### MAIL-IN VOTING RISK: INFRASTRUCTURE AND PROCESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISK</th>
<th>COMPENSATING CONTROLS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All forms of voting – in this case mail-in voting – bring a variety of cyber and infrastructure risks.</td>
<td>Risks to mail-in voting can be managed through various policies, procedures, and controls, which build layers of safeguards to defend the process from manipulation.</td>
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<td>Implementation of mail-in voting infrastructure and processes within a compressed timeline may also introduce new risk.</td>
<td>Election officials must assess the risks of introducing new infrastructure with the operational risks associated with doing so in a compressed timeline before making a determination. Planning, preparation, training, and redundancy will build resiliency.</td>
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<td>The outbound and inbound processing of mail-in ballots introduces additional infrastructure and technology, increasing potential scalability of cyber attacks.</td>
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<td>Disinformation risk to mail-in voting infrastructure and processes is similar to that of in-person voting while utilizing different content. Threat actors may leverage limited understanding regarding mail-in voting processes to mislead and confuse the public.</td>
<td>Compensating controls for additional infrastructure are the same as other election technology and infrastructure, so election officials should focus on cyber risk management best practices to build resiliency in the overall election process.</td>
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- **Some jurisdictions have implemented election technology and infrastructure to speed up the process.**
- **Some jurisdictions are legally afforded the opportunity to begin processing ballot application and ballots in advance of election day.**
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**Election officials, media, candidates, and NGOs are educating voters about the mail voting process.**

- **The National Association of Secretaries of State launched TrustedInfo2020 to highlight state and local election officials as the credible, verified sources for election information.**