Analysis Report

MAR-10135536-12 – North Korean Trojan: TYPEFRAME

Last Revised
Alert Code
AR18-165A

Notification

This report is provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service, referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.

This document is marked TLP:WHITE. Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol, see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp.

Summary

Description

This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts between Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Working with U.S. Government partners, DHS and FBI identified Trojan malware variants used by the North Korean government. This malware variant is known as TYPEFRAME. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on HIDDEN COBRA activity, visit https[:]//www[.]us-cert.gov/hiddencobra.DHS and FBI are distributing this MAR to enable network defense and reduce exposure to North Korean government malicious cyber activity.This MAR includes malware descriptions related to HIDDEN COBRA, suggested response actions and recommended mitigation techniques. Users or administrators should flag activity associated with the malware, report the activity to the DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) or the FBI Cyber Watch (CyWatch), and give the activity the highest priority for enhanced mitigation.This malware report contains analysis of 11 malware samples consisting of 32-bit and 64-bit Windows executable files and a malicious Microsoft Word document that contains Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. These files have the capability to download and install malware, install proxy and Remote Access Trojans (RATs), connect to command and control (C2) servers to receive additional instructions, and modify the victim's firewall to allow incoming connections.

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see:

Submitted Files (11)

201c7cd10a2bd50dde0948d14c3c7a0732955c908a3392aee3d08b94470c9d33 (1C53E7269FE9D84C6DF0A25BA59B82...)

20abb95114de946da7595438e9edf0bf39c85ba8512709db7d5532d37d73bd64 (EF9DB20AB0EEBF0B7C55AF4EC0B7BC...)

3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210 (java.exe)

40ef57ca2a617f5d24ac624339ba2027b6cf301c28684bf8b2075fc7a2e95116 (CA67F84D5A4AC1459934128442C53B...)

4bd7d801d7ce3fe9c2928dbc834b296e934473f5bbcc9a1fd18af5ebd43192cd (3229A6CEA658B1B3CA5CA9AD7B40D8...)

546dbd370a40c8e46f9b599a414f25000eec5ae6b3e046a035fe6e6cd5d874e1 (6AB301FC3296E1CEB140BF5D294894...)

675a35e04b19aab314bcbc4b1f2610e3dea4a80c277cc5188f1d1391a00dfdb1 (10B28DA8EEFAC62CE282154F273B3E...)

8c3e0204f52200325ed36db9b12aba1c5e46984d415514538a5bf10783cacdf8 (F5A4235EF02F34D547F71AA5434D9B...)

c9e3b83d77ce93cc1d70b22e967f049b13515c88572aa78e0a838103e5478777 (BFB41BC0C3856AA0A81A5256B7B8DA...)

d1d490866d4a4d29306f0d9300bffc1450c41bb8fd62371d29672bf9f747bf92 (BF474B8ACD55380B1169BB949D60E9...)

e69d6c2d3e9c4beebee7f3a4a3892e5fdc601beda7c3ec735f0dfba2b29418a7 (60294C426865B38FDE7C5031AFC4E4...)

Additional Files (3)

089e49de61701004a5eff6de65476ed9c7632b6020c2c0f38bb5761bca897359 (midimapper.rs)

a71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6 (laxhost.dll)

e088c3a0b0f466df5329d9a66ff618de3d468d8a5981715303babb1452631eef (dwnhost.dll)

IPs (7)

111.207.78.204

181.119.19.56

184.107.209.2

59.90.93.97

80.91.118.45

81.0.213.173

98.101.211.162

Findings

8c3e0204f52200325ed36db9b12aba1c5e46984d415514538a5bf10783cacdf8

Tags

backdoorremote-access-trojantrojan

Details
Name F5A4235EF02F34D547F71AA5434D9BB4
Size 490705 bytes
Type PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
MD5 f5a4235ef02f34d547f71aa5434d9bb4
SHA1 338699d56f17ab91fa2da1cb446593c013ae1a01
SHA256 8c3e0204f52200325ed36db9b12aba1c5e46984d415514538a5bf10783cacdf8
SHA512 27c610096248492fce0f8f478c62255cd1abc4ceb4a1ae310ca311a6d38ee3b93ce75ba45089204d0eb2036393bdcb98b3e77396d5ae6b9eecacc3a019ed225e
ssdeep 12288:2okf/Epk6/lctEJxrXtl3h1ihDnjvAHR7ie5XtO/DRUKwS4Z/B5:2o6/EpH/iwNXtlhSnjg+e5A/DaZp5
Entropy 7.788643
Antivirus
Ahnlab Malware/Win32.Generic
Avira TR/Crypt.ZPACK.Gen
BitDefender Trojan.GenericKD.31021159
ClamAV Win.Trojan.Typeframe-6595033-1
Cyren W32/Trojan.CTWS-9289
ESET a variant of Win32/NukeSped.EP trojan
Emsisoft Trojan.GenericKD.31021159 (B)
Ikarus Trojan.Crypt
K7 Trojan ( 00535e7c1 )
McAfee RDN/Generic BackDoor
Microsoft Security Essentials Trojan:Win32/NukeSped
NANOAV Trojan.Win32.NukeSped.feqzlz
Sophos Troj/Cruprox-B
Symantec Trojan Horse
TrendMicro BKDR_NUKESPED.I
TrendMicro House Call BKDR_NUKESPED.I
VirusBlokAda Backdoor.Agent
Zillya! Backdoor.Agent.Win32.66271
Yara Rules
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule enc_PK_header { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "3229a6cea658b1b3ca5ca9ad7b40d8d4" strings: $s0 = { 5f a8 80 c5 a0 87 c7 f0 9e e6 } $s1 = { 95 f1 6e 9c 3f c1 2c 88 a0 5a } $s2 = { ae 1d af 74 c0 f5 e1 02 50 10 } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and any of them }
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule import_obfuscation_2 { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51" strings: $s0 = {A6 D6 02 EB 4E B2 41 EB C3 EF 1F} $s1 = {B6 DF 01 FD 48 B5 } $s2 = {B6 D5 0E F3 4E B5 } $s3 = {B7 DF 0E EE } $s4 = {B6 DF 03 FC } $s5 = {A7 D3 03 FC } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them }
ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata
Compile Date 2017-06-05 21:21:28-04:00
Import Hash edb148321293bdc8b7ba8fbe0b1c6ed9
PE Sections
MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy
dde6c6e739f41680377511c709f7209a header 4096 0.590336
db44e1900789a7fd43b05d3871c9ab03 .text 53248 6.538652
91d9797bd52d49fb73009fc3e0cdd7c5 .rdata 12288 3.476192
ef4ab26cc2c30397b12c53c759fcbef2 .data 16384 2.132158
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ v6.0
Relationships
8c3e0204f5... Contains a71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6
Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows portable executable file designed to install a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) as a service on the victim system. The malware accepts the following argument during execution "68S3mI2AMcmOz3BgjnuYpLlZ4fZog7sd”.The RAT’s APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:--Begin RC4 key--85 C0 7C 17 8B 4D F4 8B 76 20 33 C0 3B C8 77 0B--End RC4 key--Decrypted strings of interest are displayed below:--Begin strings of interest--host.dll"Task Notification Service""Monitors And Notifies Task Scheduling And Interaction"netsvcs--End strings of interest--When executed, the RAT checks if the module "C:\Windows\system32\laxhost.dll" is installed on the compromised system. If it is not installed, it will load an embedded RC4 encrypted archive file from the start of the offset "0x15000”.The malware decrypts the archive using the same RC4 key. The decrypted archive contains a malicious DLL module, which is decompressed and installed into "C:\Windows\system32\laxhost.dll”. The first three characters of the module name are randomly generated.The malware contains an RC4 encrypted configuration file data (192 bytes). During runtime, it installs the encrypted configuration data into the following registry key:--Begin registry key--hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESubkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\laxhost.dll"ValueName = "Description"ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"--End registry key--The malware installs a malicious DLL module as a serviceDLL in the "netsvcs" service group in order to execute "C:\Windows\system32\laxhost.dll" using the Windows service hosting process, "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe." The service name and the display name are randomly generated.The installed service information is displayed below:--Begin service information--ServiceName = "Irmon"DisplayName = "Irmon"DesiredAccess = SERVICE_ALL_ACCESSServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32_SHARE_PROCESSStartType = SERVICE_AUTO_STARTBinaryPathName = "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs"--End service information--

