Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS)

As of July 28, 2023, Congress allowed the statutory authority for the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program (6 CFR Part 27) to expire. Therefore, CISA cannot enforce compliance with the CFATS regulations at this time.

The lapse of CFATS authorization means that CISA cannot require facilities to report their chemicals of interest or submit any information in CSAT, perform inspections, or provide CFATS compliance assistance, amongst other activities. CISA can no longer require facilities to implement their CFATS Site Security Plan or CFATS Alternative Security Program.

CISA encourages facilities to maintain security measures. CISA’s voluntary ChemLock resources are available on the ChemLock webpages.

If CFATS is reauthorized, CISA will follow up with facilities in the future. To reach us, please contact CFATS@hq.dhs.gov.

Impacts to our nation’s chemical security, the 3,200 facilities previously designated as high-risk, and the communities surrounding these locations—including the 7,000 schools, colleges, and universities located within a mile of these chemical facilities—as a result of the lapse include:

• CISA cannot inspect high-risk sites—on average, that's 160 inspections per month going unscheduled.
• CISA cannot conduct terrorist vetting on personnel who have access to dangerous chemicals—that's 9,000 names each month going unvetted.
• CISA cannot require the implementation of cyber and physical security measures or assess the risk to these facilities and the communities that surround them—on average, facilities improve their security posture by nearly 60% to comply with CFATS.
• CISA cannot identify new facilities that possess high-risk chemicals—meaning the locations of dangerous chemicals are unknown to CISA and local first responders.
• More than one third of inspections turn up security gaps—CISA can no longer address these gaps with facilities.
• More than 90% of CFATS visits result in confirmed outreach with law enforcement and the local fire department—CISA can no longer confirm these important relationships and ensure critical information sharing and preparedness.

Bottom line: CISA cannot ensure that chemical facilities are mitigating the terrorist exploitation of chemical holdings. Without CFATS, our tools to lessen the risk of such an attack are now limited. With the expiration of CFATS authorities, we have lost vital safeguards that were created to protect Americans from incidents of chemical terrorism.