MAR-10322463-3.v1 - AppleJeus: Union Crypto

This report is provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.

This document is marked TLP:WHITE--Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp.

Description

This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts among the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of Treasury (Treasury) to highlight the cyber threat to cryptocurrency posed by North Korea, formally known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and provide mitigation recommendations. Working with U.S. government partners, FBI, CISA, and Treasury assess that Lazarus Group—which these agencies attribute to North Korean state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) actors—is targeting individuals and companies, including cryptocurrency exchanges and financial service companies, through the dissemination of cryptocurrency trading applications that have been modified to include malware that facilitates theft of cryptocurrency.



This MAR highlights this cyber threat posed by North Korea and provides detailed indicators of compromise (IOCs) used by the North Korean government. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on other versions of AppleJeus and recommended steps to mitigate this threat, see Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA21-048A: AppleJeus: Analysis of North Korea's Cryptocurrency Malware at https://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/AA21-048A.



There have been multiple versions of AppleJeus malware discovered since its initial discovery in August 2018. In most versions, the malware appears to be from a legitimate-looking cryptocurrency trading company and website, whereby an unsuspecting individual downloads a third-party application from a website that appears legitimate.



The U.S. Government has identified AppleJeus malware version—Union Crypto—and associated IOCs used by the North Korean government in AppleJeus operations.



Union Crypto, discovered by a cybersecurity company in December 2019, is a legitimate-looking cryptocurrency trading software that is marketed and distributed by a company and website—Union Crypto and unioncrypto[.]vip, respectively—that appear legitimate.

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: MAR-10322463-3.v1.stix.

Submitted Files (8)

01c13f825ec6366ac2b6dd80e5589568fa5c8685cb4d924d1408e3d7c178902f (UnionCryptoUpdater.exe)

0967d2f122a797661c90bc4fc00d23b4a29f66129611b4aa76f62d8a15854d36 (UnionCryptoTrader.exe)

2ab58b7ce583402bf4cbc90bee643ba5f9503461f91574845264d4f7e3ccb390 (UnionCryptoTrader.dmg)

631ac269925bb72b5ad8f469062309541e1edfec5610a21eecded75a35e65680 (unioncryptoupdater)

6f45a004ad6bb087f733feb618e115fe88164f6db9562cb9b428372c9add75f0 (UnionCryptoTrader)

755bd7a3765efceb8183ffade090ef2637a85c4505f8078dda116013dd5758f3 (NodeDLL.dll)

af4144c1f0236e6b59f40d88635ec54c2ef8034f6a96a83f5dbfd6b8ea2c0d49 (UnionCryptoTrader.msi)

e3623c2440b692f6b557a862719dc95f41d2e9ad7b560e837d3b59bfe4b8b774 (UnionCryptoSetup.exe)

Domains (1)

unioncrypto.vip

IPs (1)

216.189.150.185

e3623c2440b692f6b557a862719dc95f41d2e9ad7b560e837d3b59bfe4b8b774

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Relationships

Description

This Windows program from the Union Crypto Trader site is a Windows executable. This executable is actually an installer, and will first extract a temporary MSI named UnionCryptoTrader.msi (af4144c1f0236e6b59f40d88635ec54c2ef8034f6a96a83f5dbfd6b8ea2c0d49) to the “C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Temp\{82E4B719-90F7-4BD1-9CF1-56CD777E0C42}” folder, which will be executed by "UnionCryptoTraderSetup.exe" and deleted after it successfully completes the installation.

unioncrypto.vip

Tags

command-and-control

URLs

• hxxps[:]//unioncrypto.vip/update
• hxxps[:]//www[.]unioncrypto.vip/download/W6c2dq8By7luMhCmya2v97YeN

Whois

Whois for unioncrypto.vip had the following information on December 8, 2019:

Registrar: NameCheap

Created: June 5, 2019

Expires: June 5, 2020

Updated: June 5, 2019

Relationships

Description

While this site is no longer available, a download link of hxxps[:]//www[.]unioncrypto.vip/download/W6c2dq8By7luMhCmya2v97YeN was discovered by a cyber-security researcher and is recorded on VirusTotal for the OSX version of UnionCryptoTrader. In contrast, open source reporting disclosed the Windows version may have been downloaded via Telegram, as it was found in a “Telegram Downloads” folder on an unnamed victim. Union Crypto Trader has a legitimately signed Sectigo SSL certificate, which was “Domain Control Validated” just as the previous version certificates. .