a71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6

Tags

backdoorremote-access-trojantrojan

Details
Name laxhost.dll
Size 843776 bytes
Type PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
MD5 aa7924157b77dd1ff749d474f3062f90
SHA1 4f02a6bf2b24c371e9f589cff8e32b4d94cf4f29
SHA256 a71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6
SHA512 5150d8b063297d0da04288b4e4e2ad3d54b7546d909a71557789529d73703673098c37970280cd62c45306458cfcda701c1a7cee31ee7fb2192e627e11f0a3bd
ssdeep 24576:r/pmC31xkE8sOvtQ6Wtuc0WhgpaM2yYq:bpj0E8sOvtQ6Wtuc0WhgpaM2yYq
Entropy 6.681288
Antivirus
Ahnlab Backdoor/Win32.Nukesped
Antiy Trojan/Win32.AGeneric
Avira TR/AD.LazerusAPT.cpdeh
BitDefender Trojan.GenericKD.31015744
ClamAV Win.Trojan.Typeframe-6595033-1
Cyren W32/Trojan.KSYA-1796
ESET a variant of Win32/NukeSped.EP trojan
Emsisoft Trojan.GenericKD.31015744 (B)
Filseclab W32.NukeSped.EP.zous
Ikarus Trojan.Win32.NukeSped
K7 Riskware ( 0040eff71 )
McAfee RDN/Generic BackDoor
Microsoft Security Essentials Backdoor:Win32/SilverMob.A!dha
NANOAV Trojan.Win32.Redcap.fepugy
Sophos Troj/Cruprox-B
Systweak malware.gen-ra
TrendMicro BKDR_NU.6961FCEE
TrendMicro House Call BKDR_NU.6961FCEE
VirusBlokAda Backdoor.SilverMob
Zillya! Trojan.NukeSped.Win32.79
Yara Rules
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule import_obfuscation_2 { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51" strings: $s0 = {A6 D6 02 EB 4E B2 41 EB C3 EF 1F} $s1 = {B6 DF 01 FD 48 B5 } $s2 = {B6 D5 0E F3 4E B5 } $s3 = {B7 DF 0E EE } $s4 = {B6 DF 03 FC } $s5 = {A7 D3 03 FC } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them }
ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata
Compile Date 2017-06-09 13:59:30-04:00
Import Hash 180f8d53e7b967e9af9444547c05f192
Company Name Microsoft Corporation
File Description Xps Object Model in memory creation and deserialization
Internal Name xpsservices.dll
Legal Copyright Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
Original Filename xpsservices.dll
Product Name Microsoft Windows Operating System
Product Version 6.1.7601.17514
PE Sections
MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy
e1b6f98aadc18cf1b2e1796eb3d8b783 header 4096 0.800174
5d97a9d06913043a085d8071f7a5ab7c .text 540672 6.661444
bab7eb304870fe36e8c98f5085b8603c .rdata 163840 6.184319
33e00b6b91f87e1e948a8bc44803837f .data 81920 4.853104
4093ef4294e5d39c92ba4d89a6c92a15 .rsrc 8192 3.983157
39ddff289842b4fafc796c9795b870c8 .reloc 45056 5.723684
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0
Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 DLL (Debug)
Relationships
a71017302e... Connected_To 59.90.93.97
a71017302e... Contained_Within 8c3e0204f52200325ed36db9b12aba1c5e46984d415514538a5bf10783cacdf8
Description

laxhost.dll (original name: KDCOLCWP.DLL) is a 32-bit Windows dynamic-link library (DLL) file and is a RAT module that was installed as a service by the file 8c3e0204f52200325ed36db9b12aba1c5e46984d415514538a5bf10783cacdf8.laxhost.dll’s APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:--Begin RC4 key--85 C0 7C 17 8B 4D F4 8B 76 20 33 C0 3B C8 77 0B--End RC4 key--When executed, it loads and decrypts the encrypted configuration file data from the registry using the same RC4 key:--Begin registry key--hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESubkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\laxhost.dll"ValueName = "Description"ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"--End registry key--The decrypted data contains hexadecimal-encoded C2 IP address and port number:--Begin IP and port # list -BB 01 3B 5A 5D 61 ==> 59.90.93.97:443--End IP and port # list --The malware attempts to connect to its C2 server 59.90.93.97 using port 443 and wait for further instructions.The malware is designed to accept instructions from the remote server to perform the following functions:--Begin functions performed by the malware--Get Disk Free SpaceSearch for filesExecute process in elevated modeTerminate processesDelete filesExecute command-using shellDownload and upload filesRead files and write filesDelete Service and uninstall malware components using a batch script--End functions performed by the malware--

675a35e04b19aab314bcbc4b1f2610e3dea4a80c277cc5188f1d1391a00dfdb1

Tags

dropperproxytrojan

Details
Name 10B28DA8EEFAC62CE282154F273B3E34
Size 466267 bytes
Type PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
MD5 10b28da8eefac62ce282154f273b3e34
SHA1 25991d00eb1b1204b0066d5aeb79ac691047d7f0
SHA256 675a35e04b19aab314bcbc4b1f2610e3dea4a80c277cc5188f1d1391a00dfdb1
SHA512 7955c46e3d5ed3454340821caecd44d6bc1b918ef7bdcd6f0f8d67676cbf0fde52a578583a0388c4d838652d3d1da4615ced6ae2c59b562f030f752cbc7bfb99
ssdeep 6144:qoXLxi/EpH/ae6jEazjsHZ3OJJMUc6ngmOsH95rjw26XwXFLP7E1tC1KRtyn5o1n:qoQ/EpH/mEaiZiJy6ngm95t6qLPJp2d
Entropy 7.761748
Antivirus
Ahnlab Malware/Win32.Generic
Antiy Trojan/Win32.TSGeneric
Avira TR/Agent.ajluz
BitDefender Trojan.GenericKD.31017444
ClamAV Win.Trojan.Typeframe-6595033-1
Cyren W32/Trojan.LYOG-8913
ESET a variant of Win32/Agent.YDV trojan
Emsisoft Trojan.GenericKD.31017444 (B)
Ikarus Trojan.Win32.Agent
K7 Trojan ( 004fa2411 )
McAfee Generic.dvp
Microsoft Security Essentials Trojan:Win32/Autophyte.B!dha
NANOAV Trojan.Win32.Drop.feqzpd
Sophos Troj/Agent-AZOF
Symantec Trojan Horse
TrendMicro TROJ_PROXSPED.A
TrendMicro House Call TROJ_PROXSPED.A
VirusBlokAda BScope.TrojanDropper.Agent
Zillya! Trojan.Agent.Win32.902273
Yara Rules
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule enc_PK_header { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "3229a6cea658b1b3ca5ca9ad7b40d8d4" strings: $s0 = { 5f a8 80 c5 a0 87 c7 f0 9e e6 } $s1 = { 95 f1 6e 9c 3f c1 2c 88 a0 5a } $s2 = { ae 1d af 74 c0 f5 e1 02 50 10 } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and any of them }
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule import_obfuscation_2 { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51" strings: $s0 = {A6 D6 02 EB 4E B2 41 EB C3 EF 1F} $s1 = {B6 DF 01 FD 48 B5 } $s2 = {B6 D5 0E F3 4E B5 } $s3 = {B7 DF 0E EE } $s4 = {B6 DF 03 FC } $s5 = {A7 D3 03 FC } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them }
ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata
Compile Date 2016-07-24 19:38:33-04:00
Import Hash 225e9f7be86d6676c98a852492458049
PE Sections
MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy
58c7eb8637b7fbde7bb31985b77ca1af header 4096 0.591843
65d9f034d6153048c3e51bf5e07d6486 .text 53248 6.446416
eb9c5e8a429ac587cd35f0dcec939295 .rdata 12288 3.434883
d80b556aaa361958d9ecd816ac2a36c7 .data 16384 2.106829
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ v6.0
Relationships
675a35e04b... Contains e69d6c2d3e9c4beebee7f3a4a3892e5fdc601beda7c3ec735f0dfba2b29418a7
Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows executable designed to install a proxy module as a service on the victim’s system. This file accepts the following arguments during execution: "68S3mI2AMcmOz3BgjnuYpLlZ4fZog7sd."The malware’s APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:--Begin RC4 key--85 C0 7C 17 8B 4D F4 8B 76 20 33 C0 3B C8 77 0B--End RC4 key--Decrypted strings of interest are displayed below:--Begin strings of interest--"wmplayer.xml""printcache.tlb""Print Device Cache""Manage Print Device Cache And Printing"printcache--End strings of interest--When executed, it will load an embedded RC4 encrypted archive file from the start of the offset "0x15000."The malware decrypts the archive using the same RC4 key. The decrypted archive contains a proxy module, which is decompressed and installed from the existing file name "wmplayer.xml" to "C:\Windows\system32\printcache.tlb."The malware installs the module as a serviceDLL in the "printcache" service group in order to execute "C:\Windows\system32\printcache.tlb" using the Windows service hosting process, "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe."--Begin service--ServiceName = "printcache"DisplayName = "Print Device Cache"DesiredAccess = SERVICE_ALL_ACCESSServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32_SHARE_PROCESSStartType = SERVICE_AUTO_STARTBinaryPathName = "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe -k printcache"--End service--The malware contains an RC4 encrypted configuration file data, which contains port numbers (8 bytes). During runtime, it installs the encrypted configuration data into the following registry key:--Begin registry key--hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESubkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs"ValueName = "Description"ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"--End registry key--

e69d6c2d3e9c4beebee7f3a4a3892e5fdc601beda7c3ec735f0dfba2b29418a7

Tags

proxytrojan

Details
Name 60294C426865B38FDE7C5031AFC4E453
Size 778240 bytes
Type PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
MD5 60294c426865b38fde7c5031afc4e453
SHA1 f8736e3f89f30f082cfd68a73763afcfb0e1c9c3
SHA256 e69d6c2d3e9c4beebee7f3a4a3892e5fdc601beda7c3ec735f0dfba2b29418a7
SHA512 fe96fa2f127a3a71a9edc89268567188f8c585ea8356feb9a2c46224dc7022b3d751848424df745b517e7a1e123c566b6feb094653281026ffd2e9ce81d5a7a1
ssdeep 12288:8iwDMd29KJgSWD8QfEbsjlqxlsiAen1XQ1pV+jPAt:8WghEbvhAeC1pIDAt
Entropy 6.714021
Antivirus
Ahnlab Trojan/Win32.Agent
Antiy Trojan/Win32.Agentb
Avira TR/RedCap.gzgan
BitDefender Gen:Variant.Symmi.14589
ClamAV Win.Trojan.Typeframe-6595033-1
Cyren W32/Trojan.LQBT-4086
ESET Win32/NukeSped.EO trojan
Emsisoft Gen:Variant.Symmi.14589 (B)
Ikarus Trojan-Proxy.Win32.SilverMob
K7 Trojan ( 00535e7f1 )
McAfee GenericRXFZ-TW!60294C426865
Microsoft Security Essentials TrojanProxy:Win32/SilverMob.A!dha
NANOAV Trojan.Win32.RedCap.feqzkt
Sophos Troj/Cruprox-B
Symantec Trojan Horse
TACHYON Process timed out
TrendMicro TROJ_PROXSPED.A
TrendMicro House Call TROJ_PROXSPED.A
VirusBlokAda Trojan.Agentb
Zillya! Trojan.Agentb.Win32.19365
Yara Rules
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule import_obfuscation_2 { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51" strings: $s0 = {A6 D6 02 EB 4E B2 41 EB C3 EF 1F} $s1 = {B6 DF 01 FD 48 B5 } $s2 = {B6 D5 0E F3 4E B5 } $s3 = {B7 DF 0E EE } $s4 = {B6 DF 03 FC } $s5 = {A7 D3 03 FC } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them }
ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata
Compile Date 2017-03-02 14:01:47-05:00
Import Hash 09e63e3d425d6b543de4003f71c2b66d
PE Sections
MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy
1eda6d8dec57fac45afb42a6f27080a0 header 4096 0.767469
4109d939d8532ac1bd9f2cfa81a33905 .text 475136 6.632858
3b24a4913977b402a4dcce1694306cfb .rdata 147456 5.923542
f597eb4917ef44a2f9a080fc59f528f3 .data 77824 4.968551
77c814f5856057e7a7f6237bbba51a76 .rsrc 32768 7.100017
438ec3064d499d63eb03035aa1f7a142 .reloc 40960 5.759460
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0
Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 DLL (Debug)
Relationships
e69d6c2d3e... Contained_Within 675a35e04b19aab314bcbc4b1f2610e3dea4a80c277cc5188f1d1391a00dfdb1
Description

