hazardous materials or chemicals that could affect responders or reduce the effectiveness of a K9 unit.




Figure 5: The Alfred P. Murrah Building following the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City that killed 168 people and injured more than 500. Property of DHS

In addition, law enforcement officers will often want to speak with the person who received initial information about an IED threat, the manager (to learn about recent threats, firings, and any other employee issues), and the building engineer or facility manager.



Public Assembly Subsector C-IED Goals

- **Information to visitors.** Provide visitors with up-to-date information about a credible IED threat, especially given that some information about the IED threat and associated law enforcement presence is likely to be posted on social media. Consider also providing guidance to performers and their associated staff, especially for those who may be considered controversial, to increase security in and around hotels and while traveling to and from the public assembly venue (e.g., varying transportation routes).
- **Information to media.** Seek guidance with leadership/management and public relations staff to develop a media relations strategy and/or plan about an IED threat/or incident or suspected IED within the public assembly venue to communicate with patrons/attendees/guests, staff, and any businesses or residential communities in the surrounding area. Utilize news and social media and other communication mediums to share important information, such as stand-off areas or evaluation plans, to law enforcement, emergency responders, and customers.



Example

Coordinate with communications staff to develop standard messages that have been vetted and approved so that they can be posted as quickly as possible in the event of a credible IED threat.

For more information on sharing IED-related information, see Appendix 2.

Coordinate with responders and provide support for response operations following an IED detonation.

Following an IED detonation within or near the public assembly venue, establish a command structure to coordinate all activities inside the venue, including the following:

- Prepare staging areas and triage points for arriving law enforcement, fire rescue, and emergency medical services responders;
- Initiate a security sweep to identify potential secondary devices;
- Implement a process to account for all employees;
- Clear and sweep exits routes to support evacuation of visitors; and
- Designate someone with authority to make decisions to support the responders' unified command, when it is established.

Public assembly venues located within the vicinity of an IED detonation but otherwise unaffected could also support response efforts. Examples include the following:

- Provide space and/or resources for a command post to direct response operations;
- Serve as a family reunification center and/or emergency shelter;
- Support medical services and triage; and
- Stage responder vehicles in parking areas.



Example

During the steady-state threat environment, invite first responders for a security walk-through or to train in the public assembly venue. This provides an opportunity for venue staff to coordinate with responders and for responders get a better idea of the venue layout.

Public Assembly Subsector C-IED Goals

Relationship between C-IED goals, tasks, and stakeholders

The following table shows the relationship between the C-IED goals and example tasks described in greater detail above and the stakeholder(s) responsible for addressing them.

C-IED Goals and Tasks	Stakeholder				
	Visitors	Security / Management ⁸	Public-Facing Staff	Facilities / Engineering	Internal Support Staff
Goal 1: Use and share risk information to guide IED-related physical security, law enforcement, and emergency response activities					
Assess risk of an IED incident		X			
Monitor and share IED-related security information		X			
Goal 2: Identify and report IED-related suspicious activity					
Educate all staff and visitors to understand potential IED threats	X	X	X	X	X
Recognize out-of-place and suspicious behavior	X	X	X	X	X
Recognize IED components and explosive precursors	X	X	X	X	X
Report any potential IED-related information to appropriate authorities	X	X	X	X	X
Provide evidence and information from bomb threats to local law enforcement		X			
Goal 4: Implement site-specific protective measures to prevent and minimize the impact of IED incidents					
Verify identity of full-time employees, temporary staff and performers, and volunteers		X			X
Conduct a security sweep of the event space before opening prior to special events		X		X	
Implement facility-related security measures		X			

⁸ For venues without full-time security managers, these activities would likely be accomplished by the facility manager.