The domain is registered with NameCheap at the IP address 104.168.167.16 with ASN 54290.

Screenshots

af4144c1f0236e6b59f40d88635ec54c2ef8034f6a96a83f5dbfd6b8ea2c0d49

Tags

dropper

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Relationships

Description

This Windows program is a Windows MSI Installer. The MSI installer will install "UnionCryptoTrader.exe"(0967d2f122a797661c90bc4fc00d23b4a29f66129611b4aa76f62d8a15854d36) in the “C:\Program Files\UnionCryptoTrader” folder and also install UnionCryptoUpdater.exe (01c13f825ec6366ac2b6dd80e5589568fa5c8685cb4d924d1408e3d7c178902f) in the “C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\UnionCryptoTrader” folder. Immediately after installation, the installer launches "UnionCryptoUpdater.exe."

Screenshots

0967d2f122a797661c90bc4fc00d23b4a29f66129611b4aa76f62d8a15854d36

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

No matches found.

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Relationships

Description

This file is a 64-bit Windows executable contained within the Windows MSI Installer "UnionCryptoTrader.msi." When executed, "UnionCryptoTrader.exe" loads a legitimate cryptocurrency arbitrage application with no signs of malicious activity. (Note: arbitrage is defined as “the simultaneous buying and selling of securities, currency, or commodities in different markets or in derivative forms in order to take advantage of differing prices for the same asset”).



This application does not appear to be a modification of the Windows QT Bitcoin Trader, but may be a modification of Blackbird Bitcoin Arbitrage.



In addition to the "unioncrypto.vip" site describing "UnionCryptoTrader.exe" as a “Smart Cryptocurrency Arbitrage Trading Platform," many of the strings found in "UnionCryptoTrader.exe" have references to Blackbird Bitcoin Arbitrage including but not limited to:



--Begin similarities--

Blackbird Bitcoin Arbitrage

| Blackbird Bitcoin Arbitrage Log File |

output/blackbird_result_

output\blackbird_log_

ERROR: Blackbird needs at least two Bitcoin exchanges. Please edit the config.json file to add new exchanges

--End similarities--



The strings also contain the links and references to all fourteen exchanges listed as implemented or potential on the Blackbird GitHub page. In addition, the "config.txt" file found in the “C:\Program Files\UnionCryptoTrader” folder with "UnionCryptoTrader.exe" also contains references to all fourteen exchanges, as well as sets the database file to "blackbird.db." The file "blackbird.db" is also found in the same folder.

Screenshots

01c13f825ec6366ac2b6dd80e5589568fa5c8685cb4d924d1408e3d7c178902f

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Packers/Compilers/Cryptors

Relationships

Description

This file is a 64-bit Windows executable contained within the Windows MSI Installer "UnionCryptoTrader.msi." When executed, "UnionCryptoUpdater.exe" first installs itself as a service, which will automatically start when any user logs on. The service is installed with a description stating it “Automatically installs updates for Union Crypto Trader."



After installing the service, "UnionCryptoUpdater.exe" collects different information about the system the malware is running on. Specifically, it uses Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Query Language (WQL) to collect this information. "UnionCryptoUpdater.exe" first finds the BIOS Serial Number by using the “SELECT * FROM Win32_Bios” WMI filter as a WQL Query String (Figure 4).



This returns SMBBIOSBIOSVersion, Manufacturer, Name, SerialNumber, and Version. The function later pulls the “SerialNumber” from this returned data (Figure 5).



The same process is followed to pull the operating system version and build number. The WQL Query String is “SELECT * FROM Win32_OperatingSystem," and the fields pulled are “Caption” and “BuildNumber." Note that the “Caption” field contains the OS version for the computer running the malware.



After collecting the system data, "UnionCryptoUpdater.exe" then builds a string consisting of the current time and the hard-coded value “12GWAPCT1F0I1S14." The current time is stored in the "auth_timestamp" variable.



This combined string is MD5 hashed and stored in the "auth_signature" variable. These variables are sent in the first communication to the command and control (C2) server, and are likely used to verify any connections to the server are actually originating from the "UnionCryptoUpdater.exe" malware.