This file, printcache.tlb (original name: PDll.dll), is a proxy module installed as a service by the file 675a35e04b19aab314bcbc4b1f2610e3dea4a80c277cc5188f1d1391a00dfdb1. This file is designed to open the Windows Firewall on the victim’s machine to allow incoming connections and force the compromised system to function as a proxy server.The malware’s APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:--Begin Rc4 key--85 C0 7C 17 8B 4D F4 8B 76 20 33 C0 3B C8 77 0B--End Rc4 key--When executed, it loads and decrypts the encrypted configuration file data from the registry using the same RC4 key.--Begin registry key--hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESubkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs"ValueName = "Description"ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"--End registry key--The decrypted data contains hexadecimal encoded port numbers:--Begin port # list --BB 01 ==> 1BB ==> 4437F 00 ==> 7F ==> 12790 1F ==> 1F90 == 8080--End port # list --The malware utilized the following command to open the Windows Firewall on the victim’s machine to allow incoming connections.--Begin firewall modification--"netsh.exe advfirewall firewall add rule name="PortOpenning" dir=in protocol=tcp localport=443 action"--End firewall modification--The malware attempts to open ports 443, 127, and 8080 and wait for a connection. The malware contains public SSL certificates in its resource named "101” and is designed to generate crafted TLS sessions (fake TLS communication mechanism). 

089e49de61701004a5eff6de65476ed9c7632b6020c2c0f38bb5761bca897359

Tags

proxytrojan

Details
Name midimapper.rs
Size 761856 bytes
Type PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
MD5 00b0cfb59b088b247c97c8fed383c115
SHA1 0cdee734d3a17de0e81b9b2b0b36804d516c3212
SHA256 089e49de61701004a5eff6de65476ed9c7632b6020c2c0f38bb5761bca897359
SHA512 9c9f65e277816a42574ddc28724e1afde8c3bffd0e8bf2e0414204d7b07384848718ada43e59c206b6d13dca33c28c4ae3a82ec12b21207efa5cbb8abfacf7d6
ssdeep 12288:5XYoUXvfAkdRwowG358mOlVvRaXKgCJpV4DDxazfAF:+zwowHJ46jJp+DmfAF
Entropy 6.693566
Antivirus
Ahnlab Trojan/Win32.Agent
Antiy Trojan/Win32.Agentb
BitDefender Gen:Variant.Symmi.14589
ClamAV Win.Trojan.Typeframe-6595033-1
Cyren W32/Trojan.DYIG-2477
ESET Win32/NukeSped.AQ trojan
Emsisoft Gen:Variant.Symmi.14589 (B)
Ikarus Trojan.Win32.Agentb
K7 Trojan ( 0051e0501 )
McAfee GenericRXFZ-TW!00B0CFB59B08
Microsoft Security Essentials TrojanProxy:Win32/SilverMob.A!dha
NANOAV Trojan.Win32.NukeSped.eylorq
Sophos Troj/NukeSped-A
Symantec Trojan.Gen.2
TrendMicro TROJ_NUKESPED.D
TrendMicro House Call TROJ_NUKESPED.D
VirusBlokAda Trojan.Agentb
Zillya! Trojan.Agentb.Win32.18439
Yara Rules
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule import_obfuscation_2 { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51" strings: $s0 = {A6 D6 02 EB 4E B2 41 EB C3 EF 1F} $s1 = {B6 DF 01 FD 48 B5 } $s2 = {B6 D5 0E F3 4E B5 } $s3 = {B7 DF 0E EE } $s4 = {B6 DF 03 FC } $s5 = {A7 D3 03 FC } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them }
ssdeep Matches
100 dfb41457088fa2003a085c325bcb63666e1e66fa36bdc8975995bfbeac39500d
PE Metadata
Compile Date 2016-07-25 03:12:34-04:00
Import Hash 100f0ee6d217c6b9e15be71a6c42a2d3
PE Sections
MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy
93649845b04705777d78e05982b93e5f header 4096 0.765196
93649845b04705777d78e05982b93e5f header 4096 0.765196
aca858c8ea569b991797da02f8613716 .text 458752 6.614177
aca858c8ea569b991797da02f8613716 .text 458752 6.614177
11b9d8a29ef67ebb2c19f753f1c7ada4 .rdata 147456 5.918054
11b9d8a29ef67ebb2c19f753f1c7ada4 .rdata 147456 5.918054
72b7a8f5d846964649b682d6ef074cc0 .data 77824 4.964840
72b7a8f5d846964649b682d6ef074cc0 .data 77824 4.964840
d73a8feca0f13f34575c84df77fbed0e .rsrc 32768 7.100191
d73a8feca0f13f34575c84df77fbed0e .rsrc 32768 7.100191
61c29b19fe37db83e42ef9ddf46eb40f .reloc 40960 5.689934
61c29b19fe37db83e42ef9ddf46eb40f .reloc 40960 5.689934
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0
Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 DLL (Debug)
Description

midimapper.rs (original name: MDll.dll) is a proxy module installed as a service. This file is designed to open the Windows Firewall on the victim’s machine to allow incoming connections and force the compromised system to function as a proxy server.The malware’s APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:--Begin Rc4 key--85 C0 7C 17 8B 4D F4 8B 76 20 33 C0 3B C8 77 0B--End Rc4 key--When executed, the malware loads and decrypts the encrypted configuration file data from the registry using the same RC4 key.--Begin registry key--hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESubkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs"ValueName = "Description"ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"--End registry key--The decrypted data contains hexadecimal encoded port numbers:-- Begin port # list --FB 20 ==> 20FB ==> 8443-- End port # list --The malware utilized the following command to open the Windows Firewall on the victim’s machine to allow incoming connections.--Begin firewall modification--"netsh.exe advfirewall firewall add rule name="PortOpenning" dir=in protocol=tcp localport=8443 action=allow enable=yes"--End firewall modification--The malware attempts to open port 8443 and wait for connection. The malware contains public SSL certificates in its resource named "101”. It is designed to generate crafted TLS sessions (fake TLS communication mechanism).

d1d490866d4a4d29306f0d9300bffc1450c41bb8fd62371d29672bf9f747bf92

Tags

dropperproxytrojan

Details
Name BF474B8ACD55380B1169BB949D60E9E4
Size 466241 bytes
Type PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
MD5 bf474b8acd55380b1169bb949d60e9e4
SHA1 c60c18fc0226a53be15637ee3ef0b73b0dabd854
SHA256 d1d490866d4a4d29306f0d9300bffc1450c41bb8fd62371d29672bf9f747bf92
SHA512 46995cf3516c160d2f4fa5957c8c67df75f2768b24562b22de46a5d4ef7ba17fecaef2ad900bc6925e0c4284802864361423653154ad0622af18d049fb0419be
ssdeep 12288:G+3/oi/EpRsV97/8Olq3p8YNk5oYEeLxCStEowZVKmZag:Gmoi/EpRsV9S3prgomLE9oVmQg
Entropy 7.760001
Antivirus
Ahnlab Malware/Win32.Generic
Antiy Trojan/Win32.TSGeneric
Avira TR/Autophyte.hctaa
BitDefender Trojan.GenericKD.31017522
ClamAV Win.Trojan.Typeframe-6595034-1
Cyren W32/Trojan.SYHZ-1002
ESET a variant of Win32/NukeSped.EO trojan
Emsisoft Trojan.GenericKD.31017522 (B)
Ikarus Trojan.Win32.Autophyte
K7 Trojan ( 00535e7f1 )
McAfee RDN/Generic Dropper
Microsoft Security Essentials Trojan:Win32/Autophyte.B!dha
NANOAV Trojan.Win32.Autophyte.feqzxh
Sophos Troj/Cruprox-B
Symantec Trojan Horse
TrendMicro BKDR_PROXSPED.A
TrendMicro House Call BKDR_PROXSPED.A
VirusBlokAda BScope.TrojanDropper.Agent
Zillya! Dropper.Agent.Win32.376404
Yara Rules
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule enc_PK_header { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "3229a6cea658b1b3ca5ca9ad7b40d8d4" strings: $s0 = { 5f a8 80 c5 a0 87 c7 f0 9e e6 } $s1 = { 95 f1 6e 9c 3f c1 2c 88 a0 5a } $s2 = { ae 1d af 74 c0 f5 e1 02 50 10 } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and any of them }
ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata
Compile Date 2017-06-08 07:12:45-04:00
Import Hash 225e9f7be86d6676c98a852492458049
PE Sections
MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy
21257d58787390491b672d426714b015 header 4096 0.592724
dff4417e6006f193afa34a31581d52dd .text 53248 6.423430
5fbeefe580cf5cb5ee032f29c78b5f7b .rdata 12288 3.435650
c5776014ec07771c8d8093a7af1868c7 .data 16384 2.126011
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ v6.0
Relationships
d1d490866d... Contains 40ef57ca2a617f5d24ac624339ba2027b6cf301c28684bf8b2075fc7a2e95116
Description

