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This report analyzes 8 unique files. 5 files are malicious loaders that contain an embedded executable. Two of the embedded executables are included in this report. The embedded executables are Remote Access Tool (RAT) that provides a vast array of Command and Control (C2) capabilities. These C2 capabilities include the ability to remotely monitor a system's desktop, gain reverse shell access, exfiltrate data, and upload and execute additional payloads. The malware can also function as a proxy, allowing a remote operator to pivot to other systems.
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: MAR-10382580-1.v1.stix.
Submitted Files (8)
No matches found.
This malware is a 64-bit Windows loader that contains an encrypted malicious executable. During runtime, this encrypted executable is decrypted and loaded into memory, never touching the system's hard disk. The encrypted executable is similar in functionality to the file "f7_dump_64.exe" (88a5e4b24747648a4e3f0a2d5282b51683260f9208b06788fc858c44559da1e8), described below. The malware embedded within this loader attempts to communicate with the hard-coded C2 Internet Protocol (IP) address 185[.]136[.]163[.]104. This malware provides a vast array of C2 capabilities including the ability to log keystrokes, upload and execute additional payloads, function as a proxy, and have graphical user interface (GUI) access over a target Windows system's desktop. Many of the structures utilized to implement the C2 capabilities in this malware appear to be derived from the same source code as "f7_dump_64.exe", however this malware utilizes much more complex obfuscation to hinder the analysis of its code structures.
Figure 1 - This screenshot illustrates the algorithm the malware uses to encrypt its inbound and outbound communications from the remote C2. This is a simple algorithm that relies primarily on incrementing through the target data and modifying each byte by either XOR'ing it with 0x10 or 0xe7. The basic arithmetic of the algorithm is to XOR every byte of the target data by 0x10 and then every other byte by 0xe7. Notably, outbound data appears to be prepended with a block of data that contains random bytes and is a random length. Therefore, the result of the encryption, even of the exact same data, will vary as the length of the prepended block will cause the 0xe7 XOR operation to occur on different bytes in the target data. If PCAP is collected, all observed communications between this RAT and its remote C2 may be decrypted by following this simple algorithm.
Figure 2 - This screenshot illustrates the malware sending a great deal of target system information outbound. As illustrated, this system information contains the computer name, user name, MAC address, IP address, operating system version, processor version, and all currently running processes. The malware responds with this data when simply echoing back the outbound (encrypted) data illustrated in Figure 3 and Figure 4. Effectively, the malware says hello and if the same hello response is provided it will provide a great deal of information about the compromised system. As further illustrated, the outbound data is encrypted with the algorithm displayed in Figure 1.
Figure 3 - This screenshot illustrates the malware forming a block of data the implant will send to its remote C2 during its initial connection attempts. Note the phrase "hello" inside this initial block of data. Also, note the apparent random data prepended to the outbound "hello".
Figure 4 - This screenshot illustrates the malware forming a block of data the implant will send to its remote C2 during its initial connection attempts. Note the phrase "hello" inside this initial block of data. Also note the apparent random data prepended to the outbound "hello". The purpose of this screenshot is to illustrate how the malware prepends a random block of data of a random size to the outbound data in an effort to make the entire packet more difficult to signature.
Figure 5 - This screenshot illustrates the malware attempting to read a file named %Temp%\IDPE988.tmp. This file was not available for analysis therefore the contents are unknown.