MAR-10322463-2.v1 - AppleJeus: JMT Trading

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Description

This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts among the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of Treasury (Treasury) to highlight the cyber threat to cryptocurrency posed by North Korea, formally known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and provide mitigation recommendations. Working with U.S. government partners, FBI, CISA, and Treasury assess that Lazarus Group—which these agencies attribute to North Korean state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) actors—is targeting individuals and companies, including cryptocurrency exchanges and financial service companies, through the dissemination of cryptocurrency trading applications that have been modified to include malware that facilitates theft of cryptocurrency.



This MAR highlights this cyber threat posed by North Korea and provides detailed indicators of compromise (IOCs) used by the North Korean government. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on other versions of AppleJeus and recommended steps to mitigate this threat, see Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA21-048A: AppleJeus: Analysis of North Korea's Cryptocurrency Malware at https://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/AA21-048A.



There have been multiple versions of AppleJeus malware discovered since its initial discovery in August 2018. In most versions, the malware appears to be from a legitimate-looking cryptocurrency trading company and website, whereby an unsuspecting individual downloads a third-party application from a website that appears legitimate.



The U.S. Government has identified AppleJeus malware version—JMT Trading—and associated IOCs used by the North Korean government in AppleJeus operations.



JMT Trading malware, discovered by a cybersecurity company in October 2019, is a legitimate-looking cryptocurrency trading software that is marketed and distributed by a company and website—JMT Trading and jmttrading[.]org, respectively—that appear legitimate.

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: MAR-10322463-2.v1.stix.

Submitted Files (6)

07c38ca1e0370421f74c949507fc0d21f4cfcb5866a4f9c0751aefa0d6e97542 (jmttrader.msi)

081d1739422bf050755e6af269a717681274821cea8becb0962d4db61869c5d6 (JMTTrader.exe)

4d6078fc1ea6d3cd65c3ceabf65961689c5bc2d81f18c55b859211a60c141806 (jmttrader_mac.dmg)

7ea6391c11077a0f2633104193ec08617eb6321a32ac30c641f1650c35eed0ea (JMTTrader)

9bf8e8ac82b8f7c3707eb12e77f94cd0e06a972658610d136993235cbfa53641 (CrashReporter.exe)

e352d6ea4da596abfdf51f617584611fc9321d5a6d1c22aff243aecdef8e7e55 (CrashReporter)

Domains (2)

beastgoc.com

jmttrading.org

07c38ca1e0370421f74c949507fc0d21f4cfcb5866a4f9c0751aefa0d6e97542

Tags

backdoordroppertrojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Relationships

Description

This Windows program from the JMTTrade GitHub site is a Windows MSI Installer. The installer looks legitimate and previously had a valid digital signature from Comodo (Sectigo). The signature was signed with a code signing certificate purchased by the same user as the SSL certificate for "jmttrading.org." The installer asks for administrative privileges to run and while installing "JMTTrader.exe" (081d1739422bf050755e6af269a717681274821cea8becb0962d4db61869c5d6) in the “C:\Program Files (x86)\JMTTrader” folder, it also installs "CrashReporter.exe" (9bf8e8ac82b8f7c3707eb12e77f94cd0e06a972658610d136993235cbfa53641) in the “C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\JMTTrader” folder. Immediately after installation, the installer launches "CrashReporter.exe" with the “Maintain” parameter.

Screenshots

jmttrading.org

Tags

command-and-control

Whois

Whois for jmttrading.org had the following information on October 11, 2019:

Registrar: NameCheap

Created: July 11, 2019

Expires: July 11, 2020

Updated: September 10, 2019

Relationships

Description

This site contained a “Download from GitHub” button which takes the user to the JMTTrader GitHub page (github.com/jmttrading/JMTTrader/releases) where both Windows and OSX versions of JMTTrader were available for download. There are also zip and a tar.gz files containing the source code. JMT Trading has a legitimately signed Sectigo SSL certificate. The SSL certificate was “Domain Control Validated," just as the Celas LLC certificate for AppleJeus variant 1. The domain was registered at the IP address 198.187.29.20 with ASN 22612.

081d1739422bf050755e6af269a717681274821cea8becb0962d4db61869c5d6

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Relationships

Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows executable contained within the Windows MSI Installer "JMTTrader_Win.msi." When executed, "JMTTrader.exe" asks for the user’s exchange, and then loads a legitimate cryptocurrency trading platform with no signs of malicious activity.



"JMTTrader.exe" is similar in appearance to version 1 and QT Bitcoin Trader. In addition to similar appearance, many strings found in "JMTTrader.exe" have QT Bitcoin Trader references and parameters being set to “JMT Trader” including but not limited to:



--Begin similarities--

String_ABOUT_QT_BITCOIN_TRADER_TEXT=JMT Trader

String_ABOUT_QT_BITCOIN_TRADER_TEXT=JMT Trader is a free Open Source project<br>developed on pure C++ Qt and OpenSSL.