This 32-bit Windows executable is a RAT, designed to install a proxy module as a service on the victim’s system.The malware's APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:--Begin Rc4 key--75 0E 83 C0 02 83 C1 02 84 D2 75 E4 33 C0 EB 05--End Rc4 key--Decrypted strings of interest are displayed below:--Begin strings of interest--"wmplayer.xml""printcache.tlb""printcache""Print Device Cache""Manage Print Device Cache And Printing"--End strings of interest--When executed, the malware will load an embedded RC4 encrypted archive file from the start of the offset "0x15000”.The malware decrypts the archive using the same Rc4 key. The decrypted archive contains a proxy module, which is decompressed and installed from the existing file name "wmplayer.xml" to "C:\Windows\system32\printcache.tlb".The malware installs the module as a serviceDLL in the "printcache" service group in order to execute "C:\Windows\system32\printcache.tlb" by the Windows service hosting process, "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe”.--Begin service--ServiceName = "printcache"DisplayName = "Print Device Cache"DesiredAccess = SERVICE_ALL_ACCESSServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32_SHARE_PROCESSStartType = SERVICE_AUTO_STARTBinaryPathName = "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe -k printcache"--End service--The malware contains an RC4 encrypted configuration file data, which contains port numbers (8 bytes). During runtime, it installs the encrypted configuration data into the following registry key:--Begin registry key--hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESubkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs"ValueName = "Signature"ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"--End registry key--

40ef57ca2a617f5d24ac624339ba2027b6cf301c28684bf8b2075fc7a2e95116

Tags

proxytrojan

Details
Name 1printcache.tlb
Name CA67F84D5A4AC1459934128442C53B03
Size 778240 bytes
Type PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
MD5 ca67f84d5a4ac1459934128442c53b03
SHA1 f4eb6a50c60320edafb3e48c612c6a55560d0684
SHA256 40ef57ca2a617f5d24ac624339ba2027b6cf301c28684bf8b2075fc7a2e95116
SHA512 4695cf69e2ae52fc94eab31cbc3bb846022a3e1516d9bc293118f674ea1eb86468cff0a4c0dee8dff8a2d545df153116e8d86669513426e1b32a205041339e45
ssdeep 12288:drrF4D0d2QKPIyWE8QPnWnGHiS2VcL2ZotSNfpV532/dlZ:x6IGnWntQ2ZvfpvmdlZ
Entropy 6.710797
Antivirus
Ahnlab Trojan/Win32.Agent
BitDefender Gen:Variant.Symmi.14589
ClamAV Win.Trojan.Typeframe-6595034-1
Cyren W32/Trojan.NVOE-8746
ESET a variant of Win32/NukeSped.EO trojan
Emsisoft Gen:Variant.Symmi.14589 (B)
Ikarus Trojan.Win32.NukeSped
K7 Trojan ( 00535e7f1 )
McAfee GenericRXFZ-TW!CA67F84D5A4A
NANOAV Trojan.Win32.NukeSped.feqzxq
Sophos Troj/Cruprox-B
Symantec Trojan Horse
TrendMicro TROJ_PROXSPED.A
TrendMicro House Call TROJ_PROXSPED.A
VirusBlokAda Trojan.Agentb
Yara Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata
Compile Date 2017-06-08 07:12:35-04:00
Import Hash 09e63e3d425d6b543de4003f71c2b66d
PE Sections
MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy
5b1f93f0412e9f1c7a7ad42d729b292b header 4096 0.769911
e6ea312f762f4df521b229a77f186664 .text 475136 6.629464
b6fa7b267ea19010d44f056ec3cca39d .rdata 147456 5.920344
1076ec3948d21da8d6c5036548880c63 .data 77824 4.972282
77c814f5856057e7a7f6237bbba51a76 .rsrc 32768 7.100017
3184d0afb653bf0723cadccc14d92071 .reloc 40960 5.752155
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0
Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 DLL (Debug)
Relationships
40ef57ca2a... Contained_Within d1d490866d4a4d29306f0d9300bffc1450c41bb8fd62371d29672bf9f747bf92
Description

1printcache.tlb (original name: PDll.dll) is a proxy module installed as a service by the file d1d490866d4a4d29306f0d9300bffc1450c41bb8fd62371d29672bf9f747bf92. This file is designed to open the Windows Firewall on the victim’s machine to allow incoming connections and force the compromised system to function as a proxy server.The malware’s APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:--Begin Rc4 key--75 0E 83 C0 02 83 C1 02 84 D2 75 E4 33 C0 EB 05--End Rc4 key--When executed, it loads and decrypts the encrypted configuration file data from the registry using the same RC4 key.--Begin registry key--hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESubkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs"ValueName = "Description"ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"--End registry key--The decrypted data contains hexadecimal encoded port numbers:--Begin port # list --BB 01 ==> 1BB ==>4437F 00 ==> 7F ==> 127FB 20 ==> 20FB ==> 8443--End port # list --The malware utilized the following command to open the Windows Firewall on the victim’s machine to allow incoming connections.--Begin firewall modification--"netsh.exe advfirewall firewall add rule name="PortOpenning" dir=in protocol=tcp localport=443 action=allow enable=yes"--End firewall modification--The malware attempts to open ports 443, 127, and 8443 and wait for connection. The malware contains public SSL certificates in its resource name "101”. It is designed to generate crafted TLS sessions (fake TLS communication mechanism).

546dbd370a40c8e46f9b599a414f25000eec5ae6b3e046a035fe6e6cd5d874e1

Tags

downloaderdroppertrojan

Details
Name 6AB301FC3296E1CEB140BF5D294894C5
Size 259584 bytes
Type PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
MD5 6ab301fc3296e1ceb140bf5d294894c5
SHA1 8d62498656db928f987b47bdbcfab5d6032be48a
SHA256 546dbd370a40c8e46f9b599a414f25000eec5ae6b3e046a035fe6e6cd5d874e1
SHA512 3abd7a690d821ace78d8f5e2394f0922308963c7ba8ee63661e9cdb2e36fe8353904346b4b0457c6ace3071505533187d62a41d47473a6a9680cab7fca209ceb
ssdeep 3072:JdHh7xVwMPRTxXX0bqkmvA7XKmJLiSi3Ix1DKXrlTNEsuFFCeojbmUkGVcNP+:17xVrxxn0PrWiv8hLnS+
Entropy 5.918488
Antivirus
Ahnlab Trojan/Win32.Agent
Antiy Trojan/Win32.Cossta
Avira TR/AD.APTLazerus.aroap
BitDefender Trojan.GenericKD.31019942
ClamAV Win.Trojan.Typeframe-6595058-1
Cyren W64/Trojan.BVRT-3061
ESET a variant of Win32/NukeSped.AK trojan
Emsisoft Trojan.GenericKD.31019942 (B)
Ikarus Trojan.Win32.NukeSped
K7 Trojan ( 0051c2fd1 )
McAfee RDN/Generic.dx
Microsoft Security Essentials Trojan:Win32/Typeframe
NANOAV Trojan.Win64.Cossta.feqzmr
Symantec Trojan Horse
TrendMicro TROJ64_.CF537F06
TrendMicro House Call TROJ64_.CF537F06
VirusBlokAda Trojan.Downloader
Zillya! Trojan.GenericKD.Win32.146686
Yara Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata
Compile Date 2017-05-08 11:43:26-04:00
Import Hash b32c7db2b70ae7b183886924d873c585
PE Sections
MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy
24baa03194bc78f0184ea606128bc80f header 1024 2.821047
170ce86f9a7ffcd242f3903fafe1f302 .text 57856 6.433615
33b066692952c4534ebf0a56ca293085 .rdata 37888 5.095210
b4eed5366c4254a3c7f6c2f021c29efe .data 156160 4.916035
3ad7431aaa87a1e6b6400ca9b273d98a .pdata 4096 4.579212
c23d2715b42b072fcf86b2aa58807b56 .rsrc 512 4.714485
ad711ec082866631d620286bb36fdb72 .reloc 2048 4.752156
Relationships
546dbd370a... Contains 3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210
Description

This file is a malicious 64-bit Windows dynamic-link library (DLL) that is designed to drop and execute an embedded file. The malware decodes the embedded file by XORing it with the value "0x35".During analysis, the malware executed the file as C:\Windows\Temp\java.exe (3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210). The dropped file has been identified as a RAT.