Public Assembly Subsector C-IED Goals

C-IED Goals and Tasks	Stakeholder				
	Visitors	Security / Management ⁸	Public-Facing Staff	Facilities / Engineering	Internal Support Staff
Goal 5: Utilize IED screening and detection methods in high-risk environments					
Screen patrons and inspect bags upon entry		X	X		
Screen vehicles		X		X	
Screen incoming deliveries		X		X	
Goal 6: Take immediate safety precautions for bomb threats, suspicious items, and IEDs					
Search for potential IEDs		X			
Determine and implement appropriate protective measures		X	X	X	X
Goal 7: Safely coordinate response activities at IED incident sites					
Establish and operate a command structure during events		X			
Implement emergency operations plan		X			
Share IED-related information in the event of an IED threat		X	X		
Coordinate with responders and provide support for response operations following an IED detonation		X	X	X	X

Public Assembly Subsector C-IED Goals

The following image presents tasks for countering IED threats in and around public assembly facilities.




EXHIBITS/PERFORMANCE SPACES

- Conduct a security sweep before opening to public and before events
- Recognize IED components, precursors, and devices
- Recognize and report information on suspicious activity and potential bomb threats
- Report unauthorized access to secure areas
- Search for persons or objects associated with an IED threat
- Implement appropriate protective measures
- Share information with visitors in the event of a bomb threat or incident



LOBBY/ATRIUM/CONCOURSE

- Conduct a security sweep before opening to public and before events
- Recognize IED components, precursors, and device
- Recognize and report information on suspicious activity and potential bomb threats
- Report unauthorized access to secure areas
- Search for persons or objects associated with an IED threat
- Implement appropriate protective measures
- Share information with visitors in the event of a bomb threat or incident



SECURITY OFFICE

- Assess potential risks to the venue
- Educate all staff to understand potential bomb threats
- Conduct background checks on personnel prior to employment
- Issue badges to staff
- Exchange IED-related security information with government and private sector partners
- Control access to secure areas
- Implement emergency operations plan in response to a credible bomb threat or incident
- Share information with staff and visitors in the event of a bomb threat or incident
- Coordinate with responders supporting an event and/or responding to a bomb threat or incident
- Provide evidence to law enforcement in response to a bomb threat or incident
- Determine and implement appropriate protective measures based on emergency action plan
- Support response operations following a bomb detonation



ENTRANCES

- Implement facility-related security measures, such as lighting and cameras
- Conduct a security sweep before opening to public and before events
- Verify visitor credentials, as applicable
- Screen visitors and bags
- Recognize IED components, precursors, and devices
- Recognize and report information on suspicious activity and potential bomb threats



DELIVERY/STORAGE/ON-SITE PARKING

- Implement security measures, such as fencing, cameras, and lighting
- Maintain control over explosives (e.g., fireworks) and explosive precursors (e.g., fertilizer and cleaning supplies)
- Screen delivery personnel and deliveries
- Conduct a security sweep before opening to public and before events
- Screen vehicles parking on-site
- Recognize IED components, precursors, and devices
- Recognize and report information on suspicious activity and potential bomb threats
- Report unauthorized access to secure areas



Public Assembly Subsector C-IED Goals

Conclusion

Ensuring the safety of visitors and staff is a priority for all public assembly owners and operators. By connecting with local authorities, developing plans to identify issues and support incident response, training employees, and reporting concerns to emergency authorities, many incidents may be mitigated or avoided. The preventive measures outlined in this report can help public assembly owners and operators create a safer environment for their visitors and staff while maintaining an open and inviting atmosphere.