These variables are sent via a POST the C2 hxxps[:]//unioncrypto.vip/update along with the collected system data. The system data is sent in this specific format:



--Begin format--

rlz=[BIOS serial number]&ei=[OS Version] (BuildNumber)&act=check

--End format--



These values, along with a hard-coded User Agent String of “Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/75.0.3770.142 Safari/537.36” can be found in the malware data section.



If the POST is successful (i.e. returns an HTTP response status code of 200), but returns a string of “0”, UnionCryptoUpdater.exe will sleep for ten minutes and then regenerate the "auth_timestamp" and "auth_signature" to contact the C2 again.



If the POST is successful and the C2 server does not return the string “0”, the malware will decode the base64 payload and decrypt it. It then uses built in C++ functions to allocate memory, write the payload to memory, and executes the payload. If this is successful, the malware will send another POST to the C2 with the value “act=done” replacing the “act=check” for the previously specified format (Figure 9).

Screenshots

755bd7a3765efceb8183ffade090ef2637a85c4505f8078dda116013dd5758f3

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

No matches found.

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata

PE Sections

Relationships

Description

This file is a 64-bit dynamic-link library (DLL). This file was identified as a payload for the Windows malware. This stage 2 is not immediately downloaded by "UnionCryptoUpdater.exe," but instead is downloaded after a period of time likely specified by the C2 server at "hxxps[:]//unioncrypto.vip/update." This delay could be implemented to prevent researchers from immediately obtaining the stage 2 malware.



The C2 and build path are visible from the "NodeDLL.dll" strings. The C2 for the malware is hxxp[:]//216.189.150.185:8080/push.jsp.



The build path found in the strings is “Z:\Opal\bin\x64_Release\NodeDll.pdb." This stage 2 is likely part of a project named “Opal” by the actors, due to the folder in the build path.



NodeDLL.dll has multiple functionalities which can be verified by examining the program imports and strings. Functionalities with corresponding strings/imports include but are not limited to:

1. Get/Update implant configuration

   a. Imports: GetComputerNameA, GetCurrentDirectoryW, GetStartupInfoW, GetTimeZoneInformation

   b. Strings: CurrentUser

2. Get/Put a file or directory

   a. Imports: WriteFile

3. Execute a program

   a. Imports: CreateProcessW

4. Directory listing

   a. Imports: GetCurrentDirectoryW

5. Active Drive Listing (C:\, D:\, etc.)

   a. Imports: GetLogicalDrives, GetDriveTypeW

6. Move a file/directory

   a. Imports: CreateDirectoryW, MoveFileExW

7. Delete a file/directory

   a. Imports: DeleteFileW

8. Screenshot active desktop

   a. Imports: GetDIBits, CreateCompatibleBitmap, BitBlt, etc from gdi32

9. Execute a shell command through cmd.exe

   a. Imports: GetCommandLineW, GetCommandLineA, CreateProcessAsUserW

10. Check IPv4 TCP connectivity against specified target

   a. Imports: connect, bind, send, socket, getaddrinfo, etc. from ws2_32

   b. Strings: Network unreachable, HTTP/1.%d %d, httponly, Remote file not found

11. Update configuration (beacon interval, AP address, etc.)

   a. Strings: Host: %s%s%s:%d, Set-Cookie:



The "NodeDLL.dll" strings also show a hard-coded user agent string: “Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/64.0.3282.140 Safari/537.36 Edge/17.17134”. Finally, a format string which matches the HostUS C2 is found in the strings: "%s://%s%s%s:%d%s%s%s," along with many references to proxies or proxy configurations.

216.189.150.185

Tags

command-and-control

URLs

• 216.189.150.185:8080/push.jsp

Ports

• 8080 TCP

Whois

Queried whois.arin.net with "n 216.189.150.185"...



NetRange:     216.189.144.0 - 216.189.159.255

CIDR:         216.189.144.0/20

NetName:        HOSTUS-IPV4-3

NetHandle:     NET-216-189-144-0-1

Parent:         NET216 (NET-216-0-0-0-0)

NetType:        Direct Allocation

OriginAS:     AS7489, AS25926

Organization: HostUS (HOSTU-4)

RegDate:        2014-08-29

Updated:        2015-12-29

Comment:        Please send all abuse reports to abuse@hostus.us

Ref:            https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/216.189.144.0





OrgName:        HostUS

OrgId:         HOSTU-4

Address:        125 N Myers St

City:         Charlotte

StateProv:     NC

PostalCode:     28202

Country:        US

RegDate:        2013-07-26

Updated:        2019-10-23

Comment:        IP addresses from this network are further reallocated or assigned to customers.