3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210

Tags

backdoorremote-access-trojantrojan

Details
Name java.exe
Size 118784 bytes
Type PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
MD5 77b50bb476a85a7aa30c962a389838aa
SHA1 df466a1f473c7c5eba5f22d90822fd1430b6a244
SHA256 3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210
SHA512 33b78e0bc8832958b79292bfebffe32c03b59b92044bb95331ee384f7061f6724c7d10bcf17ee1395dbd437b225c0813ba4bc5de6ef44f4bdd9ee58e446ad143
ssdeep 3072:sPhrkoI8QYJRMs4y5pe+/a5sN5t4+PXP:Mi/lqpe+/0sa
Entropy 5.880053
Antivirus
Ahnlab Backdoor/Win32.Agent
Antiy Trojan/Win32.Cossta
Avira TR/Agent.bkecf
BitDefender Trojan.GenericKD.30623185
ClamAV Win.Trojan.Typeframe-6595035-1
Cyren W32/Trojan.YPCX-1821
ESET a variant of Win32/NukeSped.AK trojan
Emsisoft Trojan.GenericKD.30623185 (B)
Ikarus Trojan.Win32.NukeSped
K7 Trojan ( 004fa2411 )
McAfee Trojan-FNWY!77B50BB476A8
Microsoft Security Essentials Trojan:Win32/Typeframe
NANOAV Trojan.Win32.NukeSped.fajisv
Quick Heal Trojan.MauvaiseRI.S5249940
Sophos Troj/Cruprox-A
Symantec Backdoor.Cruprox
Systweak trojan.nukesped
TACHYON Backdoor/W32.Agent.118784.FE
TrendMicro TROJ_NUKESPED.A
TrendMicro House Call TROJ_NUKESPED.A
VirusBlokAda Trojan.Cossta
Zillya! Trojan.Cossta.Win32.10325
Yara Rules
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule HC_RAT { meta: author = "NCCIC Code & Media Analysis" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "1C53E7269FE9D84C6DF0A25BA59B822C" strings: $s0 = {8B4C240433C081E1FFFF000081C10080FFFF83F9430F8770010000} $s1 = {880430403D00010000} $s2 = {48894C2408574883EC200FB7C133FF050080FFFF83F8430F8760020000} $s3 = {8801FFC048FFC13D00010000} condition: ($s0 and $s1) or ($s2 and $s3) }
ssdeep Matches
94 7429a6b6e8518a1ec1d1c37a8786359885f2fd4abde560adaef331ca9deaeefd
PE Metadata
Compile Date 2017-04-28 03:28:32-04:00
Import Hash 85c89bf0449505044219f0be26213402
Company Name Microsoft Corporation
File Description ProQuota
Internal Name proquota
Legal Copyright Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
Original Filename proquota.exe.mui
Product Name Microsoft Windows Operating System
Product Version 6.1.7600.16385
PE Sections
MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy
81c12eb5fc3cbdd06675cd1097363a40 header 4096 0.689960
2539474aa6202371abd37a4d66031955 .text 86016 6.641666
b97c14b801643b3a61ea28266f3f71b1 .rdata 8192 4.735406
48eb8a67d4fd42ea24da9dc9029cb101 .data 16384 1.857068
c139ac9cb34e0620a10c15e5d42b85d2 .rsrc 4096 1.174962
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ v6.0
Relationships
3c809a1010... Contained_Within 546dbd370a40c8e46f9b599a414f25000eec5ae6b3e046a035fe6e6cd5d874e1
3c809a1010... Connected_To 184.107.209.2
3c809a1010... Connected_To 111.207.78.204
3c809a1010... Connected_To 80.91.118.45
3c809a1010... Connected_To 181.119.19.56
Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows executable designed to connect to its remote server and wait for instructions. The malware’s APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:--Begin Rc4 key--DA E1 61 FF 0C 27 95 87 17 57 A4 D6 EA E3 82 2B--End Rc4 key--This file is a RAT and contains the following embedded hexadecimal encoded C2 IP addresses and port numbers:--Begin IP and port # list--1BBh ==> 4432D765B50h ==> 80.91.118.45381377B5h ===> 181.119.19.560CC4ECF6Fh ==> 111.207.78.2042D16BB8h ==> 184.107.209.2--End IP and port # list--When executed, it attempts to connect to its C2 IPs using port 443 and waits for instructions. The malware is designed to accept instructions from the remote server to perform additional functions:--Begin functions perform by the malware--Search for filesExecute processTerminate processesDelete filesExecute command-using shellDownload and upload filesRead files and write files--End functions perform by the malware--The malware is designed to use the same RC4 key to encrypt its configuration file data, which contains the hexadecimal encoded C2 IP address and port number. The encrypted configuration data is stored into the following registry key:--Begin registry key--hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESubkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\"ValueName = "Description"ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"--End registry key--

4bd7d801d7ce3fe9c2928dbc834b296e934473f5bbcc9a1fd18af5ebd43192cd

Tags

downloaderdroppertrojan

Details
Name 3229A6CEA658B1B3CA5CA9AD7B40D8D4
Size 712192 bytes
Type Composite Document File V2 Document, Little Endian, Os: Windows, Version 6.2, Code page: 949, Author: ISkyISea, Template: Normal, Last Saved By: ISkyISea, Revision Number: 2, Name of Creating Application: Microsoft Office Word, Total Editing Time: 17:00, Create Time/Date: Mon Apr 3 18:36:00 2017, Last Saved Time/Date: Thu Apr 6 00:34:00 2017, Number of Pages: 1, Number of Words: 0, Number of Characters: 1, Security: 0
MD5 3229a6cea658b1b3ca5ca9ad7b40d8d4
SHA1 70730e608e2fcc68ce468ed148e965c5bacfb51c
SHA256 4bd7d801d7ce3fe9c2928dbc834b296e934473f5bbcc9a1fd18af5ebd43192cd
SHA512 ff385a9446415412950562cca832eab1d17de56932f3633a86202dea829e8bd25e56864306f2e6c8bb7ff7d2cfe2785acc4261410e38348946baf72d4a0696de
ssdeep 12288:sh+81FiNloAzjMXJ1NPeZ3eMNZtF7fHRRAug0EX7:W1FiNWEYxeV3NfHDe
Entropy 5.446016
Antivirus
Ahnlab MSOffice/Dropper
Antiy Trojan[Downloader]/MSOffice.Agent.ye
BitDefender VB:Trojan.Valyria.401
ClamAV Doc.Dropper.Agent-6591386-0
Cyren Trojan.TKGI-6
ESET VBA/TrojanDropper.Agent.YE trojan
Emsisoft VB:Trojan.Valyria.401 (B)
Ikarus Trojan-Dropper.VBA.Agent
McAfee W97M/Dropper.dj
Microsoft Security Essentials TrojanDropper:O97M/SilverMob.A!dha
NANOAV Trojan.Ole2.Vbs-heuristic.druvzi
Quick Heal W97M.Downloader.BJS
Sophos Troj/DocDl-KOR
Symantec W97M.Downloader
TACHYON Suspicious/W97M.Obfus.Gen.2
TrendMicro W2KM_SILVMOB.A
TrendMicro House Call W2KM_SILVMOB.A
Yara Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Description

This is a malicious Microsoft Word document, and contains Visual Basic for Application (VBA) macros. When the Word document is opened, the user is prompted to enable the use of macros by the Microsoft Word process. If the user enables macro execution, the embedded malicious macro will be executed and proceed to decode a PE binary and execute it from "%TEMP%\leo.exe”. A code snippet used to decode the malicious binary is displayed below:--Begin code snippet--   On Error GoTo gaqz      liveOn = "mfp/fyf"      liveOff = Environ("temp") + "\"   For qnx = 1 To Len(liveOn)       liveOff = liveOff + Chr(Asc(Mid$(liveOn, qnx, 1)) - 1)   Next      Dim str(238) As String   str(1) = "Encoded hex data"   str(2) = "Encoded hex data"   str(3) = "Encoded hex data"   str(4) = "Encoded hex data"   str(5) = "Encoded hex data"   .......   .......   str(238) = "Encoded hex data"   Dim offBin(499) As Byte   str(1) = "Encoded hex data"   str(2) = "Encoded hex data"   str(3) = "Encoded hex data"   ......   ......   str(499) = "Encoded hex data"   Open liveOff For Binary Access Write As #1   lpdq = 1   For jnx = 0 To 237       For inx = 0 To 499           offBin(inx) = Val("&H" + Mid(str(jnx + 1), inx * 2 + 1, 2))           offBin(inx) = offBin(inx) Xor 231       Next inx       Put #1, lpdq, offBin       lpdq = lpdq + 500   Next jnx   Close #1   jfsukew liveOff   liveOn = "tfdvsjuzxbsojoh`mndjsu`514/epd"   liveOffd = Environ("temp") + "\"   For qnx = 1 To Len(liveOn)       liveOffd = liveOffd + Chr(Asc(Mid$(liveOn, qnx, 1)) - 1)   Next qnx   Dim strd(167) As Stringstrd(167) = ""   Dim offBind(499) As Byte   Open liveOffd For Binary Access Write As #2   lpdq = 1   For jnx = 0 To 166       For inx = 0 To 499           offBind(inx) = Val("&H" + Mid(strd(jnx + 1), inx * 2 + 1, 2))           offBind(inx) = offBind(inx) Xor 231       Next inx       Put #2, lpdq, offBind       lpdq = lpdq + 500   Next jnx      Close #2      SetAttr liveOffd, 6      bazs = ThisDocument.Name      Application.Documents.Open (liveOffd)   Application.ActiveDocument.ActiveWindow.Caption = bazs   ThisDocument.Close   gaqz:End SubFunction Jdhcuad(Input_Str$) As String   Dim Len_Str%, Result$, Temp_Str$, n%      Len_Str = Len(Input_Str)   For n = 1 To Len_Str       Temp_Str = Mid(Input_Str, n, 1)       Temp_Str = Chr(46 + (Asc(Temp_Str) - 46 - 20 + (122 - 46)) Mod (122 - 46))       Result = Result + Temp_Str   Next      Jdhcuad = ResultEnd FunctionPrivate Sub jfsukew(filename)   Dim obj As Object   Set obj = CreateObject(Jdhcuad("kgw:18<Bg0y44"))   obj.Run filename, 1, False   Set obj = NothingEnd Sub--End code snippet--