Appendix 1: Public Assembly Subsector C-IED Goals and Tasks Checklist

This appendix contains a version of the C-IED goals and tasks in a checklist format. Security managers and staff at public assembly venues can use this checklist to evaluate their C-IED preparedness and identify areas for improvement. Managers should consider the following instructions prior to beginning the evaluation of their C-IED preparedness:

- **Select Tasks.** Security managers should first identify which C-IED tasks are most relevant to their venue based on their assessment of the risk from IEDs.
- **Select participants.** Security managers are encouraged to engage a subgroup of employees representing a broad cross-section of functions to examine their C-IED processes and identify deficiencies.
- **Solicit responses.** Some tasks can be examined by one functional group; others require collaboration across functional groups. For those that require collaboration, managers should gather input from all of the stakeholders that have a role in executing the task to determine a consensus for the venue as a whole.
- **Scope of the answers.** Considerable variation exists between different types of public assembly venues, from large performance venues and conference centers, to smaller theaters and libraries, to zoos. Therefore, users of the checklist should think about how they want to be able to achieve each task and then assess whether they are able to perform that task successfully.
- **Use the results.** The information gathered can illustrate and enhance successful efforts, identify additional opportunities to strengthen C-IED preparedness, and avoid redundant efforts. Additionally, a clear understanding of gaps enables managers to identify, prioritize, and justify key actions to take and equipment to purchase.




Figure 6: Graphic showing the site of the bombing at the Manchester Arena on May 22, 2017, that killed 22 people and injured more than 50.

Property of DHS

Appendix 1: Public Assembly Subsector C-IED Goals and Tasks Checklist

C-IED goals and tasks checklist

The following table outlines a broader list of tasks, which align to the six goals described in the document in an operational checklist format.

C-IED Goals and Tasks	Response (Yes—Partial—No—N/A)
Goal 1: Use and share risk information to guide IED-related physical security, law enforcement, and emergency response activities	
Assess potential risks, including threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, from an IED incident.	
Assess potential IED risks by buildings adjacent to the public assembly facility.	
Support local, state, tribal, territorial, regional, and national efforts to analyze and assess IED risk and resilience.	
Maintain the routine exchange of IED-related security information—including alerts, attack indications and warnings, and advisories—among government and industry stakeholders and nearby businesses.	
Monitor and act upon industry and government IED-related threat information.	
Report unauthorized access to secure areas.	
Promptly share actionable alerts and messages with employees and visitors, as appropriate, in the event of an IED threat.	
During an IED event, communicate warnings (e.g., protective measures for evacuation or shelter in place) to employees and visitors.	
Provide information that could be associated with IEDs (e.g., individuals conducting surveillance) to local law enforcement.	
Provide evidence to appropriate authorities to support the collection of intelligence information with respect to potential IED threats.	
Goal 2: Identify and report IED-related suspicious activity	
Educate employees and visitors to recognize and report suspicious behavior, activities, and objects that could be associated with IEDs.	
Recognize out-of-place and suspicious behavior (e.g., persons loitering in entrance areas wearing unusually bulky clothing that might conceal suicide explosives, individuals attempting to access restricted areas, or individuals conducting surveillance of the venue) that may indicate planning or execution of an IED attack.	



Appendix 1: Public Assembly Subsector C-IED Goals and Tasks Checklist

C-IED Goals and Tasks	Response (Yes—Partial—No—N/A)
Recognize out-of-place and suspicious objects (e.g., unattended packages or backpacks or vehicles illegally parked near an entrance) that could be IEDs.	
Recognize IED components, precursors, and suspect devices in common areas, such as such as entrances, lobbies/atriums/concourses and performance spaces, bathrooms lockers, trash bins, and parking garages.	
Report information on suspicious activity and potential IED threats to appropriate authorities.	
Maintain control over explosives and explosive precursors of concern located in the public assembly venue (e.g. fuel and cleaning supplies).	
Goal 4: Implement site-specific protective measures to prevent and minimize the impact of IED incidents	
Verify visitor credentials (e.g., tickets) for access to the event, as required.	
Issue badges to verify identity of full-time staff, temporary or visiting staff, and volunteers.	
Secure and control access to high-risk areas that require additional security, such as security offices, mechanical and storage areas, performance preparatory areas, and parking lots.	
Inspect security barriers such as locks, gates, and doors for signs of intrusion.	
Develop and implement protective security features, such as perimeter lighting and fences, and barriers that provide effective standoff distance from potential IED attacks and to prevent unauthorized access to the event.	
Develop and implement mitigation measures and blast-resistant design, especially in high-risk areas, to limit the effects of an IED detonation.	
Deploy assets (e.g., surveillance cameras and security personnel) to interior and exterior areas to interdict, deter, or disrupt IED threats from reaching potential target(s).	
Goal 5: Utilize IED screening and detection methods in high-risk environments	
Screen patrons and inspect bags, including equipment bags and other containers, to detect suspicious objects that could be IEDs or IED components.	
Screen vehicles upon arrival and in parking facilities to identify suspicious objects or devices that could be IEDs.	