Comment:        Please send all abuse reports to abuse@hostus.us.

Comment:        Abuse reports must be submitted through email with the IP address in title.

Ref:            https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/HOSTU-4





OrgNOCHandle: HOSTU2-ARIN

OrgNOCName: HostUS Tech

OrgNOCPhone: +1-302-300-1737

OrgNOCEmail: noc@hostus.us

OrgNOCRef:    https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/HOSTU2-ARIN



OrgAbuseHandle: HAD18-ARIN

OrgAbuseName: HostUS Abuse Desk

OrgAbusePhone: +1-302-300-1737

OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@hostus.us

OrgAbuseRef:    https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/HAD18-ARIN



OrgTechHandle: HOSTU2-ARIN

OrgTechName: HostUS Tech

OrgTechPhone: +1-302-300-1737

OrgTechEmail: noc@hostus.us

OrgTechRef:    https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/HOSTU2-ARIN

Relationships

Description

The C2 identified for NodeDLL.dll. The IP address 216.189.150.185 has ASN 7489 and is owned by HostUS.

2ab58b7ce583402bf4cbc90bee643ba5f9503461f91574845264d4f7e3ccb390

Tags

backdoordownloaderloadertrojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Relationships

Description

This OSX program from the "UnionCrypto" download link is an Apple DMG installer.



The OSX program does not have a digital signature, and will warn the user of that before installation. Just as previous versions, the UnionCrypto installer appears to be legitimate and installs both “UnionCryptoTrader” (6f45a004ad6bb087f733feb618e115fe88164f6db9562cb9b428372c9add75f0) in the “/Applications/UnionCryptoTrader.app/Contents/MacOS/” folder and a hidden program named “.unioncryptoupdater” (631ac269925bb72b5ad8f469062309541e1edfec5610a21eecded75a35e65680) in the “/Applications/UnionCryptoTrader.app/Contents/Resources/” folder. The installer contains a postinstall script (see figure 10).



This postinstall script is identical in functionality to the postinstall script for the second version. It moves the hidden plist file (.vip.unioncrypto.plist) to the LaunchDaemons folder and changes the file permissions for the plist to be owned by root. Once in the LaunchDaemons folder, this program will be ran on system load as root for every user. This will launch the unioncryptoupdater program.



The postinstall script also moves the hidden “.unioncryptoupdater” binary to a new location “/Library/UnionCrypto/unioncryptoupdater” and makes the file executable. As the LaunchDaemon will not be run immediately after the plist file is moved, the postinstall script then launches the unioncryptoupdater program in the background (&). In contrast to the CelasTradePro “Updater” binary and JMTTrader “CrashReporter” binary, the unioncryptoupdater binary is not launched with any parameters.

Screenshots

6f45a004ad6bb087f733feb618e115fe88164f6db9562cb9b428372c9add75f0

Tags

trojan

Details

Antivirus

No matches found.

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Relationships

Description

This OSX sample was contained within Apple DMG Installer "UnionCryptoTrader.dmg." When executed, UnionCryptoTrader loads a legitimate cryptocurrency arbitrage application with no signs of malicious activity. (Note: arbitrage is defined as “the simultaneous buying and selling of securities, currency, or commodities in different markets or in derivative forms in order to take advantage of differing prices for the same asset”). This application does not appear to be a modification of the OSX QT Bitcoin Trader, but may be a modification of Blackbird Bitcoin Arbitrage11.

In addition to the "unioncrypto.vip" site describing UnionCryptoTrader as a “Smart Cryptocurrency Arbitrage Trading Platform," may of the strings found in UnionCryptoTrader have references to Blackbird Bitcoin Arbitrage including but not limited to:



--Begin similarities--

Blackbird Bitcoin Arbitrage

| Blackbird Bitcoin Arbitrage Log File |

output/blackbird_result_

output/blackbird_log_

ERROR: Blackbird needs at least two Bitcoin exchanges. Please edit the config.json file to add new exchanges

--End similarities--



The strings also contain the links and references to all fourteen exchanges listed as implemented or potential on the Blackbird GitHub page.

631ac269925bb72b5ad8f469062309541e1edfec5610a21eecded75a35e65680

Tags

backdoordownloaderloadertrojan

Details

Antivirus

YARA Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Relationships

Description

This OSX sample was contained within Apple DMG Installer "UnionCryptoTrader.dmg." This malware is signed adhoc, meaning it is not signed with a valid code signing ID.