c9e3b83d77ce93cc1d70b22e967f049b13515c88572aa78e0a838103e5478777

Tags

backdoorremote-access-trojantrojan

Details
Name BFB41BC0C3856AA0A81A5256B7B8DA51
Size 578174 bytes
Type PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
MD5 bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51
SHA1 cb96e29332fe94d1a70309837f73daf7bec81284
SHA256 c9e3b83d77ce93cc1d70b22e967f049b13515c88572aa78e0a838103e5478777
SHA512 37223163a329ffa7b77a9190aab1da5fbf38c6d76139591d592d695e5caa81b56f6d3769540e2781c87a29de3d39e5e9c8ee70bd9ed6a0bee040917f530bc11a
ssdeep 12288:jxn1kOPTkEjkHsnCrYHM46QyFgHj+u1XC1GbA/UXAfAGZI3PWM+:jxn1kOLkEQHsYYDdD+u1HbA/Uw47/L+
Entropy 7.848313
Antivirus
Ahnlab Trojan/Win32.Akdoor
Avira TR/NukeSped.qkzfp
BitDefender Trojan.GenericKD.31025967
ClamAV Win.Trojan.Typeframe-6595036-1
Cyren W64/Trojan.ZNJL-0100
ESET a variant of Win64/NukeSped.BA trojan
Emsisoft Trojan.GenericKD.31025967 (B)
Ikarus Trojan.Win64.Nukesped
K7 Riskware ( 0040eff71 )
NANOAV Trojan.Win64.NukeSped.feqzml
Sophos Troj/NukeSped-T
Symantec Trojan Horse
TACHYON Trojan/W32.Agent.578174
TrendMicro BKDR64_.97ED50E7
TrendMicro House Call BKDR64_.97ED50E7
VirusBlokAda Backdoor.Win64.Agent
Zillya! Backdoor.Agent.Win64.360
Yara Rules
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule enc_PK_header { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "3229a6cea658b1b3ca5ca9ad7b40d8d4" strings: $s0 = { 5f a8 80 c5 a0 87 c7 f0 9e e6 } $s1 = { 95 f1 6e 9c 3f c1 2c 88 a0 5a } $s2 = { ae 1d af 74 c0 f5 e1 02 50 10 } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and any of them }
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule import_obfuscation_2 { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51" strings: $s0 = {A6 D6 02 EB 4E B2 41 EB C3 EF 1F} $s1 = {B6 DF 01 FD 48 B5 } $s2 = {B6 D5 0E F3 4E B5 } $s3 = {B7 DF 0E EE } $s4 = {B6 DF 03 FC } $s5 = {A7 D3 03 FC } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them }
ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata
Compile Date 2017-06-05 21:21:48-04:00
Import Hash c1bcec5e2d5d967daefaff0a252273a6
PE Sections
MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy
55b6d1ed6d76c7d17cc270bc1843d2cb header 1024 2.558659
6e501513865a783fa945269010ac3785 .text 69632 6.390707
45584c7afdc086b651d7299673643506 .rdata 24064 4.704433
4a8e757aef91c54de52d5b81098e0cc7 .data 7680 4.003255
de3fe99833797faa77379640174d16c4 .pdata 4096 4.786623
0cc425d0556c63acb7c04b9b1a211d5b .rsrc 512 5.105006
914f25782a74f42e42d7974b13bd01c8 .reloc 1536 2.869845
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ 8.0 (DLL)
Relationships
c9e3b83d77... Contains e088c3a0b0f466df5329d9a66ff618de3d468d8a5981715303babb1452631eef
Description

This file is a 64-bit Windows executable version of the file 8c3e0204f52200325ed36db9b12aba1c5e46984d415514538a5bf10783cacdf8 and is designed to install a RAT as a service on the victim’s system. This file accepts the following arguments during execution "68S3mI2AMcmOz3BgjnuYpLlZ4fZog7sd".The RAT’s APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:--Begin RC4 key--85 C0 7C 17 8B 4D F4 8B 76 20 33 C0 3B C8 77 0B--End RC4 key--Decrypted strings of interest are displayed below:--Begin strings of interest--host.dll"Task Notification Service""Monitors And Notifies Task Scheduling And Interaction"netsvcs--End strings of interest--When executed, the RAT loads an embedded RC4 encrypted archive file from the start of the offset "0x1A800" of the file.The malware decrypts the archive using the same Rc4 key. The decrypted archive contains a malicious DLL module, which is decompressed and installed into "C:\Windows\system32\dwnhost.dll”. The first three characters of the module name are randomly generated.The malware contains RC4 encrypted configuration file data (192 bytes). During runtime, it installs the encrypted configuration data into the following registry key:--Begin registry key--hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESubkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\dwnhost.dll"ValueName = "Description"ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"--End registry key--The malware installs a malicious DLL module as a serviceDLL in the "netsvcs" service group in order to execute "C:\Windows\system32\dwnhost.dll" by Windows service hosting process, "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe”. The service name and the display name are randomly generated.The installed service information is displayed below:--Begin service--ServiceName = "NWCWorkstation"DisplayName = "NWCWorkstation"DesiredAccess = SERVICE_ALL_ACCESSServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32_SHARE_PROCESSStartType = SERVICE_AUTO_STARTBinaryPathName = "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs"--End service--

e088c3a0b0f466df5329d9a66ff618de3d468d8a5981715303babb1452631eef

Tags

remote-access-trojantrojan

Details
Name dwnhost.dll
Size 1030144 bytes
Type PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
MD5 9722bc9e0efb4214116066d1ff14094c
SHA1 41a938499048a6ad8034d09e2fbb893da8f13ca9
SHA256 e088c3a0b0f466df5329d9a66ff618de3d468d8a5981715303babb1452631eef
SHA512 8470c240868441093314ebe263028ceef61d900b41aaeed77fd934edf81b9a75f6c96d0fccc0ac87364c8e23e0b8eb19ec8bcd47daf1d50c1182be999475fc4c
ssdeep 12288:nqU713B5hV7rJIBBAVbyjRbjSbdSYJ3raxt7o6qRBpDwQmnQ2bqPjD+PmCNVGsPf:nRxJIB7hSZSG37jo/GsPepCdOwy
Entropy 6.424883
Antivirus
Ahnlab Trojan/Win32.Agent
Antiy Trojan/Win32.AGeneric
BitDefender Trojan.GenericKD.31025935
ClamAV Win.Trojan.Typeframe-6595036-1
Cyren W64/Trojan.IFZB-3557
ESET a variant of Win64/NukeSped.BA trojan
Emsisoft Trojan.GenericKD.31025935 (B)
Ikarus Trojan.Win64.Nukesped
K7 Riskware ( 0040eff71 )
McAfee RDN/Generic.dx
NANOAV Trojan.Win64.NukeSped.fepuhl
Sophos Troj/NukeSped-U
TrendMicro BKDR64_.512A3DD3
TrendMicro House Call BKDR64_.512A3DD3
Zillya! Trojan.Generic.Win32.68467
Yara Rules
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule import_obfuscation_2 { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51" strings: $s0 = {A6 D6 02 EB 4E B2 41 EB C3 EF 1F} $s1 = {B6 DF 01 FD 48 B5 } $s2 = {B6 D5 0E F3 4E B5 } $s3 = {B7 DF 0E EE } $s4 = {B6 DF 03 FC } $s5 = {A7 D3 03 FC } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them }
ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Relationships
e088c3a0b0... Contained_Within c9e3b83d77ce93cc1d70b22e967f049b13515c88572aa78e0a838103e5478777
Description

dwnhost.dll (original name: DLL64.dll) is a 64-bit Windows dynamic-link library (DLL) of "laxhost.dll" (a71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6). This RAT module was installed as a service by the file "c9e3b83d77ce93cc1d70b22e967f049b13515c88572aa78e0a838103e5478777”.The RAT’s APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:--Begin RC4 key--85 C0 7C 17 8B 4D F4 8B 76 20 33 C0 3B C8 77 0B--End RC4 key--When executed, the RAT loads and decrypts the encrypted configuration file data from the registry using the same RC4 key.--Begin registry key--hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESubkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\dwnxhost.dll"ValueName = "Description"ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"--End registry key--The decrypted data contains a hexadecimal encoded command and control IP address and port number:--Begin IP and port # list--BB 01 3B 5A 5D 61 ==> 59.90.93.97:443--End IP and port # list--The malware attempts to connect to its remote server IP 59.90.93.97 using port 443 and waits for instructions.The malware is designed to accept instructions from the remote server to perform the following functions:--Begin functions perform by the malware--Get Disk Free SpaceSearch for filesExecute process in elevated modeTerminate processesDelete filesExecute command-using shellDownload and upload filesRead files and write filesDelete Service and uninstall malware components using a batch script--End functions perform by the malware--

20abb95114de946da7595438e9edf0bf39c85ba8512709db7d5532d37d73bd64

Tags

remote-access-trojantrojan

Details
Name EF9DB20AB0EEBF0B7C55AF4EC0B7BCED
Size 152064 bytes
Type PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
MD5 ef9db20ab0eebf0b7c55af4ec0b7bced
SHA1 0202942d11c994cece943bb873f3af156d820f59
SHA256 20abb95114de946da7595438e9edf0bf39c85ba8512709db7d5532d37d73bd64
SHA512 85fa80079c59da83e3b2471eab0d2981c92b6c589cbe5052bf438831ae464e6499040ead68d6bc9929edd9f6c08ecc6abf2a0173e31bd361a24fad89ff1f7064
ssdeep 3072:qocqUTuIzXblpGxqSDBiiBmLEEjdTIf3TIb9Qw/uAZyerrPabYlQ:qJqUnXKxqSAiBJyTC3TIb9QRL0lQ
Entropy 6.269643
Antivirus
Antiy Trojan/Win32.AGeneric
Avira TR/AD.APTLazerus.ciszm
BitDefender Trojan.GenericKD.31020049
ClamAV Win.Trojan.Typeframe-6595037-1
Cyren W64/Trojan.CWPJ-5887
ESET a variant of Win64/NukeSped.L trojan
Emsisoft Trojan.GenericKD.31020049 (B)
Ikarus Trojan.Win64.Nukesped
K7 Trojan ( 00535d221 )
McAfee Generic.dvq
Microsoft Security Essentials Trojan:Win32/Autophyte.A!dha
NANOAV Trojan.Win64.NukeSped.feqzil
Sophos Troj/NukeSped-V
Symantec Trojan Horse
TrendMicro BKDR64_.97ED50E7
TrendMicro House Call BKDR64_.97ED50E7
VirusBlokAda Trojan.Autophyte
Zillya! Trojan.NukeSped.Win64.21
Yara Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata
Compile Date 2016-09-07 14:28:45-04:00
Import Hash 13c53cfa11bb74ea99fefdf29d78a9f9
PE Sections
MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy
2082ea5adc4b910e8673c04dc7d962d2 header 1024 2.623906
e6e5ce270a5e80221a815dbf739883a2 .text 111616 6.434048
3a7628ebb18c5e07cf37654fd431de6b .rdata 26112 5.315772
52e12517ca5b2c29e9496bc3032f0d5d .data 5632 2.052338
f9b37a6c76a99538605929f5bef6c2e2 .pdata 5632 5.165417
d5ecc406ee2be45ed510958b0d4f326a .rsrc 512 5.112624
07b2edf2675fa88a86c977fec3ad03cd .reloc 1536 2.826598
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ 8.0 (DLL)
Relationships
20abb95114... Connected_To 98.101.211.162
20abb95114... Connected_To 81.0.213.173
Description

This file is a 64-bit Windows executable designed to connect to its remote server and wait for instructions. The malware’s file APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:--Begin RC4 key--DA E1 61 FF 0C 27 95 87 17 57 A4 D6 EA E3 82 2B--End RC4 key--This file is a variant of a RAT that contains the following embedded hexadecimal-encoded C2 IP address and port number:--Begin IP and port # list--1BBh ==> 4430A2D36562h ==> 98.101.211.1620ADD50051h ==> 81.0.213.173--End IP and port # list--When executed, it attempts to connect to its C2 IPs using port 443 and waits for instructions. The malware is designed to accept instructions from the remote server to perform additional functions.