QtBitcoinTraderClass

July IGHOR (note: Ighor July is one of the developers of QT Bitcoin Trader)

--End similarities--



The strings also reference the name “Gary Mendez” with email garyhmendez@yahoo.com as the author of "JMTTrader.exe." There is also reference to an additional GitHub repository under the name Gary Mendez “github.com/garymendez/JMTTrader/issues."



While the JMTTrader application is likely a modification of QT Bitcoin Trader, the legitimate QT Bitcoin Trader for Windows is not available for download as an MSI, but only as a Windows portable executable. This is a singular file named "QtBitcoinTrader.exe" and does not install or run any additional programs. The JMTTrader MSI contains "JMTTrader.exe," the modified version of QT Bitcoin Trader, as well as the additional "CrashReporter.exe" (9bf8e8ac82b8f7c3707eb12e77f94cd0e06a972658610d136993235cbfa53641) executable not included with the original QT Bitcoin Trader.

Screenshots

9bf8e8ac82b8f7c3707eb12e77f94cd0e06a972658610d136993235cbfa53641

Tags

backdoortrojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Relationships

Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows executable contained within the Windows MSI Installer "JMTTrader_Win.msi." Unlike the first version of the malware, "CrashReporter.exe" is installed in the “C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\JMTTrader," which is a different folder than "JMTTrader.exe." "CrashReporter.exe" is heavily obfuscated with the ADVObfuscation library, which has been renamed “snowman” by the malware writer. ADVObfuscation is described as using C++ 11/14 language to generate, at compile time, obfuscated code without using any external tool and without modifying the compiler and introduces some form of randomness to generate polymorphic code like the encryption of strings literals and the obfuscation of calls using finite state machines. Due to this obfuscation, detailed functionality can be difficult to determine to the extent of the non-obfuscated "Updater.exe" binary.



At launch, "CrashReporter.exe" first checks for the “Maintain” parameter and if not found, exits the program to likely evade detection in a sandbox environment. The malware collects basic victim information and encrypts the data with the hardcoded XOR key “X,%`PMk--Jj8s+6=15:20:11."



The encrypted data is sent to “hxxps[:]//beastgoc.com/grepmonux.php” with a multipart form data separator “--wMKBUqjC7ZMG5A5g."



The malware’s capabilities include reading/writing itself to various directories, querying/writing to the registry, searching for files, extract/decode payload, and terminating processes. "CrashReporter.exe" also creates a scheduled SYSTEM task named "JMTCrashReporter," which runs the "CrashReporter.exe" program with the “Maintain” parameter at the login of any user.

Screenshots

beastgoc.com

Tags

command-and-control

URLs

• https[:]//beastgoc.com/grepmonux.php

Whois

Whois information for the domain beastgoc.com on October 11, 2019 was as follows:

Registrar: NameCheap

Created Date: July 19, 2019

Expiration Date: July 19, 2020

Relationships

Description

The site "beastgoc.com" had as valid digital signature signed by Sectigo. This is a “Domain Control Validated” signature, which is the lowest level of validation. The domain was registered at the IP address 185.228.83.32 with ASN 205406.

4d6078fc1ea6d3cd65c3ceabf65961689c5bc2d81f18c55b859211a60c141806

Tags

backdoortrojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Relationships

Description

This OSX program from the JMTTrader GitHub is an Apple DMG installer. The OSX program has very similar functionality to the Windows program, but does not have a digital signature. Again, the installer appears to be legitimate and installs both JMTTrader in the “/Applications/JMTTrader.app/Contents/MacOS/” folder and a hidden program named “.CrashReporter” in the “/Applications/JMTTrader.app/Contents/Resources/” folder. The installer contains a postinstall script (see Figure 5).



This postinstall script has similar functionality to the postinstall script of the first version but has a few additional features. It still moves the hidden plist file (.com.jmttrading.plist) to the LaunchDaemons folder, but also changes the file permissions on the plist. Once in the LaunchDaemons folder, this program will be ran on system load as root for every user, which will launch the CrashReporter program with the Maintain parameter.



The postinstall script also moves the “.CrashReporter” program to a new location “/Library/JMTTrader/CrashReporter” and makes it executable. Like CelasTradePro, as the LaunchDaemon will not run automatically after the plist file is moved, the postinstall script then launches the CrashReporter program with the Maintain parameter and runs it in the background (&).



The package also has “Developed by Gary Mendez. JMTTrading Group” in the Info.plist properties file.

Screenshots

7ea6391c11077a0f2633104193ec08617eb6321a32ac30c641f1650c35eed0ea

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

No matches found.