Appendix 1: Public Assembly Subsector C-IED

Goals and Tasks Checklist

C-IED Goals and Tasks	Response (Yes—Partial—No—N/A)
Screen incoming deliveries to identify anything suspicious that could be associated with IEDs (e.g., strange odors, ticking sounds, or protruding wires).	
Screen full-time staff, temporary or visiting staff, and volunteers prior to employment and/or use.	
Conduct a security sweep throughout the event space before opening.	
Goal 6: Take immediate safety precautions for bomb threats, suspicious items, and IEDs	
Determine and implement appropriate protective measures (e.g., evacuation) for employees and visitors in the event of a known/suspected IED threat.	
Search for persons or objects associated with an IED threat.	
Goal 7: Safely coordinate response activities at IED incident sites	
Implement command structure to integrate multi-organizational operations with security staff during high-profile events.	
Implement established emergency operations plan to support C-IED functions/operations in response to an IED threat or successful detonation.	
Coordinate with local first responders during an IED threat or following an explosion to ensure unity of effort (e.g., event security should coordinate with law enforcement personnel responding to a report of an IED threat).	
Alert response personnel to potential hazardous materials near the suspected or detonated IED.	
Provide support to first responders, as requested by unified command and elected officials, following an IED detonation (e.g., command post, vehicle staging area, or medical services and triage).	

Appendix 2: Public Assembly Subsector C-IED Resources

The resources appendix provides a number of pre-existing guidance documents and products (e.g., posters, pamphlets, and guides) for public assembly stakeholders who are interested in learning more about the C-IED tasks. Whenever possible, there is a link to the resource; to request those without a link (indicated with an asterisk), please contact OBP at OBP@hq.dhs.gov.

Resource	Resource description
Identifying ammonium nitrate and urea-based fertilizers awareness	Awareness poster that highlights the IED implications for ammonium-nitrate and fertilizer products that could be found within a public assembly venue and used in a bomb.
Identifying indicators of a bomb-making laboratory	Awareness poster* that highlights potential indicators what a room might look like when used to construct a bomb.
Identifying explosive precursor chemicals	Awareness poster* that highlights the IED implications for chemical products that could be found within a public assembly venue and used as an explosive precursor.
Identifying hazardous chemical materials	Awareness poster that highlights the IED implications for hazardous chemical products that could be found within a public assembly venue and used in a bomb.
Identifying peroxide materials	Awareness poster that highlights the IED implications for peroxide products that could be found within a public assembly venue and used in a bomb.
AWR-333: IED Construction and Classification	75-minute virtual instructor-led training that provides public and private sector individuals a foundational knowledge on the construction and classification of IEDs.
Identifying a suicide bomber	Awareness poster* that highlights the potential behaviors and indicators of a suicide bomber.
Identifying a vehicle-borne IED (VBIED)	Awareness poster that highlights potential indicators of a VBIED.
AWR-338: Homemade Explosives (HME) and Precursor Awareness	60-minute virtual instructor-led training that provides public and private sector individuals a foundational knowledge on homemade explosives and common precursor materials that are used to make them.
TRIPwire program tutorial	Tutorial video detailing DHS's TRIPwire program and the variety of C-IED resources available and how to sign up.
Bag check and suspicious item training	8-minute instructional video on how to conduct bag checks and identify suspicious items.
Screening and searching vehicles	Vehicle inspection guide that identifies safety procedures and best practices when screening vehicles entering venue.