201c7cd10a2bd50dde0948d14c3c7a0732955c908a3392aee3d08b94470c9d33

Tags

proxytrojan

Details
Name 1C53E7269FE9D84C6DF0A25BA59B822C
Size 126976 bytes
Type PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
MD5 1c53e7269fe9d84c6df0a25ba59b822c
SHA1 b775d753671133cbc4919764d2fac0d298166b07
SHA256 201c7cd10a2bd50dde0948d14c3c7a0732955c908a3392aee3d08b94470c9d33
SHA512 3d3883b9b29e264d023b7034d980b7c206c9fc82010bf7f5f1dc454fdbd316830fe69e90579406a74afc1fca8e266d10c1b46784bd661dcb2815e370a68acd32
ssdeep 1536:EaMa/KVyD4hv6LLETuA1x+sh2iE1s44tz4qoWYUwnZ7hUOC2:G8YPZ6LLqQFX4tz4quxY
Entropy 6.024087
Antivirus
Ahnlab Win-Trojan/Hwdoor.Gen
Antiy Trojan/Win32.AGeneric
Avira TR/AD.APTLazerus.itpsz
BitDefender Gen:Variant.Ursu.239474
ClamAV Win.Trojan.Typeframe-6595035-1
Cyren W32/Trojan.OYWW-7040
ESET a variant of Win32/NukeSped.AK trojan
Emsisoft Gen:Variant.Ursu.239474 (B)
Ikarus Trojan.Win32.NukeSped
K7 Trojan ( 0051c2fd1 )
Microsoft Security Essentials Trojan:Win32/Autophyte.B!dha
NANOAV Trojan.Win32.NukeSped.felyfu
Sophos Troj/Cruprox-B
Symantec Trojan Horse
TrendMicro TROJ_PROXSPED.A
TrendMicro House Call TROJ_PROXSPED.A
VirusBlokAda Trojan.Autophyte
Yara Rules
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara rule import_deob { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" md5 = "ae769e62fef4a1709c12c9046301aa5d" md5 = "e48fe20eb1f5a5887f2ac631fed9ed63" strings: $ = { 8a 01 3c 62 7c 0a 3c 79 7f 06 b2 db 2a d0 88 11 8a 41 01 41 84 c0 75 e8} $ = { 8A 08 80 F9 62 7C 0B 80 F9 79 7F 06 82 DB 2A D1 88 10 8A 48 01 40 84 C9 75 E6} condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and any of them }
ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata
Compile Date 2015-07-08 22:50:54-04:00
Import Hash 21ccd1b1341683d8831663fc3ed8f86d
PE Sections
MD5 Name Raw Size Entropy
f066de8df54d4f92795472d981374309 header 4096 0.736742
f066de8df54d4f92795472d981374309 header 4096 0.736742
e321dba33ae4db3b9e29aa6072b92e77 .text 57344 6.464385
e321dba33ae4db3b9e29aa6072b92e77 .text 57344 6.464385
a256d5f52608331df8545a9d38751462 .rdata 8192 3.628560
a256d5f52608331df8545a9d38751462 .rdata 8192 3.628560
1d905ad87919346eb6c8463f61b599e8 .data 16384 1.547483
1d905ad87919346eb6c8463f61b599e8 .data 16384 1.547483
afdf2120655e37010482a536d552199e .rsrc 32768 7.100033
afdf2120655e37010482a536d552199e .rsrc 32768 7.100033
bbeec3983cc5b2094f8311718d327480 .reloc 8192 3.234713
bbeec3983cc5b2094f8311718d327480 .reloc 8192 3.234713
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0
Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 DLL (Debug)
Description

This file (original name: Proxy_SVC_DLL.dll) is a proxy module installed as a service. The proxy installer that installs this module was not available for analysis.This file is designed to open the Windows Firewall on the victim’s machine to allow incoming connections and force the compromised system to function as a proxy server. The malware’s APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:--Begin Rc4 key--DA E1 61 FF 0C 27 95 87 17 57 A4 D6 EA E3 82 2B--End Rc4 key--When executed, the proxy installer will attempt to load and decrypt the encrypted configuration file data from the registry using the RC4 key.--Begin registry key--hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESubkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs"ValueName = "Description"ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"--End registry key--Analysis indicates that the decrypted configuration data contains port numbers. The malware utilized the following command to open the Windows Firewall on the victim’s machine to allow incoming connections:--Begin firewall modification--"netsh.exe advfirewall firewall add rule name="PortOpenning" dir=in protocol=tcp localport=<decrypted port number> action=allow enable=yes"--End firewall modification--The malware attempts to open the predefined port and waits for connection. The malware contains public SSL certificates in its resource name "101”. It is designed to generate crafted TLS sessions (fake TLS communication mechanism).

98.101.211.162

Ports
  • 443 TCP
Whois

NetRange:     98.100.0.0 - 98.103.255.255CIDR:         98.100.0.0/14NetName:        RCMSNetHandle:     NET-98-100-0-0-1Parent:         NET98 (NET-98-0-0-0-0)NetType:        Direct AllocationOriginAS:    Organization: Time Warner Cable Internet LLC (RCMS)RegDate:        2008-03-17Updated:        2009-05-05Ref:            https://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-98-100-0-0-1OrgName:        Time Warner Cable Internet LLCOrgId:         RCMSAddress:        6399 S Fiddlers Green CircleCity:         Greenwood VillageStateProv:     COPostalCode:     80111Country:        USRegDate:        2001-09-25Updated:        2018-03-07Comment:        Allocations for this OrgID serve Road Runner commercial customers out of the Columbus, OH, Herndon, VA and Raleigh, NC RDCs.Ref:            https://whois.arin.net/rest/org/RCMS

Relationships
98.101.211.162 Connected_From 20abb95114de946da7595438e9edf0bf39c85ba8512709db7d5532d37d73bd64

81.0.213.173

Ports
  • 443 TCP
Whois

inetnum:        81.0.213.168 - 81.0.213.175netname:        CmsConsulting-CZdescr:         CMS Consulting s.r.o.country:        CZadmin-c:        CASA3-RIPEtech-c:         CASA3-RIPEstatus:         ASSIGNED PAmnt-by:         CASABLANCA-RIPE-MNTcreated:        2009-10-09T07:31:35Zlast-modified: 2009-10-09T07:31:35Zsource:         RIPErole:         Casablanca INT RIPE manageraddress:        Casablanca INTaddress:        Vinohradska 184, Prague 3 - 130 52address:        Czech republicphone:         +420 270 000 270fax-no:         +420 270 000 277e-mail:         hostmaster@casablanca.czabuse-mailbox: abuse@casablanca.czadmin-c:        JH1771-RIPEtech-c:         JH1771-RIPEnotify:         hostmaster@casablanca.cznic-hdl:        CASA3-RIPEcreated:        2005-09-05T10:42:10Zlast-modified: 2015-07-03T11:19:49Zsource:         RIPEmnt-by:         CASABLANCA-CORE-MNT% Information related to '81.0.213.0/24AS15685'route:         81.0.213.0/24descr:         Casablanca INT prefix fractionorigin:         AS15685mnt-by:         CASABLANCA-CORE-MNTcreated:        2017-06-30T09:41:16Zlast-modified: 2017-06-30T09:41:16Zsource:         RIPE

Relationships
81.0.213.173 Connected_From 20abb95114de946da7595438e9edf0bf39c85ba8512709db7d5532d37d73bd64

184.107.209.2

Ports
  • 443 TCP
Whois

Domain Name: TVDAIJIWORLD.COMRegistry Domain ID: 632237350_DOMAIN_COM-VRSNRegistrar WHOIS Server: whois.godaddy.comRegistrar URL: http://www.godaddy.comUpdated Date: 2017-10-16T06:44:25ZCreation Date: 2006-10-14T19:18:50ZRegistrar Registration Expiration Date: 2018-10-14T19:18:50ZRegistrar: GoDaddy.com, LLCRegistrar IANA ID: 146Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@godaddy.comRegistrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.4806242505Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited http://www.icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibitedDomain Status: clientUpdateProhibited http://www.icann.org/epp#clientUpdateProhibitedDomain Status: clientRenewProhibited http://www.icann.org/epp#clientRenewProhibitedDomain Status: clientDeleteProhibited http://www.icann.org/epp#clientDeleteProhibitedRegistry Registrant ID: Not Available From RegistryRegistrant Name: ******** ******** (see Notes section below on how to view unmasked data)Registrant Organization: KonkandaizRegistrant Street: Post Box 53608Registrant Street: DubaiRegistrant City: DubaiRegistrant State/Province: Not ApplicableRegistrant Postal Code: 04Registrant Country: AERegistrant Phone: ************Registrant Phone Ext:Registrant Fax: 111111111111Registrant Fax Ext:Registrant Email: ********@*****.***Registry Admin ID: Not Available From RegistryAdmin Name: ******** ******** (see Notes section below on how to view unmasked data)Admin Organization: KonkandaizAdmin Street: Post Box 53608Admin Street: DubaiAdmin City: DubaiAdmin State/Province: Not ApplicableAdmin Postal Code: 04Admin Country: AEAdmin Phone: ************Admin Phone Ext:Admin Fax: 111111111111Admin Fax Ext:Admin Email: ********@*****.***Registry Tech ID: Not Available From RegistryTech Name: ******** ******** (see Notes section below on how to view unmasked data)Tech Organization: KonkandaizTech Street: Post Box 53608Tech Street: DubaiTech City: DubaiTech State/Province: Not ApplicableTech Postal Code: 04Tech Country: AETech Phone: ************Tech Phone Ext:Tech Fax: 111111111111Tech Fax Ext:Tech Email: ********@*****.***Name Server: MY.PRIVATEDNS.COMName Server: YOUR.PRIVATEDNS.COMDNSSEC: unsigned