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Relationships

Description

This OSX sample was contained within Apple DMG Installer "JMTTrader_Mac.dmg." When exexuted, JMTTrader has identical functionality and appearance to the Windows JMTTrader.exe. It asks for the user’s exchange and loads a legitimate cryptocurrency trading application with no signs of malicious activity. While the appearance has changed slightly from the CelasTradePro application, JMTTrader is close in appearance to both CelasTradePro and QT Bitcoin Trader, and is likely a modification of the OSX QT Bitcoin Trader.



In addition to similar appearance, many strings found in JMTTrader have QT Bitcoin Trader references and parameters being set to “JMT Trader” including but not limited to:



--Begin similarities--

String_ABOUT_QT_BITCOIN_TRADER_TEXT=JMT Trader

String_ABOUT_QT_BITCOIN_TRADER_TEXT=JMT Trader is a free Open Source project<br>developed on pure C++ Qt and OpenSSL.

User-Agent: Qt Bitcoin Trader v1.40.42

July IGHOR (note: Ighor July is one of the developers of QT Bitcoin Trader)

--End similarities--



The strings also reference the name “Gary Mendez” with email garyhmendez@yahoo.com as the author of JMTTrader.exe. There is also reference to an additional GitHub repository under the name Gary Mendez “github.com/garymendez/JMTTrader/issues."



While the JMTTrader application is likely a modification of QT Bitcoin Trader, the legitimate QT Bitcoin Trader DMG for OSX does not contain the postinstall script nor the plist file which creates a LaunchDaemon. When executed, only QTBitcoinTrader will be installed, and no additional programs will be created, installed, or launched.



In contrast, the JMTTrader DMG contains the CelasTradePro OSX executable, the modified version of QT Bitcoin Trader, as well as the additional CrashReporter OSX executable not included with the original QT Bitcoin Trader.

e352d6ea4da596abfdf51f617584611fc9321d5a6d1c22aff243aecdef8e7e55

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Relationships

Description

This OSX sample was contained within Apple DMG Installer "JMTTrader_Mac.dmg." CrashReporter likely functions very similarly to the Windows CrashReporter.exe program, but unlike the Windows program, it is not obfuscated. This lack of obfuscation makes it easier to determine the program’s functionality in detail.



Upon launch, the malware checks for the “Maintain” parameter, and will exit if the parameter is not found, likely to avoid sandbox analysis.



CrashReporter then creates a randomly generated token (identifier) and collects the binary’s version and process ID to send to the server. This data is XOR encrypted with the hard-coded key “X,%`PMk--Jj8s+6=\x02” (last value is a non-printable ASCII character which is hexadecimal \x02). While the key is different than the XOR key for the Windows sample, the first 16 bytes are the same.



The encrypted data is sent to the same C2 server as the Windows sample at hxxps[:]//beastgoc.com/grepmonux.php with the multipart data form separator “jGzAcN6k4VsTRn9”. CrashReporter also has a hard-coded user-agent string: “Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/72.0.3626.121 Safari/537.36” along with other hard-coded values sent with the data including “token," “query," and “mont.jpg."



If CrashReporter receives a response with the HTTP code 200 (successful), it will invoke another function which will wait for tasking from the C2 server. When a tasking is received, the function decrypts the data with the same hardcoded XOR key and processes the tasking. Accepted tasking commands include the following:



--Begin accepted tasking commands--

“exit”: this command will cause CrashReporter to gracefully exit

“up”: this command will upload a file from the C2 server to the infected host

“stand ”: this command will execute commands from the server via the shell using the popen API (the "popen()" function opens a process by creating a bidirectional pipe, forking, and invoking the shell)

--End accepted tasking commands--



These possible commands from the C2 server gives the remote attacker full control over the OSX system. It is likely that the functionality of the Windows CrashReporter.exe is the same as this OSX malware, as the original AppleJeus had the same functionality on both operating systems.

Screenshots

Soon after October 11, 2019, the files on GitHub were updated to clean, non-malicious installers. Then on October 13, 2019, a different cyber security organization published an article detailing the OSX JMTTrader, and soon after the C2 "beastgoc.com" went offline. There is not a confirmed sample of the payload to analyze at this point.

CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization's systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.

• Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
• Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
• Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
• Restrict users' ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
• Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
• Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
• Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
• Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
• Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its "true file type" (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
• Monitor users' web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
• Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
• Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
• Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).

Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, "Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops".

• 1-888-282-0870
• CISA Central (UNCLASS)
• CISA SIPR (SIPRNET)
• CISA IC (JWICS)

CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/

What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

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Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:

• Web: https://malware.us-cert.gov
• E-Mail: submit@malware.us-cert.gov
• FTP: ftp.malware.us-cert.gov (anonymous)

CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA's homepage at www.cisa.gov.