When executed, unioncryptoupdater immediately calls the “onRun()” function, which contains most of the logic and functionality for this malware. This function first collects different information about the system the malware is running on. It uses IOKit, which is an Apple framework designed to allow programs to gain user-access to hardware devices and drivers. IOKit is specifically used to retrieve the system serial number with IOPlatformSerialNumber global variable (Figure 12).



The function then collects the operating system version by reading the system file at “/System/Library/CoreServices/SystemVersion.plist," and specifically extracting the ProductVersion and ProductBuildVersion from the system file (Figure 13).



After collecting the system data, unioncryptoupdater then builds a string consisting of the current time and the hard-coded value “12GWAPCT1F0I1S14" (Figure 14).



This string is MD5 hashed and stored in the "auth_signature" variable and the current time (used to create string for "auth_signature") in the "auth_timestamp" variable. These variables are sent in the first communication to the C2 server and are likely used to verify any connections to the server are actually originating from the unioncryptoupdater malware.



All collected data and the "auth_signature" and "auth_timestamp" are sent to hxxps[:]//unioncrypto.vip/update using the Barbeque::post() method. The Barbeque class is custom made C++ class which has both a post() and a get() method, which utilize libcurl to perform network communications for the malware. Barbeque::post() sends the system data in this specific format:



--Begin format--

rlz=[device serial number]&ei=[ProductVersion] (ProductBuildVersion)&act=check

--End format--



These values are found as described above or are hard-coded into the malware data section (Figure 15).



If the C2 server returns the string “0," unioncryptotrader will sleep for ten minutes and then regenerate the auth_timestamp and auth_signature to contact the C2 again via the same Barbeque::post() method.



If the C2 server does not return the string “0," the malware will decode the base64 payload, and decrypt it using the C++ aes_decrypt_cbc function. After decryption, the malware uses the OSX function mmap to allocate memory with read, write, and execute permissions. This is specified by the 7 loaded into the edx register before mmap is called. (Note: the 7, or binary 111, comes from OR’ing the read (100), write (010), and execute (001) binary values together, just as file permissions are often set). If mmap is successful in allocating the memory, the function then uses memcpy to copy the decrypted payload into the mmap’d memory region (Figure 16).



After the decrypted payload is copied into memory, unioncryptoupdater calls a function named memory_exec2, which utilizes Apple API NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory to create an “object file image” from the memory, and Apple API NSLinkModule to link the “object file image”. The API calls are necessary to allow the payload in memory to execute, as files in memory are not simply able to execute as files on disk are (Figure 17).



Once the malware has mapped and linked the payload in memory, it searches the mapped memory for “0xfeedfacf," which is the magic number for 64-bit OSX executables. This check is likely included to verify the payload was properly decoded, decrypted, and memory mapped before attempting execution (Figure 18).



After verifying the magic number, the malware searches for the address 0x80000028, which is the address of the LC_MAIN Load Command. Load Commands are similar to a table of contents for an OSX executable which contain commands and command positions in the binary. Offset 0x8 of the LC_MAIN load command contains the offset of the OSX executable entry point (Figure 19). This entry point is placed in register r8, and is called by the malware.



This process of allocating memory, copying the payload into memory, and calling the entry point achieves pure in-memory execution of the remotely downloaded payload. As such, if this is successful, the payload can be executed exclusively in memory and is never copied to disk.

If any part of the memory code execution process fails, unioncryptoupdater will write the received payload to “/tmp/updater” instead and execute it with a call to system (Figure 20).



The payload for this OSX malware could not be downloaded, as the C2 server "unioncrypto.vip/update" is no longer accessible. In addition, the payload was not identified in open source reporting.

Screenshots

CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization's systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.

• Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
• Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
• Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
• Restrict users' ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
• Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
• Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
• Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
• Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
• Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its "true file type" (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
• Monitor users' web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
• Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
• Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
• Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).

Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, "Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops".

• 1-888-282-0870
• CISA Central (UNCLASS)
• CISA SIPR (SIPRNET)
• CISA IC (JWICS)

CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/

What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Central.

Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:

• Web: https://malware.us-cert.gov
• E-Mail: submit@malware.us-cert.gov
• FTP: ftp.malware.us-cert.gov (anonymous)

CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA's homepage at www.cisa.gov.