Relationships
184.107.209.2 Connected_From 3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210

111.207.78.204

Ports
  • 443 TCP
Whois

inetnum:        111.192.0.0 - 111.207.255.255netname:        UNICOM-BJdescr:         China Unicom Beijing province networkdescr:         China Unicomcountry:        CNadmin-c:        CH1302-APtech-c:         SY21-APremarks:        service providermnt-by:         APNIC-HMmnt-lower:     MAINT-CNCGROUPmnt-lower:     MAINT-CNCGROUP-BJmnt-routes:     MAINT-CNCGROUP-RRstatus:         ALLOCATED PORTABLEmnt-irt:        IRT-CU-CNlast-modified: 2016-05-04T00:18:25Zirt:            IRT-CU-CNaddress:        No.21,Financial Streetaddress:        Beijing,100033address:        P.R.Chinae-mail:         hqs-ipabuse@chinaunicom.cnabuse-mailbox: hqs-ipabuse@chinaunicom.cnadmin-c:        CH1302-APtech-c:         CH1302-APauth:         # Filteredmnt-by:         MAINT-CNCGROUPlast-modified: 2017-10-23T05:59:13Zperson:         ChinaUnicom Hostmasternic-hdl:        CH1302-APe-mail:         hqs-ipabuse@chinaunicom.cnaddress:        No.21,Jin-Rong Streetaddress:        Beijing,100033address:        P.R.Chinaphone:         +86-10-66259764fax-no:         +86-10-66259764country:        CNmnt-by:         MAINT-CNCGROUPlast-modified: 2017-08-17T06:13:16Zperson:         sun yingaddress:        fu xing men nei da jie 97, Xicheng Districtaddress:        Beijing 100800country:        CNphone:         +86-10-66030657fax-no:         +86-10-66078815e-mail:         hostmast@publicf.bta.net.cnnic-hdl:        SY21-APmnt-by:         MAINT-CNCGROUP-BJlast-modified: 2009-06-30T08:42:48Zsource:         APNIC

Relationships
111.207.78.204 Connected_From 3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210

80.91.118.45

Ports
  • 443 TCP
Whois

inetnum:        80.91.118.0 - 80.91.119.255netname:        Abissnetdescr:         Business Customerscountry:        ALadmin-c:        AB34506-RIPEtech-c:         AB34506-RIPEstatus:         ASSIGNED PAmnt-by:         AS35047-MNTcreated:        2014-10-24T10:09:33Zlast-modified: 2016-06-09T09:47:15Zsource:         RIPErole:         Abissnet BBoneaddress:        Rr. Ismail Qemali, P. Abissnete-mail:         bbone@abissnet.alabuse-mailbox: bbone@abissnet.alnic-hdl:        AB34506-RIPEmnt-by:         AS35047-MNTcreated:        2016-06-09T08:09:15Zlast-modified: 2016-06-09T08:41:05Zsource:         RIPE% Information related to '80.91.118.0/24AS35047'route:         80.91.118.0/24descr:         Abissnet ISPorigin:         AS35047mnt-by:         AS35047-MNTcreated:        2011-02-27T10:24:58Zlast-modified: 2011-02-27T10:24:58Zsource:         RIPE

Relationships
80.91.118.45 Connected_From 3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210

181.119.19.56

Ports
  • 443 TCP
Whois

NetRange:     181.0.0.0 - 181.255.255.255CIDR:         181.0.0.0/8NetName:        LACNIC-181NetHandle:     NET-181-0-0-0-0Parent:         ()NetType:        Allocated to LACNICOriginAS:    Organization: Latin American and Caribbean IP address Regional Registry (LACNIC)RegDate:        1993-04-30Updated:        2010-07-21Comment:        This IP address range is under LACNIC responsibilityComment:        for further allocations to users in LACNIC region.Comment:        Please see http://www.lacnic.net/ for further details,Comment:        or check the WHOIS server located at http://whois.lacnic.netRef:            https://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-181-0-0-0-0OrgName:        Latin American and Caribbean IP address Regional RegistryOrgId:         LACNICAddress:        Rambla Republica de Mexico 6125City:         MontevideoStateProv:    PostalCode:     11400Country:        UYRegDate:        2002-07-26Updated:        2018-03-15Ref:            https://whois.arin.net/rest/org/LACNIC

Relationships
181.119.19.56 Connected_From 3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210

59.90.93.97

Ports
  • 443 TCP
Whois

inetnum:        59.90.64.0 - 59.90.127.255netname:        BB-Multiplaydescr:         O/o DGM BB, NOC BSNL Bangalorecountry:        INadmin-c:        BH155-APtech-c:         DB374-APstatus:         ASSIGNED NON-PORTABLEmnt-by:         MAINT-IN-DOTmnt-irt:        IRT-BSNL-INlast-modified: 2011-02-18T09:27:20Zsource:         APNICirt:            IRT-BSNL-INaddress:        Internet Celladdress:        Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limitedaddress:        8th Floor,148-B Statesman Houseaddress:        Barakhamba Road, New Delhi - 110 001e-mail:         abuse@bsnl.inabuse-mailbox: abuse@bsnl.inadmin-c:        NC83-APtech-c:         CGMD1-APauth:         # Filteredmnt-by:         MAINT-IN-DOTlast-modified: 2017-10-20T05:42:50Zsource:         APNICperson:         BSNL Hostmasternic-hdl:        BH155-APe-mail:         hostmaster@bsnl.inaddress:        Broadband Networksaddress:        Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limitedaddress:        2nd Floor, Telephone Exchange, Sector 62address:        Noidaphone:         +91-120-2404243fax-no:         +91-120-2404241country:        INmnt-by:         MAINT-IN-PER-DOTlast-modified: 2015-11-12T06:00:14Zperson:         DGM Broadbandaddress:        BSNL NOC Bangalorecountry:        INphone:         +91-080-25805800fax-no:         +91-080-25800022e-mail:         dnwplg@bsnl.innic-hdl:        DB374-APmnt-by:         MAINT-IN-PER-DOTlast-modified: 2011-02-19T10:03:44Zsource:         APNIC% Information related to '59.90.80.0/20AS9829'route:         59.90.80.0/20descr:         BSNL Internetcountry:        INorigin:         AS9829mnt-lower:     MAINT-IN-DOTmnt-routes:     MAINT-IN-DOTmnt-by:         MAINT-IN-AS9829last-modified: 2008-09-04T07:54:47Zsource:         APNIC

Relationships
59.90.93.97 Connected_From a71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6

Relationship Summary

8c3e0204f5... Contains a71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6
a71017302e... Connected_To 59.90.93.97
a71017302e... Contained_Within 8c3e0204f52200325ed36db9b12aba1c5e46984d415514538a5bf10783cacdf8
675a35e04b... Contains e69d6c2d3e9c4beebee7f3a4a3892e5fdc601beda7c3ec735f0dfba2b29418a7
e69d6c2d3e... Contained_Within 675a35e04b19aab314bcbc4b1f2610e3dea4a80c277cc5188f1d1391a00dfdb1
d1d490866d... Contains 40ef57ca2a617f5d24ac624339ba2027b6cf301c28684bf8b2075fc7a2e95116
40ef57ca2a... Contained_Within d1d490866d4a4d29306f0d9300bffc1450c41bb8fd62371d29672bf9f747bf92
546dbd370a... Contains 3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210
3c809a1010... Contained_Within 546dbd370a40c8e46f9b599a414f25000eec5ae6b3e046a035fe6e6cd5d874e1
3c809a1010... Connected_To 184.107.209.2
3c809a1010... Connected_To 111.207.78.204
3c809a1010... Connected_To 80.91.118.45
3c809a1010... Connected_To 181.119.19.56
c9e3b83d77... Contains e088c3a0b0f466df5329d9a66ff618de3d468d8a5981715303babb1452631eef
e088c3a0b0... Contained_Within c9e3b83d77ce93cc1d70b22e967f049b13515c88572aa78e0a838103e5478777
20abb95114... Connected_To 98.101.211.162
20abb95114... Connected_To 81.0.213.173
98.101.211.162 Connected_From 20abb95114de946da7595438e9edf0bf39c85ba8512709db7d5532d37d73bd64
81.0.213.173 Connected_From 20abb95114de946da7595438e9edf0bf39c85ba8512709db7d5532d37d73bd64
184.107.209.2 Connected_From 3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210
111.207.78.204 Connected_From 3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210
80.91.118.45 Connected_From 3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210
181.119.19.56 Connected_From 3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210
59.90.93.97 Connected_From a71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6

Recommendations

NCCIC would like to remind users and administrators to consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization's systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.

  • Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
  • Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
  • Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
  • Restrict users' ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
  • Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
  • Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
  • Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
  • Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
  • Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its "true file type" (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
  • Monitor users' web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
  • Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumbdrives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
  • Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
  • Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate ACLs.

Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in NIST's Special Publication 800-83, Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops.

Contact Information

NCCIC continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://us-cert.gov/forms/feedback/

Document FAQ

What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact US-CERT and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact US-CERT and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the NCCIC at 1-888-282-0870 or soc@us-cert.gov.

Can I submit malware to NCCIC? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:

NCCIC encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on US-CERT's homepage at www.us-cert.gov.

Revisions

June 14, 2018: Initial version|March 14, 2019: Made YARA rule correction

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.