Appendix 2: Public Assembly Subsector C-IED Resources

Resource	Resource description
Bomb threat guidance	Informational guide to assist personnel in identifying critical steps and procedures to prevent and protect against a potential IED incident.
MGT-451: Bomb Threat Management Planning Course	8-hour in-person training that provides participants a foundational knowledge of the DHS risk management process.
PER-336: Protective Measures Course	8-hour in-person training that provides participants foundational knowledge on facility vulnerability, C-IED protective measures, and strategies that can be used to mitigate risk and reduce vulnerabilities within their unique sector.
PER-346: Surveillance Detection Course for Law Enforcement and Security Professionals	3-day in-person training that provides public and private sector security professionals with instructions on how to detect hostile surveillance by exploring surveillance techniques, tactics, and procedures from an adversary's perspective; these skills enhance C-IED capabilities to detect, prevent, protect against, and respond to IED threats.
PER-310: VBIED Detection Course	8-hour in-person training that improves participant's ability to successfully inspect for, detect, identify, and respond to a VBIED; instruction covers the VBIED threat, explosive effects, IEDs, and vehicle inspections, enabling participants to detect, deter, and protect against the illicit use of explosives.
AWR-348: Bombing Prevention Awareness Course	8-hour in-person training that provides participants knowledge of general bombing prevention measures that aid in the prevention of a bombing incident, identification of protective measures, and mitigation of IED impacts.
AWR-335: Response to Suspicious Behaviors and Items	60-minute virtual instructor-led training that provides participants with an awareness of the indicators of suspicious behavior and the preventative responses to suspicious behaviors and/or items.
IS-914: Surveillance Awareness: What You Can Do	60-minute Web-based training that provides an overview of surveillance activities and how employees and service providers can identify and report potential surveillance incidents.
Training course on IEDs, package inspection and mail room procedures	2-day in-person training that provides participants a basic understanding of explosives, IEDs; package handling, mail room procedures and bomb threats; vehicle bombs and inspections.
AWR-340: Protective Measures Awareness	60-minute virtual instructor-led course that provides participants foundational knowledge on risk management, surveillance, and various protective measures.
Conducting visitor screening	Informational guide that identifies best practices for screening visitors.

Appendix 2: Public Assembly Subsector C-IED Resources

Resource	Resource description
AWR-337: IED Explosive Effects Mitigation	60-minute virtual instructor-led training that introduces participants to the effects of an explosive blast and security measures and best practices that can help prevent or mitigate explosive effects.
PER-346: Surveillance Detection Course for Law Enforcement and Security Professionals	3-day in-person training that provides public and private sector security professionals instructions on how to detect hostile surveillance by exploring surveillance techniques, tactics, and procedures from an adversary’s perspective; these skills enhance C-IED capabilities to detect, prevent, protect against, and respond to IED threats.
Steps to take when receiving a bomb threat	4-minute informational video describing what steps to take in the event of receiving a bomb threat.
Recording information during a phoned in bomb threat	Informational guide on what information to record in the event of receiving a bomb threat by phone.
Minimum evacuation distance for an IED incident	Informational poster that details the recommended minimum evacuation distance for IED incidents of different magnitudes.
PER-339: IED Search Procedures Course	8-hour in-person training that provides participants foundational knowledge of search safety procedures and the opportunity to practice live searches of a facility, an area, and a route.
AWR-341: IED Awareness and Safety Procedures Computer-Based Training	60-minute Web-based training that provides participants with foundational knowledge concerning IEDs and proper safety precautions and procedures for reacting and responding to unattended and suspicious items.



Appendix 3: Public Assembly Subsector C-IED References

The following is a list of references that informed the public assembly C-IED tasks.

- Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee. *Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Guidelines for Places of Mass Gathering*. 2016.
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